Wednesday 29 October 2014

Erring Officials who commit errors by altering entries in the ROR without following the due procedure should not be with leniently – The party who has been put to irreparable loss and mental agony be compensated by paying the compensation amount by the state in the first instance and recovering the same from the officers responsible for the same



ALT 2014(1) ALT Vol CLXXXVII 15th February 2014 Part-4. Index

Page- 16 : Quotable Points – Erring Officials who commit errors by altering entries in the ROR without following the due procedure should not be with leniently – The party who has been put to  irreparable loss and mental agony be compensated by paying the compensation amount by the state in the first instance and recovering the same from the officers responsible for the same. –HC 123

in case of accident the liability is on the person who purchased on the vehicle as per sale of goods act though registration is not transferred on his name.



MACMA- 674 of 208 decided on 02-03-209 High Court of A.P- 2011 ACJ 1076    Uppala Muralidhar Rao, Vs K.Bla Krishna Reddy and others. The transfer of ownership of a vehicle is matter governed not by the MV Act but by the provisions of the sale of goods act. Transfer made in accordance with the sale of Goods act must preceded registration certificate and that certificate is not document of title. It  follows therefore that, what is essence is the actual transfer of the property in the vehicle and not the certificate of registration.  Therefore in case of accident the liability is on the person who purchased on the vehicle as per sale of goods act though registration is not transferred on his name.

No person can sink well within a distance of (250) meters from the Public drinking water source without obtaining permission from the competent authority



Sinking of Well - No person can sink well within a distance of (250) meters from the Public drinking water source without obtaining permission from the competent authority under section 10 of WALTA Act 2002.- 2013(6) ALT 280 (D.B) W.P .No. 27989 of 2013 date 26-09-2013

Celluor Towers cannot be erected on roof tops of multi stories apartments/buildings which endanger the building or the lives o residents therein



Celluor Towers cannot be erected on roof tops of multi stories apartments/buildings which endanger the building or the lives o residents therein -2013(6) ALT 493(D.B) W.P. No.23228 of 2007. P.Varalaxmi Vs Commissioner &Spl. Officer, GHMC, HYd.

mere utterance of caste name does not constitute offence under sc/st act



2013 (2) ALD (Crl.) 535 (AP) – Anticipatory bail in SC/ST Cases- Section 18 discussed. – mere utterance of caste name does not constitute offence. 2013 vol. clxxxv 15th October, 2013(5) ALT

Land Assigned to Ex-Servicemen under DKT patta can be permitted to be alienated after 10 years of assignment



ALT 2013 (3) 500 WP 38504 of 2012 date 21-12-2012 – Land Assigned to Ex-Servicemen under DKT patta can be permitted to be alienated after 10 years of assignment

mere digging of earth for purpose not connected with the mining activity cannot result in obligation to pay Seigniorage fee



ALT 2013 (3) 602 WP 3813 of 2012 date 22-12-2012 - Seigniorage fee not required for building constructions – mere digging of earth for purpose not connected with the mining activity cannot result in obligation to pay Seigniorage fee

Suit for cancellation of document which creates any right, title or interest in immovable property – Value of property for which document was executed and not, its market value is irrelevant for the purposed of the Court Fee.,



AIR 2010 Supreme Court 2777 Civil Appeal No. 4347 of 2010 arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 3597 of 2009 (Kerala) –Court Fee- Determination of market value of Property – Suit for cancellation of document which creates any right, title or interest  in immovable property – Value of property for which document was executed and not, its market value is irrelevant for the purposed of the Court Fee.,

proper Fee Payable in appeal or suit. – Only pleadings made in the plaint or WS are to taken into consideration to decide the proper court fee payable.



ALT 2013(3)  - 301 (D.B), 15TH May 2013 – CCCA NO. 225 of 2008 date 22-08-2012.
A.P. Court Fee and Suit Valuation Act, 1956 – section  11 and 34 – proper Fee Payable in appeal or suit. – Only pleadings made in the plaint or WS are to taken into consideration to decide the proper court fee payable.

Tahasildar has no jurisdiction to issue Family Member certificate



2013(5) ALT 489- WP no. 12441 of 2010 25-04-2013 d.leelavathi vs director of mines
Tahasildar has no jurisdiction to issue Family Member certificate

Court has power to grant permission to non-lawyers to plead/argue cases in certain special circumstances and if such circumstances exist in particulate case



Court has power to grant permission to non-lawyers to plead/argue cases in certain special circumstances and if such circumstances exist in particulate case HC-578-2014(3) ALT       Part-11                             01-06-2014(CLXXXIX)---------CRP 2191 of 2012 date 23-12-2013APHC.

Judge who passed an order in his judicial capacity cannot be made party in any proceedings filed against such order


Impleadment of Judge- Judge who passed an order in his judicial capacity cannot be made party in any proceedings filed against such order. HC-590-2014(3) ALT       Part-11                             01-06-2014(CLXXXIX)---------WP 6603 of 201 4 date 25-02-2014 A.PHC  Varuana Investment Port Louis Ms/ Asian Infrastructure

The Principal Courts having power to make over cases filed before them to other courts for disposal shall group the identical cases and transfer them to a single court as far as possible to avoid conflicting judgments



Transfers of Cases- The Principal Courts having power to make over cases filed before them to other courts for disposal shall group the identical cases and transfer them to a single court as far as possible to avoid conflicting judgments. 2014(5)ALT 559- MACMA 564 of 2009  date 09-06-2014, National insurance company Yanam vs muthyala bhaskara suraknathamma

If a contract contains any stipulation for transfer of property in case of breach of such contract, which is in the nature of penalty, the contract cannot be enforced




Contract – If a contract contains any stipulation for transfer of property in case of breach of such contract, which is in the nature of penalty, the contract cannot be enforced 2014(5)ALT 608- CRP 1578 of 2009 and AS 2443 of 1999 date 27-12-2013 M. Ali baig Vs Kottalla Sanjeeva Reddy (Case on - Loan repayment agreement- in case of failure to get land registered on his name)

The property obtained by the coparcener on partition is ancestral joint family property in which sons born to him or adopted by him subsequently have rights of partition therein



Ancestral Property – The property obtained by the coparcener on partition is ancestral joint family property in which sons born to him or adopted by him subsequently have rights of partition therein.2014(5)ALT 473- AS 999/1995 and Trl.A.S.88/2010 date 28-04-2014 –agina chandra moulli vs agina varamma

Statutory bail application shall be decided on the same day when it is filed


Application for statutory bail has to be decided on same date it is filed – SC 3952-Cr.A.No. 786/2010 Date: 30-06-2014- Union of India through CBI Vs Nirala Yadava – 2014 Crl.L.J 3952

Saturday 18 October 2014

Inrerim Bail, during pendency of bail petition- and Article by Additional Director, Tamilnadu, State Judicial Director

Bail Pending Petition for Bail

S. Mohamed Abdahir, M.Com., M.L.,
Additional Director,
Tamil Nadu State Judicial Academy



(1) Chapter 33, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) deals with procedure
and powers of the court to grant bail. Sections 436 and 437 CrPC pertain to bail
in cases involving bailable and non-bailable offences. Section 170(1) CrPC
enables the station house officer / investigating officer to admit an accused
person, under arrest for committing a bailable offence, to bail, if he’s able to give
security for his appearance before the Magistrate. If the police produce him or he
appears before the Magistrate, he may seek bail as a matter of right u/s 436.
The Magistrate may release the accused with or without surety. In case the
accused fails to appear as per the terms of the bail bond, the Magistrate may
refuse him bail when he appears subsequently. Ref: Section 436(2). Thus
Section 436 CrPC is the Magistrate’s domain of bail power.
(2) Section 437 CrPC is about the Magistrate’s power to issue bail in cases of nonbailable
offence. Which power doesn’t extend to releasing the accused, if the
offence involved is punishable with death or imprisonment for life. However, the
Magistrate may free the accused on bail, even in such cases, provided, at any
stage of the investigation inquiry or trial, he feels no reasonable grounds exist to
believe that the person accused committed a non-bailable offence. Ref: Section
437(2). In the context, Prahalad /vs/ NCT, 2001 (Cri LJ) 1730 (SC) is relevant.
In para (11), pages (1733) & (1734) the Supreme Court declares the law:
“We would reiterate that in cases where the offence is
punishable with death or imprisonment for life which is triable
..1
exclusively by a court of Sessions, the Magistrate may, in his
wisdom, refrain to exercise the powers of granting the bail and
refer the accused to approach the higher courts unless he is
fully satisfied that there is no reasonable ground for
believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence
punishable with death or imprisonment for life”.
(Emphasis Supplied)
Thus, Section 437CrPC is also the sphere of magisterial powers to grant or
refuse bail.
(3) Section 438 CrPC relates to the High Court’s and the Sessions Court’s power to
grant anticipatory bail. That’s bail preceding to or in anticipation of arrest; and it
becomes effective from the moment of arrest. Pending the application for
anticipatory bail, the court may issue an interim order of bail as dealt with in
Section 438(1) substituted by Act 25/2005. Final orders shall be passed after
notice to the Public Prosecutor and the superintendent of police and on hearing
them. If the court rejects the accused’s plea for interim bail or his application for
anticipatory bail, the police are free to arrest him without warrant. In Siddharam
/vs/ State, (2011) 1 SCC 694, the Supreme Court has cleared the law as to
anticipatory bail of all confusion holding certain of its previous rulings, limiting the
period of such bail as well as forcing the accused to seek regular bail at the
expiry of the period, as per incurium.
(4) Section 439 CrPC is on the High Court’s and the Sessions Court’s power to
release the accused on bail in custody. Evident as it is that Sections 436, 437
and 439 are repository of powers of the court to release the accused in custody
on bail. That’s post-arrest. As seen above, the newly substituted Section 438
expressly provides for interim bail pending disposal of the plea for anticipatory
..2
bail. It’s a welcome provision as the accused faces the threat of arrest before his
application for the bail is decided. Also, it’s consistent with the concept of
fundamental right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Interim bail may be granted when the court is satisfied that the object of the
accusation against accused is to injure his reputation and humiliate him. It’s an
effective check against unscrupulous exercise of the arrest power by the police.
(5) An important situation lies post-arrest. That’s the time gap between the police
taking the accused into custody, producing him before the Magistrate and the
Magistrate granting remand. May be for a simple non-bailable offence or for an
offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. A specific example: the
police officer adds the charge of attempt to murder punishable u/s 307 IPC to a
simple case of voluntarily causing hurt u/s 323 or 324 IPC. In such a case, the
Magistrate may be reluctant to look into the records and apply Section 437(2) for
the reason the offence is triable exclusively by a Court of Session. Leaving alone
Section 307 IPC, if the police adds 506(2) IPC (Criminal intimidation), usually the
Magistrate remands the accused to custody, posting his application for bail for
consideration to a later date to hear the prosecution. In the situation, the
accused is forced to remain in detention/judicial custody. It’s a grey area in the
sense that generally courts keep off their hands when the investigation is at the
threshold. The object is to ensure independent / impartial process of
investigation. Taking advantage of this, the police whimsically add penal
provisions joining hands with vengeful complainants / private parties to humiliate
the accused by sending him to jail. Instances in this regard are quite common.
(6) No express provision for interim bail in Sections 437 or 439 CrPC. Of course
Section 437(2) hints at such a power, but not in explicit terms. Even to exercise
the power thereunder, the Magistrate may order notice to the prosecution in
..3
which case the accused under arrest can’t avoid detention in jail. Thus, the
interim bail regime becomes relevant even in post-arrest matters, leaving alone
the interim bail provision in Section 438 CrPC. Life bereft of liberty is without
honour and dignity. It losses all significance. And the life itself will not be worth
living. That’s the reason why liberty is held the very quintessence of a civilized
existence. Without the right to life with liberty, no other right can be enjoyed. Ref:
Siddaram’s case (Supra). In Sukhwant Singh /vs/ State, (2009) 7 SCC 559: 2009
(3) SCC (Cri) 487, the Supreme Court filled the gap in Sections 437 and 439
holding that in the power to grant bail is inherent the power to order interim bail,
Which means the court hearing a plea for regular bail has inherent power to order
interim bail, pending final disposal of the bail application. For this, the Supreme
Court relied on one of its earlier rulings. That’s Lal Kamlendra /vs/ State, (2009)
4 SCC 437 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 330.
(7) Here’s a quote from Para (2) and (3) of Sukwant’s case referred to just above.
“….following the decision of this Court in Kamlendra Pratap
Singh /vs/ State of U.P.1 we reiterate that a court hearing a
regular bail application has got inherent power to grant interim
bail pending final disposal of the bail application. In our opinion,
this is the proper view in view of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India which protects the life and liberty of every person……. ..
When a person applies for regular bail then the court
concerned ordinarily lists that application after a few days
so that it can look into the case diary which has to be obtained
(1) (2009) 4 SCC 437 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 330
..4
from the police authorities and in the meantime the applicant
has to go to jail. Even if the applicant is released on bail
thereafter, his reputation may be tarnished irreparably in
society. The reputation of a person is his valuable asset, and is
a facet of his right under Article 21 of the Constitution vide
Deepak Bajaj /vs/ State of Maharashtra.2 Hence, we are of the
opinion that in the power to grant bail there is inherent power in
the court concerned to grant interim bail to a person pending
final disposal of the bail application.”
(8) Section 167 CrPC mandates the investigating officer to transmit the accused
under arrest to the nearest Judicial Magistrate, if two conditions are
satisfied. One, he can’t complete the investigation within 24 hours. Two,
“there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is wellfounded”.
With the accused, he has to submit a copy of the entries in his
diary to the Magistrate. Needless to pinpoint that before issuing an order
of remand to custody, the Magistrate is not to be swayed by the penal
provisions under which the investigating officer booked the accused. The
Magistrate must look into the records and satisfy himself, primafacie, with
the nature of the accusation. The Magistrate is repository of the rights of
the citizens. The vital power to remand an accused citizen to custody is
entrusted to him, not even to a judge of the Supreme Court or High
Court. If the power is exercised disregarding the mandate of law, the
right to life and liberty will be in danger of extinction. And in the process,
the Magistrate who’s the protector of the rights of the citizens will become
the predator of the rights.
(2) (2008) 16 SCC 14 : JT (2008) 11 SC 609
..5
(9) Overall, wherever it’s expedient, the Magistrate/court shouldn’t hesitate to
exercise the power to issue interim bail. Such exercise of the power will
effectively deter abuse of the process of criminal law for objects extraneous to
its cause.
******
..6

Apex Court's recommendations- Remedial measures to tackle with the problem of ragging in educational institutions.



The Supreme Court of India Order May 2007
(based on Raghavan Committee Recommendations)
[Reproduced verbatim from the Supreme Court of India website]
ITEM NO.33
COURT NO.4
SECTION XIA
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).24295/2004

(From the judgement and order dated 24/06/2004 in WP No. 30845/2003 of the HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM)

UNIVERSITY OF KERALA Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

COUNCIL,PRINCIPALS,COLLEGES,KERALA & ORS Respondent(s)

(With appln(s) for intervention and modification and directions and impleadment as party respondent and with prayer for interim relief and office report)

WITH SLP(C) NO. 14356 of 2005 (With appln.(s) for exemption from filing O.T. and c/delay in filing counter affidavit and office report)

W.P.(CRL.) NO. 173 of 2006 (With appln.(s) for directions and exemption from filing O.T. and urging addl. ground and with office report)

SLP(C) NO. 24296-24299 of 2004 (With prayer for interim relief and office report)

Date: 16/05/2007
These Petitions were called on for hearing today. 
CORAM : 
HON'BLE Dr. JUSTICE ARIJIT PASAYAT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.H. KAPADIA





UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following ORDER 

We have perused the Report of the Committee constituted pursuant to this Court's order to suggest remedial measures to tackle with the problem of ragging in educational institutions. 

An elaborate report has been submitted by the Committee headed by Dr.R.K. Raghavan. According to the Committee, the following factors need to be focused to tackle with the problem:

1.     Primary responsibility for curbing ragging rests with academic institutions themselves.
2.     Ragging adversely impacts the standards of higher education.
3.     Incentives should be available to institutions for curbing the menace and there should be disincentives for failure to do so.
4.     Enrolment in academic pursuits or a campus life should not immunize any adult citizen from penal provisions of the laws of the land. 
5.     Ragging needs to be perceived as failure to inculcate human values from the schooling stage.
6.     Behavioural patterns among students, particularly potential 'raggers', need to be identified.
7.     Measures against ragging must deter its recurrence. 
8.     Concerted action is required at the level of the school, higher educational institution, district administration, university, State and Central Governments to make any curb effective. 
9.     Media and the Civil Society should be involved in this exercise.
The Committee has made several recommendations. For the present, we feel that the following recommendations should be implemented without any further lapse of time.
1.     The punishment to be meted out has to be exemplary and justifiably harsh to act as a deterrent against recurrence of such incidents. 
2.     Every single incident of ragging where the victim or his parent/guardian or the Head of institution is not satisfied with the institutional arrangement for action, a First Information Report must be filed without exception by the institutional authorities with the local police authorities. Any failure on the part of the institutional authority or negligence or deliberate delay in lodging the FIR with the local police shall be construed to be an act of culpable negligence on the part of the institutional authority. If any victim or his parent/guardian of ragging intends to file FIR directly with the police, that will not absolve the institutional authority from the requirement of filing the FIR. 
3.     Courts should make an effort to ensure that cases involving ragging are taken up on a priority basis to send the correct message that ragging is not only to be discourages but also to be dealt with sternness.
4.     In addition, we direct that the possibility of introducing in the educational curriculum a subject relating to ragging shall be explored by the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) and the respective State Council of Educational Research and Training (SCERT). This aspect can be included in the teaching of the subjects "Human Rights".
5.     In the prospectus to be issued for admission by educational institutions, it shall be clearly stipulated that in case the applicant for admission is found to have indulged in ragging in the past or if it is noticed later that he has indulged in ragging, admission may be refused or he shall be expelled from the educational institution. 
6.     The Central Government and the State Governments shall launch a programme giving wide publicity to the menace of ragging and the consequences which follow in case any student is detected to have been involved in ragging.
7.     It shall be the collective responsibility of the authorities and functionaries of the concerned institution and their role shall also be open to scrutiny for the purpose of finding out whether they have taken effective steps for preventing ragging and in case of their failure, action can be taken; for example, denial of any grant-in-aid or assistance from the State Governments.
8.     Anti-ragging committees and squads shall be forthwith formed by the institutions and it shall be the job of the committee or the squad, as the case may be, to see that the Committee's recommendations, more particularly those noted above, are observed without exception and if it is noticed that there is any deviation, the same shall be forthwith brought to the notice of this Court. 
9.     The Committee constituted pursuant to the order of this Court shall continue to monitor the functioning of the anti-ragging committees and the squads to be formed. They shall also monitor the implementation of the recommendations to which reference has been made above. 
Post these matters in September, 2007 for further directions on the recommendations received from the Committee.

I.A.No.5/2007 in S.L.P.(C) No.24295/2004:

Issue notice.

Response, if any, by the University shall be filed within four weeks.

Rejoinder, if any, within four weeks thereafter. Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, learned amicus curiae shall also indicate his views.

Writ Petition (Crl.) No.173/2006: List this petition separately in September, 2007.

(N. Annapurna) (Madhu Saxena)
Court Master Court Master

Friday 17 October 2014

Bail by Magistrates in Sessions Cases- Interpretation of Section 437 Cr.P.C- Apex Court's Judgment .

CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 324  of  2001



PETITIONER:
PRAHLAD SINGH BHATI

    Vs.

RESPONDENT:
N.C.T., DELHI & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:    23/03/2001

BENCH:
K.T. Thomas & R.P. Sethi.




JUDGMENT:


SETHI,J.

    Leave granted.
L...I...T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J

    Respondent    NO.2,  who is alleged to have  murdered     his
wife  and  against whom FIR No.566/92 was registered in     the
Police    Station Lajpat Nagar under Section 302 of the Indian
Penal  Code,  was  released  on     bail  by  the    Metropolitan
Magistrate,  New  Delhi on 22nd August, 2000.  The  revision
filed  against    the aforesaid order has been dismissed by  a
learned     Single     Judge    of  the     High  Court  by  passing  a
telegraphic  order to the effect "having considered the case
before    me  I am of the opinion no ground has been made     for
cancellation  of bail".     Not satisfied with the order of the
Magistrate  and     that of the High Court, the father  of     the
deceased has approached this Court in this appeal by special
leave.

    The     deceased  and the respondent No.2 were     married  on
24.11.1984.   She  is  alleged    to have     been  subjected  to
ill-treatment  on account of demand for dowry.    Huge amounts
are stated to have been paid by the appellant to the accused
on  various occasions.    On 18.3.1999 the respondent No.2  is
alleged     to have brought the deceased to her parental  house
on  Scooter No.DL 9SC-0680 where he poured kerosene oil     and
burnt  her alive in the presence of her parents.  As no case
was registered against the accused, the appellant approached
higher    authorities  including the Prime Minister of  India,
Home  Minister    of India and Commissioner of Police,  Delhi,
with  the  result that Deputy Commissioner of Police  (South
District)  directed the registration of case under  Sections
306  and  498A    IPC.   After registration  of  the  case  on
3.6.1999,  the investigating officer recorded the statements
of  witnesses  under  Section 161 of the  Code    of  Criminal
Procedure.   The accused-respondent moved an application for
grant  of  anticipatory bail in terms of Section 438 of     the
Code  of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the
Code").      As the bail application was not seriously  opposed
by  the Investigating Agency, the Additional Sessions Judge,
New  Delhi granted interim bail on 16.6.1999.    Applications
for  cancellation  of the anticipatory bail were  dismissed.
However,  while dismissing such an application on 13.9.1999,
the  Additional     Sessions Judge observed that if on facts  a
case  under Section 302 is made out against the accused, the
State  shall  be  at liberty to arrest him.  On     1.7.2000  a
charge-     sheet was filed against the accused under  Sections
302, 406 and 498A IPC by the investigating agency and he was
directed  to appear before the Metropolitan Magistrate,     New
Delhi  on  8.8.2000.  As he did not appear on that  date  in
that  court,  non bailable warrants were issued against     him
for  22nd  August,  2000.  In the meanwhile  the  respondent
filed a criminal miscellaneous application under Section 482
of  the     Code  in  the High  Court  without  impleading     the
appellant  as a party.    The High Court kept the order of the
Magistrate  dated  8.8.2000  in abeyance till  22nd  August,
2000.    In his petition filed in the High Court, the accused
suppressed  the     fact that a charge-sheet under Section     302
has  been  filed against him.  Notice to the  appellant     was
issued    on  17th  August,  2000     but  in  the  meantime     the
respondent  moved  an application under Section 438  of     the
Code  for  anticipatory bail before the Additional  Sessions
Judge, Delhi for which no order was passed and direction was
issued    to the accused to first appear before the Magistrate
on  22nd  August, 2000 and pray for bail in accordance    with
law.   When  he     appeared  before  the    Magistrate,  he     was
admitted  on bail even in a case under Section 302 IPC.     The
revision  petition filed in the High Court was dismissed  in
the manner as noticed hereinbefore.

    From  the  facts, as narrated in the appeal, it  appears
that  even for an offence punishable under Section 302    IPC,
the respondent-accused was never arrested and he manipulated
the  prevention of his arrest firstly by obtaining an  order
in  terms  of  Section 438 of the Code    and  subsequently  a
regular      bail    under  Section    437  of     the  Code  from   a
Magistrate.

    Chapter XXXIII relates to the provisions as to bails and
bonds.    Section 436 provides that when any person accused of
a  bailable offence is arrested or detained without  warrant
by  an officer incharge of the police station, or appears or
is  brought before a court and is prepared at any time while
in  the     custody  of  such officer or at any  stage  of     the
proceedings  before  such  court to give bail,    such  person
shall  be  released on bail.  Under Section 437 of the    Code
when a person accused of, or suspected of, the commission of
any  non-bailable  offence is arrested or  detained  without
warrant     by  an     officer in charge of a     police     station  or
appears     or is brought before a court, he may be released on
bail  by  a  court other than the High    Court  and  Sessions
subject to the conditions that he does not reasonably appear
to  have been guilty of an offence punishable with death  or
imprisonment  for life.     The condition of not releasing     the
person on bail charged with an offence punishable with death
or  imprisonment  for life shall not be applicable  if    such
person is under the age of 16 years or is a woman or is sick
or infirm, subject to such conditions as may be imposed.  It
does  not, however, mean that persons specified in the first
proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 437 should necessarily
be  released on bail.  The proviso is an enabling  provision
which confers jurisdiction upon a court, other than the High
Court and the court of Sessions, to release a person on bail
despite     the  fact that there appears reasonable ground     for
believing  that     such person has been guilty of     an  offence
punishable with death or imprisonment for life.     There is no
gainsaying  that the discretion conferred by the Code has to
be  exercised judicially.  Section 438 of the Code  empowers
the   High  Court  and    the   Court  of     Sessions  to  grant
anticipatory  bail  to a person who apprehends    his  arrest,
subject     to  the conditions specified under sub-section     (2)
thereof.

    Even  though  there is no legal bar for a Magistrate  to
consider an application for grant of bail to a person who is
arrested  for  an offence exclusively triable by a court  of
Sessions yet it would be proper and appropriate that in such
a case the Magistrate directs the accused person to approach
the Court of Sessions for the purposes of getting the relief
of  bail.  Even in a case where any Magistrate opts to    make
an  adventure of exercising the powers under Section 437  of
the  Code  in respect of a person who is, suspected  of     the
commission of such an offence, arrested and detained in that
connection,  such  Magistrate has to specifically  negtivate
the  existence of reasonable ground for believing that    such
accused is guilty of an offence punishable with the sentence
of  death  or imprisonment for life.  In a case,  where     the
Magistrate  has no occasion and in fact does not find,    that
there were no reasonable grounds to believe that the accused
had  not  committed  the offence punishable  with  death  or
imprisonment  for  life, he shall be deemed to be having  no
jurisdiction to enlarge the accused on bail.

    Powers  of    the  Magistrate,   while  dealing  with     the
applications  for  grant  of  bail,  are  regulated  by     the
punishment  prescribed for the offence in which the bail  is
sought.      Generally speaking if punishment prescribed is for
imprisonment  for life and death penalty and the offence  is
exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, Magistrate has
no  jurisdiction to grant bail unless the matter is  covered
by  the     provisos attached to Section 437 of the Code.     The
limitations   circumscribing   the   jurisdiction   of     the
Magistrate   are  evident  and     apparent.   Assumption      of
jurisdiction to entertain the application is distinguishable
from the exercise of the jurisdiction.

    The     jurisdiction  to grant bail has to be exercised  on
the  basis  of well settled principles having regard to     the
circumstances  of each case and not in an arbitrary  manner.
While  granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind     the
nature    of  accusations, the nature of evidence     in  support
thereof,  the  severity of the punishment  which  conviction
will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of
the  accused,  circumstances  which   are  peculiar  to     the
accused,  reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the  accused  at the trial, reasonable apprehension  of     the
witnesses  being tampered with, the larger interests of     the
public    or  State and similar other considerations.  It     has
also  to  be kept in mind that for the purposes of  granting
the  bail  the    Legislature has used the  words     "reasonable
grounds for believing" instead of "the evidence" which means
the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it
as  to    whether there is a genuine case against the  accused
and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie
evidence  in support of the charge.  It is not excepted , at
this  stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt  of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

    In    the instant case while exercising the  jurisdiction,
apparently  under Section 437 of the Code, the    Metropolitan
Magistrate  appears  to     have completely ignored  the  basic
principles  governing  the  grant of bail.   The  Magistrate
referred  to  certain facts and the provisions of law  which
were  not, in any way, relevant for the purposes of deciding
the application for bail in a case where accused was charged
with  an  offence punishable with death or imprisonment     for
life.    The  mere  initial grant of  anticipatory  bail     for
lesser offence, did not entitle the respondent to insist for
regular     bail  even  if     he was     subsequently  found  to  be
involved  in the case of murder.  Neither Section 437(5) nor
Section     439(1)     of  the Code was attracted.  There  was  no
question  of  cancellation  of bail earlier granted  to     the
accused     for an offence punishable under Sections 498A,     306
and  406  IPC.    The Magistrate committed a  irregularity  by
holding that "I do not agree with the submission made by the
Ld.Prosecutor in as much as if we go by his submissions then
the accused would be liable for arrest every time the charge
is  altered or enhanced at any stage, which is certainly not
the  spirit  of law".  With the change of the nature of     the
offence,  the  accused    becomes disentitled to    the  liberty
granted     to  him  in  relation to a minor  offence,  if     the
offence     is  altered  for an aggravated crime.     Instead  of
referring  to  the  grounds which entitled  the     respondent-
accused     the  grant of bail, the Magistrate adopted a  wrong
approach  to confer him the benefit of liberty on  allegedly
finding     that  no grounds were made out for cancellation  of
bail.

    Despite  the involvement of important questions of    law,
the  High  Court failed in its obligation to adjudicate     the
pleas  of law raised before it and dismissed the petition of
the  appellant    by a one sentence order.  The orders of     the
Magistrate  as also of the High Court being contrary to     law
are liable to be set aside.

    While  allowing this appeal and setting aside the orders
impugned  we  permit  the respondent-accused  to  apply     for
regular bail in the trial court.  If any such application is
filed,    the same shall be disposed of on its merits  keeping
in  view  the  position     of law and  the  observations    made
hereinabove.   We  would reiterate that in cases  where     the
offence     is  punishable with death or imprisonment for    life
which  is  triable exclusively by a court of  Sessions,     the
Magistrate  may,  in  his wisdom, refrain  to  exercise     the
powers    of  granting  the  bail and  refer  the     accused  to
approach the higher courts unless he is fully satisfied that
there is no reasonable ground for believing that the accused
has  been  guilty  of an offence punishable  with  death  or
imprisonment for life.









 

Wednesday 15 October 2014

Measures for Prevention of fatal accidents of small children due to their falling into abandoned bore wells and tube wells

                   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                     CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

                  WRIT PETITION (C) NO.36 OF 2009

In Re:

Measures for Prevention of fatal accidents of small children
due to their falling into abandoned bore wells and tube wells


Union of India and Ors.                                         ...Respondent(s)



                                O     R    D   E    R


         With    this     Court     issuing        requisite      guidelines     vide

order    dated     11th       February,        2010,       subject       to    slight

modification, nothing survives in the present writ petition.

         That modification is as follows:

           (i)          The owner of the land/premises, before
           taking any steps for constructing bore well/
           tube well must inform in writing at least 15
           days in advance to the concerned authorities in
           the    area,       i.e.,       District       Collector/     District
           Magistrate/Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat/any
           other Statutory Authority/concerned officers of
           the Department of Ground Water/Public Health/
           Municipal          Corporation,          as    the    case    may   be,
           about the construction of bore well/tube well.


           (ii)         Registration           of        all     the     drilling
           agencies,                  namely,                   Government/Semi
           Government/Private               etc.     should      be     mandatory
           with         the    district        administration/Statutory
           Authority wherever applicable.
                                                                          ....2/-
                            - 2 -
(iii)     Erection of signboard at the time of
construction near the well with the following
details :-
       (a) Complete address of the drilling agency
at the time of construction/rehabilitation of
well.
       (b) Complete        address      of     the       user
agency/owner of the well.


(iv)      Erection of barbed wire fencing or any
other suitable barrier around the well during
construction.


(v)       Construction            of     cement/concrete
platform measuring 0.50x0.50x0.60 meter (0.30
meter above ground level and 0.30 meter below
ground level) around the well casing.


(vi)      Capping     of   well     assembly   by    welding
steel plate or by providing a strong cap to be
fixed to the casing pipe with bolts & nuts.


(vii)     In case of pump repair, the tube well
should not be left uncovered.


(viii)    Filling of mud pits and channels after
completion of works.


(ix)      Filling     up     abandoned       borewells     by
clay/sand/boulders/pebbles/drill             cuttings    etc.
from bottom to ground level.


                                                     ....3/-
                                 - 3 -
(x) On completion of the drilling operations at
a   particular         location,      the   ground    conditions
are    to    be       restored   as   before    the    start   of
drilling.


(xi)        District Collector should be empowered
to verify that the above guidelines are being
followed and proper monitoring check about the
status of boreholes/tubewells are being taken
care        through       the     concerned     State/Central
Government agencies.


(xii)       District/Block/Village            wise    status   of
bore wells/tubewells drilled viz. No. of wells
in use, No. of abandoned bore wells/tube wells
found open,No. of abandoned borewells/tubewells
properly filled up to ground level and balance
number of abandoned borewells/tubewells to be
filled up to ground level is to be maintained
at District Level.
In rural areas, the monitoring of the above is
to be done through Village Sarpanch and the
Executive from the Agriculture Department.
In case of urban areas, the monitoring of the
above is to be done through Junior Engineer and
the Executive from the concerned Department of
Ground                Water/Public           Health/Municipal
Corporation etc.


(xiii)      If    a    borewell/tubewell       is    'Abandoned'
at any stage, a certificate from the concerned
department               of        Ground           Water/Public
health/Municipal Corporation/Private contractor
etc. must be obtained by the aforesaid agencies
                                                         ....4/-
                                      - 4 -
            that   the    'Abandoned'       borewell/tubewell      is
            properly filled upto the ground level.           Random
            inspection of the abandoned wells is also to be
            done   by    the   Executive       of    the   concerned
            agency/department.        Information     on   all   such
            data on the above are to be maintained in the
            District Collector/Block Development Office of
            the State.


       We   are    informed    that   the     last   paragraph   of     the

earlier order dated 11th February, 2010, concerning publicity

has been duly complied with.

       Subject to the above, the writ petition is disposed

of.


                                              ....................CJI.
                                              [S.H. KAPADIA]



                                              ......................J.
                                              [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN]



                                              ......................J.
                                              [SWATANTER KUMAR]
New Delhi,
August 06, 2010.

Sunday 12 October 2014

POWER OF ADJUDICATION OF CIVIL/PROPERTY DISPUTES IS CONFERRED ONLY ON THE JUDICIARY AND NOT ON POLICE OFFICERS


 THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN
WRIT PETITION NO.34137 of 2013
24-04-2014
G.B.C.Raj Gopal.Petitioner
The Government of A.P. rep., by the Principal Secretary, Home Department,
Secretariat Buildings, Secretariat, Hyderabad, A.P. and six others..Respondents
Counsel for the petitioner: Mr. Mohd. Shafiuddin
Counsel for respondents: Government Pleader for Home;
Sri M. Karunasagar;
Sri R. Raghunandan, Senior Counsel for P. Shreyas Reddy;
Sri D. Srinivas.
<GIST:
>HEAD NOTE:
?Citations:
1) (2014) 2 SCC 1
2) 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
3) (2013) Cri.L.J. 776 (SC)
4) AIR 1964 SC 221
5) AIR 1955 SC 196
6) AIR 1959 SC 707
7) 1982 Cri.L.J 1557 (Kerala HC FB)
8) 1976 Cri.L.J 1825 (All HC-Lucknow Bench)
9) (2010) 7 SCC 667
10) (1994) 4 SCC 260
11) 2002(2) AnW.R. 582 = 2002(2) ALD (Crl). 706 (A.P).
12) AIR 1997 SC 610
13) (2005) 3 SCC 647
14) Judgment in W.P.No.523 of 2014 dated 21.01.2014
15) 2004(4) ALT 175
16) Judgment in W.P. No.13391 of 2006 dated 14.07.2006
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN
WRIT PETITION No.34137 OF 2013

(The Deputy Commissioner of Police, West Zone, Hyderabad is the 3rd
respondent, and the Inspector of Police, Sanjeeva Reddy Nagar P.S. is th
e 4th respondent}

Important paras of the judgment

18. The question which necessitates examination is whether the petitioner could have been, orally
and forcibly, summoned to his office by the 3rd respondent even before registration of the complaint
under Section 154 CrPC. The first information report is either given in writing or is reduced to
writing. The Code contemplates two kinds of FIRs: the duly signed FIR under Section 154(1) is by
the informant to the officer concerned at the police station. The second kind of FIR is one which is
registered by the police officer himself on the basis of information received, or other than by way of
an informant [Section 157(1)]. This information must also be duly recorded, and a copy should be
sent to the Magistrate forthwith. (Lalita Kumari1). The sine qua non for recording an FIR is that
there must be an information, and that information must disclose a cognizable offence. If
information disclosing a cognizable offence, satisfying the requirements of Section 154(1) Cr.P.C, is
laid before him, the police officer has no option but to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed
form i.e., to register a case on the basis of such information. (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal ). In
G.B.C.Raj Gopal vs The Government Of A.P. Rep., By The ... on 24 April, 2014
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/15684794/ 9
registering an FIR the consent, or otherwise, of the complainant is irrelevant. For cognizable
offences a duty is cast upon the police to register an FIR, and conduct investigation. The legislative
intent of Section 154(1) CrPC is to ensure that the information, relating to the commission of a
cognizable offence, is promptly registered and investigated in accordance with law. (Lalita Kumari1).
The context in which the word shall appears in Section 154(1) CrPC, the object for which it has been
used and the consequences that will follow from the infringement of the direction to register FIRs,
show that the word shall, used in Section 154(1), is mandatory in character. Section 154(1) of the
Code places an unequivocal duty upon the police officer, in charge of a police station, to register an
FIR on receipt of information that a cognizable offence has been committed, and does not confer
any discretion on him to embark upon a preliminary inquiry prior to the registration of the FIR.
(Lalita Kumari1; Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh ; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant
Kishore Joshi ).
19. The requirement of Section 154 Cr.P.C is only that the report must disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence, and that is sufficient to set the investigating machinery in motion. The intention
of the legislature, by the insertion of sub-section (3) of Section 154, is to ensure that no information
of the commission of a cognizable offence is ignored or is not acted upon. The obligation to register
an FIR has inherent advantages. (a) It is the first step to access to justice for a victim; (b) It upholds
the rule of law in as much as the ordinary person brings forth the commission of a cognizable crime
to the knowledge of the State; (c) It also facilitates swift investigation and sometimes even
prevention of the crime. In both cases, it only effectuates the regime of law; and (d) It leads to less
manipulation in criminal cases and lessens incidents of antedated FIR or deliberately delayed FIR.
The object sought to be achieved by registering the earliest information as an FIR is, inter alia, two
fold: one, that the criminal process is set into motion and is well documented from the very start;
and second, that the earliest information, received in relation to the commission of a cognizable
offence, is recorded so that there cannot be any embellishment, etc. later. The FIR is registered in a
book called the FIR book or the FIR register. A copy of each FIR is sent to the superior officers and
to the concerned Judicial Magistrate. The signature of the complainant is obtained in the FIR book
as and when a complaint is given at the police station. As each FIR has a unique annual number, it is
possible for supervisory police officers and the courts, wherever necessary, to exercise strict control
and keep track of registration of FIRs. The underpinnings of compulsory registration of the FIR is
not only to ensure transparency in the criminal justice-delivery system but also to ensure judicial
oversight. Section 157(1) deploys the word forthwith. Any information received under Section 154(1),
or otherwise, has to be promptly informed, in the form of a report, to the Magistrate. The
commission of a cognizable offence is not only brought to the knowledge of the investigating agency
but also to the subordinate judiciary. (Lalita Kumari1).


While the police
should not interfere into the disputes, which are purely of civil nature, they cannot shirk their
responsibility of protecting persons against injury or trespass particularly when the people
complained against are powerful or hired goondas. The following instructions are, therefore, issued
for the guidance of the police officers.
A. Orders of the civil court should be implemented and all assistance should be provided to the Civil
Court officials as mentioned in order
321. B. If any civil dispute is likely to give rise to an imminent breach of peace or disturbance of
public order, the police officer shall take recourse to Sections 144 to 148 Cr.P.C. as the case may be
(Chapter 38, Volume II).
C. As per Section 149 CrPC every Police Officer may interpose for the purpose of preventing and
shall, to the best of his ability, prevent the commission of any cognizable offence. In application of
this provision, police officers shall be guided by instructions given by superior officer of the rank of SP/DCP/CP/DGP


D. In dealing with these cases the SHO should make a contemporaneous record of every action that
he takes in the general diary and in the connected file. (emphasis supplied)
39. Sections 144 to 148 CrPC, as referred to in Part B of Standing Order 322-I, relate to the powers
of a Magistrate to issue orders in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger (Section
144); powers of a District Magistrate to prohibit carrying arms in a procession or a mass drill or a
mass training with arms (Section 144-A); powers of an Executive Magistrate where disputes
concerning land or water is likely to cause breach of peace (Section
145); powers of a Magistrate to attach the subject of dispute and to appoint a receiver (Section 146);
powers of an Executive Magistrate in a dispute concerning right of use of land or water (Section
147); and the powers of a District Magistrate to conduct a local enquiry (Section 148).

41. Even in a civil dispute with an element of criminality, such as in the case of personal injury or
trespass, police officers are entitled only to take action against the criminal element of the civil
dispute, and not interfere with the civil dispute itself. For instance, if the personal injury in a civil
dispute attracts the ingredients of Section 354 IPC, and trespass in a civil dispute attracts the
provisions of Sections 447 and 448 IPC, then the information or the complaint received must be
registered under Section 154(1) Cr.P.C, as they are cognizable offences, and an investigation should
only be caused thereafter. Section 41(1)(a)&(b) CrPC enable a police officer to arrest, without an
order from a Magistrate and without warrant, any person who has either committed or is alleged or
is suspected to have committed a cognizable offence. This power is not to be exercised for the mere
asking. Section 41 Cr.P.C. requires a police officer, before arresting any person, to be satisfied that
such an arrest is necessary in terms of clauses (a) to (e) of Section 41(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. It also requires
him to record, while making such arrest, his reasons therefor in writing. (Sambangi Dhanunjaya
Naidu. v. The State of A.P. rep. by its Principal Secretary, Home Department ). Even in civil disputes
with an element of criminality, while the police officer can exercise his powers under Section 41 and


41-A CrPC during the course of investigation, he cannot adjudicate or resolve property/civil
disputes. The power conferred, on respondents 3 and 4, was only to take action in respect of the
allegations of the 5th respondent of a threat to her life from her brother as stated in her complaint
dated 13.11.2013; or her being assaulted and intimidated by her brother and his brother-in-law as
stated in her complaint dated 27.11.2013; and not to forcibly resolve the property disputes between
the petitioner and the 5th respondent.


VI. POWER OF ADJUDICATION OF CIVIL/PROPERTY DISPUTES IS CONFERRED ONLY ON
THE JUDICIARY AND NOT ON POLICE OFFICERS:
50. Maintenance of peace and public order, prevention of crime and investigation of cognizable
offences are functions which Police Officers are, statutorily, obligated to discharge. While Section
154(1) Cr.P.C confers power, and casts a duty, on the police officer to register a cognizable offence,
Section 155 Cr. P.C. enables a police officer to make an entry in the appropriate register, regarding
information relating to a non-cognizable offence. He cannot investigate a non-cognizable offence
without the order of the Magistrate. As a necessary corollary, any attempt by a police officer to
investigate a complaint, which does not contain allegations of the commission of a cognizable
offence, without permission from the Magistrate would violate Section 155(2) Cr. P.C and is, ex
facie, illegal. There is no presumption in law that every rift in human relations would lead to a civil
dispute, and a civil dispute is likely to result in clashes resulting in offences against the human body.
A Police Officer would not be justified in saying that he/she is examining a complaint which, ex
facie, has the trappings of a civil dispute. (S. Masthan Saheb11). Even if a civil dispute has a criminal
element, which falls within the ambit of a cognizable offence, with the potential of a law and order
problem posing threat to the society at large, a Police Officer can take up investigation only after
registering the complaint under Section 154 Cr.P.C. (Lakshmi @ Lakshmamma v. Commissioner of
Police ).
51. The function of resolving civil disputes is entrusted to the judiciary. Police officers lack
jurisdiction to interfere in civil/property disputes between two citizens. Even in criminal case, their
role is limited to the registration of complaints and causing investigation. The power to adjudge
whether or not an accused is guilty of having committed a criminal offence, and to convict and
sentence him therefor, is vested exclusively in the judicial branch of the State. Judicial power cannot
be exercised by agencies outside the judicial orbit and, where there is no legislative foundation for
exercise of judicial power by a forum, it has no legal capacity to entertain requests for adjudication.
Judicial power is a facet of sovereign power and can be conferred only by a Statute or by a Statutory
instrument. It cannot be assumed suo motu. No authority may exercise adjudicatory powers absent
a conferment of such powers by Statutory instruments. The coercive power of the State may not be
employed to adjudicate disputes. (M/s. Janathaeem Industries Ltd., rep., by its Public Relations
Officer M.S. Ganesan, Vijayawada. v. The District Collector, Krishna district at Vijayawada ).

52. While the inordinate delay, in resolution of civil disputes before Civil Courts of competent
jurisdiction, is undoubtedly a cause of concern that does not justify Police Officers exercising
powers, conferred exclusively of the judicial branch of the State, to adjudicate civil disputes. While
the need to strengthen judicial institutions, and to reduce the inordinate delay in disposal of Civil
Suits, cannot be over-emphasised, the highhanded acts of police officers in seeking to resolve civil
disputes, that too in the precincts of a police station, must also be sternly dealt with. Just as Courts
would not undertake investigation of criminal offences, as these are matters in the exclusive realm
of the investigating agency, the powers conferred and the duties cast upon Police Officers, under the
Criminal Procedure Code, is only to register complaints regarding cognizable offences and
investigate thereinto; and not adjudicate even criminal cases, much less resort to settlement of civil
disputes.
53. Police officers should not usurp, or even seem to usurp, judicial functions of adjudication or to
summon and force persons to resolve their inter-se civil disputes in a particular manner under the
guise of family counselling. In the present case the 3rd respondent has, in effect, donned the robes
of a judge in adjudicating property disputes between the petitioner and the 5th respondent.


65. No person can be forcibly summoned to a police station except in accordance with law, including
the provisions of the CrPC. Exercise of power by police officers, and the mode and manner of its
exercise, is circumscribed by the provisions of the CrPC. Conferment of power is only to enable
police officers to effectively discharge their statutory/legal obligations. Exercise of power, otherwise
than in furtherance of a statutory/legal duty, is an abuse of power. In the present case, not only does
the 3rd respondent lack the power to summon the petitioner to the police station, even without
registering the complaint and without a written notice asking him to appear, he has also abused his
office in carrying on a counselling session within the premises of the office of the DCP, West Zone,
that too for resolution of a civil dispute regarding division of property between the petitioner and
the 5th respondent.66. The belated and half-hearted apology tendered by the 3rd respondent, with a rider that his apology was if he had transgressed his limits in the course of interacting with the petitioner or the
5th respondent, does not commend acceptance. It is not even the case of the 3rd respondent that the
petitioner had voluntarily, and on his own accord, come to the S.R.Nagar Police Station on
14.11.2013 or that he had on his volition and free will, and without being directed by the police
officers at S.R.Nagar P.S, come over to the office of the D.C.P., West Zone, to meet the 3rd
respondent on 14.11.2013. Neither has the 3rd respondent admitted that his action in telephonically
instructing the 4th respondent to direct the petitioner to come to S.R.Nagar Police Station, and to
produce him at the office of the DCP, West Zone for counselling on 14th November, 2013 and in
directing the petitioner to appear before him on 19th November, 2013 is illegal, nor has he assured
this Court that he would refrain from indulging in such acts in future. I see no reason, therefore, to
accept the apology of the 3rd respondent which is, evidently, made only to avoid being faulted by
this Court. The illegal and high-handed acts of the 3rd respondent, depriving the petitioner of his
fundamental right of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, cannot be
ignored. The competent authority shall forthwith initiate major penalty proceedings against the
respondent, conduct a departmental enquiry, and take disciplinary action in accordance with law.
The entire exercise, culminating in a final order being passed by the competent authority, shall be
completed within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. This order shall not
preclude the petitioner from claiming damages, for the violation of his fundamental rights by the
3rd respondent, in duly instituted legal proceedings.

67. While the 4th respondent cannot absolve himself of all blame on the specious plea that he had
merely acted on the orders of the 3rd respondent, this Court must also bear in mind that the 4th
respondent has, in his counter-affidavit filed before this Court, narrated the sequence of the events
but for which the illegal and high-handed acts of the 3rd respondent may not have been established.
The 4th respondent must constantly remind himself that his foremost obligation is to uphold the
rule of law, notwithstanding the illegal orders of his superiors. It would suffice to warn the 4th
respondent to desist from indulging in such acts in future.
68. This Court has only examined the illegal and high-handed acts of the 3rd respondent in orally
summoning and counselling the petitioner at his office, to settle his property disputes with the 5th
respondent, without even registering the complaint of the 5th respondent under Section 154(1)
CrPC; and has not touched upon the property disputes between the petitioner and the fifth
respondent. It is made clear that, while investigation in Crime No.182 of 2013 may be conducted in
accordance with law and a final report submitted under Section 173 CrPC, the 3rd respondent shall
not be involved either directly or indirectly in investigation or be consulted in the preparation and
finalisation of the final report.
69. The Writ Petition is, accordingly, allowed with exemplary costs of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten
Thousand only). The costs should, ordinarily, have been paid to the petitioner. However, as he is
employed in the U.S.A, and the genesis of this dispute is an internecine fight over vast extents of
property, it is but appropriate that the cost of Rs.10,000/- is paid by the 3rd respondent to the
Andhra Pradesh State Legal Services Authority, Hyderabad, within four weeks from the date of
receipt of a copy of this Order. The miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, are also disposed of.
_______________________________ (RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J) Date: .04.201