REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2456-2457 OF 2014
[Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.16353-54 of 2012)
Polamrasetti
Manikyam & Anr. ..
Appellants
Versus
Teegala Venkata
Ramayya & Anr. ..
Respondents
J U D G M E N T
K. S.
RADHAKRISHNAN, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. We are, in this case,
concerned with the
interpretation of
Section 37 of
the Andhra Pradesh Court
Fees and Suits Valuation Act,
1956 (for short
“the Court Fees Act”) as to whether it authorizes the
valuation of the suit on the basis of the
sale consideration mentioned
in the sale deed
or to be valued on the basis of the market
value of
the property as
on the date of presentation of the
plaint for the
purpose of Court
Fee and jurisdiction.
3. Learned Single Judge of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court
in the
impugned
judgment placing reliance on the Full Bench judgment of the
Madras High Court in
Kolachala Kutumba Sastri
v. Lakkaraju Bala
Tripura
Sundaramma & Ors. AIR 1939 Mad.
462, and the Division
Bench
Judgment of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court
in Lakshminagar Housing
Welfare
Association v. Syed Sami @ Syed Samiuddin & Ors. (2010) 5 ALT
96, held that in a suit for cancellation of sale
deed, Court Fee has
to be determined
on the market value of the property as on the date of
presentation of
the plaint and not the value shown in
the registered
sale deed, the
legality of which is under challenge in these appeals.
4. The Appellants/Plaintiffs filed O.S. No.114
of 2008 on 21.7.2008
before the Court
of Junior Civil Judge, Kothavalasa, seeking,
inter
alia, the following reliefs :-
“(a) to cancel the alleged sale deed dated 2.8.2002
which was got
registered
as No.2496/05 by the Sub-Registrar, Kothavalasa
on
dt. 30
July, 2005 as the
orders of District
Registrar dt.
26.07.2005
as it was obtained fraudulently;
(b) direct the defendants to pay the cost of the
suit.”
5. Value of the suit for the purposes of Court
Fee and jurisdiction
was shown as the
value of the deed to be cancelled i.e.
Rs.1 lakh.
Court Fee of
Rs.3,426/- was paid under Section 37 of
the Court Fees
Act, deposited
vide Challan No.4239075
dated 29.7.2008. The
Appellants/Plaintiffs filed I.A. No.374 of 2008 under Order IX Rule 1
and 2
CPC for grant
of temporary injunction
restraining the
Respondents
therein from interfering with
peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the
property and also filed I.A.
No.375 of 2008
and
sought an order
restraining the Respondents from
operating the sale
deed until the
disposal of the suit. During enquiry
in I.A.
No.375
of 2008, the
Appellants/Plaintiffs got market value certificate dated
4.10.2002 as
Exh.A-6 showing the market value
of the property
as
Rs.19,36,000/-
by the year 2002 and contended that
the alleged sale
for Rs.1 lakh
was a fraudulent transaction. The Respondents
raised
an objection
that the Civil Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the
suit since the
Plaintiff’s case is that
the market value
of the
property is
more than Rs.1
lakh. It was
contended that for
cancellation of
sale deed, Court Fee has to
be calculated on the
current market
value, but not as per value shown
on the document.
Reliance was placed
on the judgment of
the Madras High
Court in
Kolachala Kutumba
Sastri (supra) and
T.S. Rajam Ammal
v. V.N.
Swaminathan
& Ors. AIR 1954 Mad.
152, wherein it was held that in a
suit for
cancellation of sale deed, Court Fee payable is on the market
value of the
property involved as on the date of the plaint and not on
the
consideration recited in it.
6. Learned Civil Judge vide his order
dated 25.11.2008 took
the
view that the
Court Fee has to be calculated as per the
market value
on the date of
presentation of the plaint and not
as per the
value
shown on the
document. Consequently, it was held
that the Court has
no pecuniary
jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the
plaint was
returned under
Order 7 Rule 10 CPC for presentation before the
proper
Court.
7. The Appellants/Plaintiffs, aggrieved by
the said
order, filed
C.M.A. No.2 of
2009 in the Court of
the Judge, Family Court-cum-
District and
Sessions Judge, Vizianagaram. The
appellate Court
dismissed the
appeal vide its order dated 29.10.2009 holding that the
Court below has
no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and
the plaint
was correctly
returned for presentation before the
appropriate Court
holding that the
Court Fee has to be calculated as
per the market
value of the
property as on the date of presentation of the plaint and
not on the value
shown in the registered sale deed.
8. The Appellant, aggrieved by the said order,
filed Civil Revision
Petition No.2539
of 2010 before the High Court
of Andhra Pradesh,
Hyderabad.
The learned Single Judge of
the Andhra Pradesh
High
Court, as already stated, placing
reliance on the
judgment of the
Madras High
Court in T.S. Rajam Ammal (supra) and also the Full Bench
decision of the
Madras High Court in Kolachala Kutumba Sastri
(supra)
and also a
Division Bench judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
Lakshminagar
Housing Welfare Association (supra), took the
view that
under Section 37
of the Court Fees Act, for cancellation of
the sale
deed the suit
has to be valued on the basis of the market value of the
property
governed by the sale deed on the date of presentation of the
plaint for the
purposes of Court Fee and jurisdiction and not
on the
basis of
sale consideration mentioned
in the sale
deed. The
appellants then filed a review petition
being Review CRP No.6557
of
2010 seeking
review of the judgment based on the
Judgment of this
Court in
Satheedevi v. Prasanna and another (2010)
5 SCC 622.
The
review petition
was, however, dismissed on
19.1.2011. Aggrieved by
the same, these
appeals have been preferred.
9. We are, in this case,
concerned with the
interpretation of
Section 37 of
the Court Fees Act, which reads as follows :-
“37.
Suits for cancellation of decrees, etc. – (1) In
a suit
for
cancellation of a decree for money or other property having
a money
value, or other document which purports or
operates to
create,
declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present
or in
future, any right, title or interest in money, movable or
immovable
property, fee shall be computed on the
value of the
subject
matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be
:-
a) If the
whole decree or
other document is
sought to be
cancelled, the amount or value of the property for which the
decree
was passed or other document was executed;
b) If a
part of the decree or other document
is sought to be
cancelled, such part of the amount or of
the value of the
property.
(2) If the decree or other document is such that
the liability
under it
cannot be split up and the relief claimed relates only
to a
particular item of property belonging to the
plaintiff or
to the
plaintiff’s share in any such property,
fee shall be
computed on
the value of such property, or
share or on the
amount of
the decree, whichever is less.
Explanation
: A suit to set aside an award shall be deemed to be
a suit for
cancellation of a decree within the meaning
of this
section.”
10. When the matter came up for hearing, the
learned counsel for
either side
brought to our knowledge a judgment
of this Court
in
Satheedevi
(supra) and submitted that a
similar issue came
up for
consideration in
the above-mentioned case while
interpreting Section
40 of the Kerala
Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1959,
which is
pari materia
with Section 37 of the Andhra Pradesh
Court Fees and
Suits Valuation
Act, 1956. While interpreting the scope
of Section 40
of the Kerala
Act, this Court had occasion to examine the
ratio laid
down by Full
Bench of the Madras High
Court in Kolachala
Kutumba
Sastri (supra)
and took the view that in the said
the interpretation
of Section
7(iv-a) of the Court Fee Act, as case,
the Madras High
Court was
primarily concerned with amended by the
Madras Act, which
refers to the
value of the
property simplicitor and
the Court
interpreted the
same as market value. It was pointed
out that the
Full Bench was
not called upon to interpret a provision
like Section
40 of the
Act. Consequently, it was held
that the ratio
of that
judgment cannot
be relied upon for the purpose of interpretation of
Section 40 of
the Act. While doing so, the Court also
opined that
the Division
Bench judgment of the Kerala
High Court in
Krishnan
Damodaran v.
Padmanabhan Parvathy 1972 KLT 774, P.K. Vasudeva Rao v.
K.C. Hari Menon
AIR 1982 Ker 35, Pachayammal v. Dwaraswamy Pillai 2006
(3) KLT 527
and the
learned Single Judge
judgments in Appikunju
Meerasayu v.
Meeran 1964 KLT 895 and Uma
Antherjanam v. Govindaru
Namboodiripad
1966 KLT 1046 do not lay down the correct law since the
High Court
had failed to
appreciate that the
legislature has
designedly used
a different language in Section 40 of the Act and the
term “market
value” has not been used therein.
11. We have already indicated that Section 40 of
the Kerala Act and
Section 37 of
the Court Fees
Act are pari
materia provisions.
Consequently,
the reasoning of this Court in Satheedevi (supra) could
be safely
applied when we interpret Section 37 of the Court Fees Act.
12. In Satheedevi (supra), this Court while
interpreting Section 40
of the Kerala
Act held as follows :-
“17.
Section 40 deals with suits for
cancellation of decrees,
etc. which
are not covered by other sections. If this section is
interpreted
in the light of the expression
“save as otherwise
provided”
used in Section 7(1), it becomes clear that
the rule
enshrined
therein is a clear departure from the one contained in
Section 7
read with Sections 25, 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45
and 48
which
provide for payment of court fee on the
market value of
the
property. In that sense, Section 40 contains a special rule.
18. Section
40(1) lays down that in a suit for cancellation of a
decree for
money or other property having a
money value, or
other
document which purports or operates
to create, declare,
assign,
limit or extinguish, whether
in the present
or in
future, any
right, title or
interest in money,
movable or
immovable
property, fee shall be computed on the
value of the
subject-matter
of the suit and further lays down that such value
shall be
deemed to be, if the whole decree or
other document
sought to
be cancelled, the amount or value of the property for
which the
decree was passed or other document was executed. If a
part of the
decree or other document is sought to be
cancelled,
such part
of the amount or value of the property constitute the
basis for
fixation of court fee. Sub-section (2) lays down that
if the decree or other document is
such that the liability under
it cannot
be split up and the relief claimed relates only
to a
particular
item of the property belonging to
the plaintiff or
the
plaintiff’s share in such property, fee shall be computed on
the value
of such property, or share or on
the amount of the
decree,
whichever is less.
19. The
deeming clause contained in the
substantive part of
Section 40(1)
makes it clear
that in a
suit filed for
cancellation of a document which creates
any right, title
or
interest in
immovable property, the court fee is required to be
computed on
the value of the property for which the document was
executed.
To put it differently, the value of the
property for
which the
document was executed and not its
market value is
relevant
for the purpose of court fee. If the expression
“value
of the
subject-matter of the suit” was
not followed by the
deeming
clause, it could possibly
be argued that
the word
“value”
means the market value, but by employing
the deeming
clause, the
legislature has made it clear that if
the document
is sought
to be cancelled, the amount of court
fee shall be
computed on
the value of the property for which the document was
executed
and not the market value of the property.
The words
“for which”
appearing between the words
“property” and “other
documents”
clearly indicate that the court fee is required to be
paid on the
value of the property mentioned in
the document,
which is the subject-matter of challenge.
20. If the
legislature intended that fee should
be payable on
the market
value of the subject-matter of the suit
filed for
cancellation of a document which purports or operates to create,
declare,
assign, limit or extinguish
any present or
future
right,
title and interest, then
it would have,
instead of
incorporating the requirement of payment of fees on the value of
subject-matter, specifically provided for
payment of court fee
on the
market value of the subject-matter of
the suit as has
been done
in respect of other
types of suits
mentioned in
Sections
25, 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45 and 48. The legislature may
have
also, instead of
using the expression
“value of the
property for which
the document was
executed”, used the
expression
“value of the property
in respect of
which the
document
was executed”. However, the fact of the matter is that
in Section
40(1) the legislature has
designedly not used
the
expression
“market value of the property”.
13. Applying the above reasoning, this Court
in Satheedevi (supra)
upheld the view
expressed by learned
Single Judge of
the Andhra
Pradesh High
Court in Allam
Venkateswara Reddy v.
Golla
Venkatanarayana
AIR 1975 AP 122 and the Division Bench judgment of the
Madras High
Court in Venkata Narasimha Raju v. Chaandrayya
AIR 1927
Mad 825,
Navaraja v. Kaliappa Gounder (1967) 80 Mad
LW 19 (SN)
and
Arunachalathammal v. Sudalaimuthu Pillai (1968) 83
Mad LW 789
and
ruled that those
judgments have laid down the correct law.
14. This Court in Satheedevi (supra), therefore,
gave its
seal of
approval to the
judgment of learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in
Allam Venkateswara Reddy (supra), wherein learned Single
Judge took the
view that in a suit for cancellation of sale deed which
was executed for
a specified amount, the Court Fee has to be
paid on
that amount and
not on the basis of the market value of
the property
at the
presentation of the plaint.
15. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in the impugned
judgment, while
interpreting
Section 37 of the Court Fees Act, placed reliance on the
Division Bench
judgment in Lakshminagar Housing Welfare
Association
(supra), wherein
the Bench, as already indicated, placed
reliance on
the Full Bench
judgment of the Madras High Court in Kolachala
Kutumba
Sastri (supra),
though a reference was made to
the learned Single
Judge Bench
judgment in Allam Venkateswara Reddy (supra).
Since we
are in agreement
with the reasoning in Satheedevi (supra),
which has
given its seal
of approval to the reasoning of
the learned Single
Judge judgment
of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Allam
Venkateswara
Reddy (supra),
the judgment of the Division
Bench in Lakshminagar
Housing Welfare
Association (supra) is no more good law.
16. We are of the view, Section 37 of the
Court Fees Act,
which
deals with the
suits for cancellation of decrees etc. is not
governed
by other
Sections of the Court Fees Act, such as Section 7 and
other
related provisions.
If Section 37
of the Court
Fees Act is
interpreted in
the light of the expression
“save as otherwise
provided” used
in Section 7 of the Court Fees Act,
it becomes clear
that the rule
enshrined therein is a clear departure
from the one
contained in
Section 7 read with Sections 24, 26, 28, 29, 34, 35, 42
and 45, which
provide for payment of Court Fee on the market value of
the
property. In that context, we are also
of the view that Section
37 is stand
alone provision, wherein the legislature has
designedly
not used the
expression “market value of the property”.
Section 37
of the Court
Fees Act, therefore, contains a special rule for valuing
the property for
the purpose of Court Fee and jurisdiction and
we do
not see any
reason why the expression “value of the property” used in
Section 37 be
substituted with the expression
“market value of the
property”.
17. In such circumstances, we are inclined to
set aside the judgment
of the High
Court and allow these appeals.
Consequently, the orders
passed by the
appellate Court as well as the High
Court would stand
quashed. The trial Court is directed to proceed with
the suit in
accordance with
law and the declaration made by this Court.
18. The Appeals are, accordingly, allowed. However, there will
be
no order as to
costs.
eard Hear……………………………..J.
(K. S. Radhakrishnan)
eard Hear……………………………..J.
(Vikramajit Sen)
New Delhi,
February 19,
2014.
