Thursday 29 February 2024

Amendment of a plaint can be allowed at the appellate stage

Amendment of a plaint can be allowed at the appellate stage in the Indian judiciary. Several references mention that the application for amendment of the plaint was allowed at the appellate stage, and the amended plaint was permitted to be filed. The main purpose of allowing such amendments is to avoid the multiplication of suits and proceedings and to ensure proper adjudication.


[Ram Kumar Poddar VS Shiv Narain Sao] states that pleadings can be amended even at the appellate stage, and if the plaint is allowed to be amended, the appellate court can either decide the appeal in accordance with the law or remand it to the trial court for fresh adjudication.

[Balaji Apartment VS Flora Properties (P) Ltd. ] mentions that the application for amendment of the plaint should be allowed at the appellate stage, and the defendants should be permitted to file their additional written statement after the plaint is amended.

[Arunashu VS Rajesh] highlights that the respondent-plaintiff filed an application for amendment of the plaint at the appellate stage, which was allowed by the first appellate court. The trial court's judgment was set aside, and the matter was remanded back to the trial court for consequential amendments in the written statement and for fresh adjudication.

[Prem Singh VS Harpal Singh] explains that the proposed amendment of the plaint is based on a subsequent event that took place during the pendency of the suit. It states that the amendment of the plaint should be allowed as per the liberal law of amendment of pleadings, and even the amended provision of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC allows for amendment at any stage before the commencement of the trial.

[Puspa Dey VS Sukanta Dey] and [Puspa Dey VS Sukanta Dey] affirm the order allowing the application for amendment of the plaint passed by the first appellate court. The plaintiffs/respondents are permitted to file the amended plaint within a specified time frame.

[EIH Associated Hotels Limited VS Paramjet Kaur (deleted)] states that the proposed amendments in the plaint are explanatory and elaborating, and they will not cause any prejudice to the defendant. Therefore, the amendment sought to be incorporated in the plaint is allowed.

[Ashmita Saha (minor), daughter of Sri Nitai Lal Saha VS Sikha Rani Saha, wife of Sri Hari Mohan Saha] allows the plaintiff-petitioner to carry out the proposed amendment and orders the filing of the amended plaint within a specified time frame. It also mentions that the defendant-respondent will have the opportunity to file an additional written statement if necessary.

[Moirangthem Yaima Singh VS Laishram Roma Devi] acknowledges that the amendment of either the plaint or the written statement can be allowed at the appellate stage. It emphasizes the need to determine whether the amendment sought changes the nature and character of the defendant's stand in the written statement and whether the additional relief claimed in the counterclaim is permissible.

[Prabha Devi VS Rita Prasad] raises the question of whether the plaintiff can be allowed to amend the relief portion of the plaint at the appellate stage.

Based on the above references, it can be concluded that the Indian judiciary allows for the amendment of a plaint at the appellate stage. This is done to ensure proper adjudication, avoid the multiplication of suits, and provide an opportunity for parties to present their case effectively. The law of amendment of pleadings is considered liberal, allowing for amendments at any stage before the commencement of the trial.

Advocate Commissioner can be appointed in Appeal Suit

 Karre Narsimulu vs Gaddamidi Diddaiah And 11 Others on 21 January, 2021 

 HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA, HYDERABAD 

 **** CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.1193 OF 2020 

Between: Karre Narsimulu ....Petitioner And Gaddamidi Siddaiah and 11 Others ....Respondent

1 This Civil Revision Petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, was directed against the order dated 12.10.2020 passed in I.A.No.777 of 2019 in A.S.No.20 of 2015 on the file of the Court of the VIII Additional District Judge, Medak, wherein and whereby the appellate Court dismissed the Karre Narsimulu vs Gaddamidi Diddaiah And 11 Others on 21 January, 2021 Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/82274002/ 2 said I.A. filed by the petitioner seeking to appoint an Advocate Commissioner. 

2 The facts germane for consideration in this Civil Revision Petition, in nutshell, are that respondent herein filed O.S.No.74 of 2008 on the file of the Court of the Junior Civil Judge, Medak, for permanent injunction restraining the petitioner herein and others from interfering with the land in Sy.No.30/AA admeasuring Ac.1-00 guntas of Chegunta village. The case of the respondent being the plaintiff in the said suit was that he purchased the suit schedule property from one G.Muthyalu through registered document No.1865/2008 dated 22.7.2008 for a consideration of Rs.30,000/- and ever since he has been in possession and enjoyment of the same. However, since the petitioner herein and others are trying to interfere with his possession over the said property without any manner of right, he filed the suit seeking permanent injunction. The petitioner herein and three others filed written statement stating that one Ramaiah was the original owner of the suit land to an extent of Ac.3-12 guntas in Sy.No.30 out of which he sold Ac.0-10 gunts each to the petitioner and other defendants in the suit through ordinary sale deed and the sale was regularized by Tahsildar, Chegunta after recording the statement of said Ramaiah under Section 13-B, vide proceeding No.B/4694/05. The petitioner further stated that subsequently the property was transferred in the name of Muthyalu S/o Ramaiah. The respondent herein, having fully known about the execution of sale deed in favour of the petitioner by Ramaiah, got executed the sale deed in his favour from said Muthyalu. 

3 The trial Court, after framing appropriate issues, recording evidence on both sides and hearing learned counsel on both sides, decreed the suit in favour of the respondent herein granting permanent injunction. 

4 Aggrieved by the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court, the petitioner and others preferred A.S.No.20 of 2015 on the file of the Court of the VIII Additional District Judge, Medak. During pendency of the appeal, the petitioner filed I.A.No.777 of 2017 under Order XXVI Rule 9 r/w Section 151 CPC, seeking appointment of an advocate commissioner to survey the lands in Sy.No.30, total extent of Ac.6-24 guntas and identify the land of the petitioners and to note down the physical features and measurements of land with the help of surveyor. The case of the petitioner was that the trial Court in its judgment held that when the entire extent of Sy.No.30 is more than Ac.6-00 guntas and the extent of land claimed by both parties is only Ac.2-00 guntas, the point that both parties are having land cannot be ruled out and it is their duty to get it surveyed with surveyor. Therefore, advocate commissioner may be appointed to survey the respective lands of the parties. The respondent herein filed his counter denying the pleadings of the petitioner contending that the petitioner did not take any steps before the trial Court to appoint an advocate commissioner to survey and demarcate the lands in Sy.No.30 to an extent of Ac.6-24 guntas and to identify the lands of the petitioner and note down the physical features of the land etc. 

5 The appellate Court by order dated 12.10.2020 dismissed the I.A.No.777 of 2020, which is impugned herein, observing that advocate commissioner cannot be appointed to collect and gather evidence in respect of suit schedule property of either parties to establish who is in possession of which land and that in a suit for permanent injunction the parties to the litigation should establish their possession by way of evidence both oral and documentary; that the petitioner filed the petition at a belated stage when the appeal is coming up for arguments. As stated supra, aggrieved thereby the Karre Narsimulu vs Gaddamidi Diddaiah And 11 Others on 21 January, 2021 Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/82274002/ 3 petitioners/appellants/ defendants preferred this Civil Revision Petition. 

6 The respondent / plaintiff filed his counter denying the material averments made by the revision petitioner, contending that only in order to protract the litigation, the petitioner filed the present Civil Revision Petition but nothing else, that too when the appeal is coming for arguments. 

7 Attacking the finding given by the appellate Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that when there is serious dispute with regard to the location of the land, advocate commissioner can be appointed.

 8 Heard the learned counsel for the respondent. 

9 Now the point for consideration is can there be an order of appointing Advocate Commissioner in a suit for injunction at appellate stage? 1

0 POINT: As seen from the schedule of property, as was mentioned in the plaint, the respondent claims to be owner and possessor of land admeasuring Ac.1-00 guntas out of Ac.3-12 guntas in Sy.No.30/AA purchased from one Mutyalu S/o Ramaiah, whereas the petitioners herein claim that their vendor Ramaiah was the original owner of an extent of Ac.3-12 guntas and that the said Ramaiah sold Ac.0-10 guntas each to the petitioners. It is an admitted fact that the total extent of Sy.No.30 is Ac.6-24 guntas. The extent of the respondent is Ac.1-00 whereas the extent of the petitioners, is Ac.0-10 guntas each totalling to Ac.1-00. Even if the extent of both parties is taken as a whole, it would not be equivalent to the entire extent of the Sy.No.30 which is Ac.6.00 and odd. Therefore, if an advocate commissioner is appointed, it would sub serve the issue clinching in this case i.e. whether the entire survey No.30 is one single plot of Ac.6.00 and odd or whether it is sub-divided into 30AA or some other. Therefore, in order to put a quietus to the litigation appointment of advocate commissioner is necessary.

 11 It was held in Arvind Kumar Agarwal vs. Legend Estates (P) Ltd., rep. by its Managing Partner, Kokapet Village, Ranga Reddy District1, that ordinarily, in a suit for injunction, Advocate Commissioner is not appointed to gather evidence. Only in cases where there is a serious dispute regarding identity of the property or boundaries thereof, an Advocate-Commissioner can be appointed even in the suits filed for injunction. As is in the case on hand, where the parties to the litigation claim that their properties situate in different survey numbers, certainly, to come to a just conclusion that in which survey number the lands of the respective parties are situated, appointment of an advocate commissioner is necessary. The object in appointing the advocate commissioner is to survey the lands of the parties in Sy.No.30, but not to ascertain or cause any enquiry as to who is in possession of which property. Therefore, it does not amount to collection or fishing of evidence. Of course, the Commissioner cannot be directed to ascertain which party is in possession of which survey number. That aspect has to be established by the parties with the aid of the evidence to be let in during the course of trial.

 12 In Shameem Begum vs. Vennapusa Chenna Reddy and Another2 it was held that: The impugned dismissal order of the lower Court, under a mistaken impression and without even reading properly the Order 1 2015 (2) ALT 484 2 2018 (2) ALD 297 XXVI Rule 9 and Section 75 C.P.C., says the purpose of appointment of an advocate Karre Narsimulu vs Gaddamidi Diddaiah And 11 Others on 21 January, 2021 Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/82274002/ 4 commissioner sought to note down the physical features regarding possession of property cannot be allowed as a party cannot be allowed to fish out evidence by appointment of a commissioner. The lower Court did not even notice the distinction between fishing out information (which is not permissible) and collection of evidence (which is permissible). What is prohibited of fish out information by commissioner is X or Y stated to him at the time of inspection A or B in possession and the like. It is not prohibited of apparently visible physical features (which is even collection of evidence).

 13 In Smt. P. Sreedevi vs. IVLN Venkata Lakshmi Narasimha Prasad3 a Division Bench of this Court by following the principle laid down in Haryana Waqf Board v. Shanti Sarup4, Badana Mutyalu and Ors. vs. Palli Appalaraju5 and Jajula Koteshwar Rao vs. Ravulapalli Masthan Rao6 held that if it was a case of demarcation of the disputed land, it was appropriate for the court to direct the investigation by appointing a Local Commissioner under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC. 

14 Further, the finding of the appellate Court that the petitioners have not taken any steps to file an application at an earlier stage and that they approached with the application for appointment of advocate commissioner at a belated stage is incongruous. Appeal is continuation of suit but not a different proceeding. In the present case, the trial Court itself in its judgment observed that the parties to the suit would have resorted to get their lands surveyed by a surveyor. 

15 Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the principle enunciated in the case cited supra, I am of the 3 2020 (4) ALT 433 (DB) (TS) 4(2008) 8 SCC 671 5(2013) 5 ALD 376 6 2015 (6) ALD 483 considered opinion that the impugned order is not sustainable either in law or on facts. Hence the same is liable to be set aside. 

16 In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed setting aside the order dated 12.10.2020 passed in I.A.No.777 of 2019 in A.S.No.20 of 2015 on the file of the Court of the VIII Additional District Judge, Medak. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this Civil Revision Petition shall also stand dismissed. __________________________

 T. AMARNATH GOUD, J. Date:21.01.2021. L.R. Copy to be marked B/o Kvsn Karre Narsimulu vs Gaddamidi Diddaiah And 11 Others on 21 January, 2021 Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/82274002/ 5


Wednesday 28 February 2024

Whether it is mandatory for Magistrate to obtain surety bond in cheque dishonour case?

Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2015 BOM 3


Subhash Atmaram Sharma And Anr vs The State Of Maharashtra And Anr
 on 20 March, 2015 
Author: M.L. Tahaliyani Bench: M.L. Tahaliyani 7

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY 
 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
 CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.992 OF 2014
 
Oral Judgment: Admit. By consent of the parties taken up forthwith for final hearing. 

2. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties. Perused the impugned order. 

3. The Applicants are facing trial for the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. They have appeared in response to the summons issued by the Court. Now they have been asked to furnish a bail in the sum of Rs.5,00,000/- each with surety of Rs.2,00,000/- each. The learned Advocate for the Applicants has submitted that the Applicants are permanent residents of Mumbai and there is no apprehension that they would not appear before the Court. 

It is brought to my notice that the Applicants had appeared before the Court immediately after getting summons. As such, there was no reason for the Magistrate to ask the Applicants to furnish bail. It is further pointed out that the Applicants had never been arrested and therefore, there was no occasion for the Magistrate to ask for personal bond and surety bond. Subhash Atmaram Sharma And Anr vs The State Of Maharashtra And Anr on 20 March, 2015 Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/106959354/ 2 

4. I have considered the arguments submitted on behalf of the Applicants. I have also taken note of the practice generally adopted by the Courts of Magistrates in Mumbai with regard to execution of personal bonds and surety bonds. It is seen that in 7_apl_992_2014_jud.doc almost all cases under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, the Trial Magistrates direct the accused to furnish personal bonds and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the Trial Magistrates. What is further noted is that in some cases the amount of personal bonds and surety bonds is too oppressive to sustain. It appears that the Trial Magistrate decides the amount of bonds on the basis of amount of the cheque allegedly dishonoured. A large number of litigants are required to move this Court for modification of orders of the Magistrates as they are not able to furnish surety of the amount stated in the order of the Magistrates. 

5. In the first place learned Trial Magistrates shall note that the cases under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act are tried as summary cases and attendance of the accused is secured by issuance of process of summons. In such cases the learned Magistrate shall also take note of the legal position that execution of personal bond and surety bond is not a condition precedent for commencement of trial. 

No doubt, the trial Magistrate has authority to ask for personal bond and surety bond to ensure attendance of the accused on the dates of hearing. However, such discretion is to be exercised judiciously. In my opinion unless there is apprehension that the accused would evade 7_apl_992_2014_jud.doc the trial or would not attend the dates of hearing, the purpose could be served by asking the accused to execute personal bond only of a reasonable amount. Surety bonds shall not be required to be executed only because the complainant wants such bonds to be executed. 

Learned Magistrates shall not ignore the fact that large number of cases under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act are pending in various Courts of the Magistrates in Mumbai. It is just not possible for any Magistrate to hear all the cases shown in the cause list of a particular date. Grant of exemption from personal appearance to the accused in deserving cases can be one of the modes to reduce the unnecessary expenditure incurred by the accused for travelling to the Court. 

6. There may be cases where the execution of bond may not be at all necessary if the accused are attending the dates of hearing regularly, in person or through their advocates. Next category could be of cases where the purpose could be served by asking the accused to execute personal bonds only and third category could be of the cases where the accused has a tendency to remain absent intentionally or without any reasonable cause. The cases following under the third category, in my view, are the cases in which the learned Magistrates 7_apl_992_2014_jud.doc may ask for personal bonds as well as surety bonds. In brief, learned Magistrates shall exercise their discretion judiciously and before asking the accused to execute bonds shall take into consideration various relevant aspects including the fact as to whether the accused had a permanent place of residence and business. Learned Magistrate shall note that time of the Court and ministerial staff saved by reducing the work of execution of surety bonds can be devoted for substantial work like hearing of main cases. Subhash Atmaram Sharma And Anr vs The State Of Maharashtra And Anr on 20 March, 2015 Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/106959354/ 3 

7. As far as the present case is concerned, the order of the learned Magistrate asking the Applicants to furnish personal bond of Rs.5,00,000/- each and surety bond of Rs.2,00,000/- each in my opinion is oppressive and needs to be set aside. I, therefore, set aside the order passed by the Magistrate instead pass the following order :

 a) The Applicants shall furnish personal bond of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs only) each with the condition that they will appear before the Magistrate on all the dates of hearing unless exempted by the Trial Magistrate from personal appearance. 

b) Learned Magistrate shall take note of the observations made by this Court and shall make 7_apl_992_2014_jud.doc endeavour to see that money and time of the accused is not wasted unnecessarily. 

c) Registrar General of this Court is directed to forward copy of this judgment to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, who shall forward copies thereof to all the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrates and Metropolitan Magistrates in Greater Mumbai. 

8. The application stands disposed of accordingly. (JUDGE) 

Tuesday 20 February 2024

Merely the proposed amendement will take away the pecuniary juridiction of Court, the amendment shall not be refused.- A citation.

Kerala High Court
T.K. Sreedharan vs P.S. Job on 22 March, 1968
Equivalent citations: AIR1969KER75, AIR 1969 KERALA 75, 1968 KER LJ 482 1968 KER LT 479, 1968 KER LT 479
ORDER
T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, J.
1. The plaintiff is the revision petitioner and the revision petition is directed against the order of the Court below refusing his application for amending the plaint. The suit is instituted by the plaintiff for recovery of Rs. 3893.00 being the balance and interest thereon due from the defendant on account of pattuvaravu transactions. In the application for amending the plaint the plaintiff stated that the balance due from the defendant is Rs. 4721.55 and the sum of Rs. 3065.54 mentioned in the plaint as the balance due is a mistake and that he should be allowed to amend the plaint so as to claim the sum of Rs. 4721.55 and interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from 19-1-1966.
2. The application for amendment was dismissed by the Court below as it took the view that it does not satisfy the requirements of law the amendment if allowed will change the character of the suit and the Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the application, as the result of allowing the amendment will be to deprive the Court of its jurisdiction to try the suit.
3. The first ground is based upon the decision in Sankaran Kesavan v. Sankaran Bharathan, 1954 Ker LT 513 where it was observed that:
"An application for amendment of pleading must state precisely the specific words, clauses or sentences to be added if the prayer is for addition and the precise place in the original pleading where those are to be inserted; if the amendment sought is for deletion of any part of the original pleading the details thereof must also be given with precision."
The complaint is that the application for amendment does not satisfy the above principle. On a perusal of the application for amendment it is seen that the prayer is to correct the amount claimed in the plaint and also to claim interest thereon. This is specifically stated in the petition. This is quite sufficient and the view taken by the Munsiff cannot be accepted.
4. The finding of the Munsiff that the amendment if allowed will alter the character of the suit cannot be supported. The plaint is based on pattuvaravu transactions between the parties and it will continue to be so even if the amendment is allowed. The second ground mentioned by the Munsiff has to be overruled. The last ground mentioned by the Court below presents some difficulty. In the case before me the original claim and the additional claim sought to be introduced by the amendment are within the jurisdiction of the trial Court. But the two claims taken together will fall outside its jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Court to try a suit is determined by the plaint. Normally therefore the Court competent to entertain the suit is entitled to deal with the application for amendment of the plaint. But the question to be considered is whether when the Court as a result of allowing the application for amendment is deprived of its jurisdiction to deal with the amendment plaint has power to deal with the application for such an amendment. In Singara Mudaliar v. Govindaswami Chetty, AIR 1928 Mad 400, a learned single Judge of the Madras High Court observed:
"I conceive that no Court will permit a plaint to be so amended as to oust its own jurisdiction to try the suit". The above principle was invoked by the learned Counsel for the respondent. In Bhavani v. Mangamma, AIR 1949 Mad 208, the view was taken by the Madras High Court that where the claim was originally with the jurisdiction of the Court but falls outside it as a result of the amendment, the Court should, if the application for amendment is allowed, return the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. The decision in AIR 1928 Mad 400 was followed by another single Judge of the Madras High Court in Nagutha Mohamed Nainar v. Vedavalli Animal, 1959-1 Mad LJ 307. The decision in AIR 1928 Mad 400 has also been followed in E. R. R. M. H. S. Committee v. P. Atchayya, AIR 1957 Andh Pra 10. 5. In Lalji v. Narottam, AIR 1953 Nag 273, the legal position was stated thus:-- "When the Court is faced with the question of allowing an amendment which taken together with the original claim exceeds its pecuniary jurisdiction, it is in effect trying a suit beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction. By adding the new relief which the plaintiff claims, the Court in effect amends the plaint as presented because it is also well settled that all amendments relate back to the presentation of the plaint. This clears the difficulty because the Court is thereby rendered incompetent to entertain the claim for amendment at all. In such a situation, because the plaintiff cannot ask for the return of the plaint, nor can the Court cause the amendment, the logical procedure to follow would be to return the plaint together with the application for amendment for the consideration of that Court which has jurisdiction to consider the original claim and the claim sought by the amendment not taken separately but together."
In Kundan Mal v. Thikana Siryari, AIR 1959 Raj 146, a Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court disagreed with the decision in AIR 1928 Mad 400 and observed:
"It is true that if the suit as framed were beyond the jurisdiction of the lower Courts, they would have had no jurisdiction to make any amendment. However, from the plaint as it stands, it cannot be said that the lower Court had no jurisdiction in the suit when it was filed. The Civil Courts would have been, therefore, perfectly justified in exercising their powers of amendment, even though the consequence of the amendment would be that the suit might become beyond the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. If as a result of amendment, the suit becomes one not cognisable by Civil Court they would have to return the plaint for presentation to proper Court."
The same principle was stated in Govardhan Bang v. Govt. of the Union of India, AIR 1953 Hyd 212, thus:--
"While considering whether an amendment should be allowed or not, the Court ought not to go on the merits of the case. If, after allowing the amendment, the Court comes to the conclusion that the Court has no jurisdiction, the Court could return the plaint to the plaintiff to be presented in the proper Court."
I accept the principle of law stated in AIR 1953 Hyd 212 and AIR 1959 Raj 146.
It is not possible to accept the dictum in AIR 1953 Nag 273. Order 7 Rule 10 (1) C. P. C. enables the return of a plaint only for presentation to the proper Court in which the suit should have been instituted. It will be possible to invoke the provision of Order 7 Rule 10 (1) C. P. C. only after the amendment of the plaint, the effect of which alone will be to deprive the jurisdiction of the Court to try the suit. No question of applicability of Order 7 Rule 10 (1) C. P. C. can arise before that stage. It is also not possible to apply the provisions of Order XXIII C. P. C. for this purpose. When a Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit it is only that Court that is competent to deal with the application for amending the plaint in that suit. If as a result of an order allowing the amendment the pecuniary jurisdiction is ousted it must return the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. The fact that the amendment relates back to the presentation of the plaint cannot affect the question a all. The amended plaint will be considered to have been wrongly presented in the Court not having jurisdiction to entertain the same in which case that Court will have to pass an order under Order 7 Rule 10 (1) C. P. C. When the original plaint and the application for amendment are returned for the reason that the effect of the amendment if allowed will be to deprive the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit, the Court will not be acting under the provision of Order 7 Rule 10 (1) C. P. C. Further if the Court in which they are presented refuses the prayer for amendment then it is open to that Court again to direct the return of the plaint for presentation in the first Court. I do not think such a situation is contemplated. The question of ouster of jurisdiction will come in only after an order allowing the amendment is passed and not before that. Under such circumstances the Court below has got jurisdiction to deal with the application. In these circumstances, I set aside the order of the Court below and allow the revision petition. But I make no order as to costs.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
 CMP No. 4 of 2023 
Sulochana Parida and others …. Petitioners Mr. Bhaskar Chandra Panda, Advocate -
versus
Kamini Parida and others …. Opp. Parties Mr. Monmoy Basu, Advocate (For Opposite Party Nos.1 to 4 and 7
) CORAM: JUSTICE K.R. MOHAPATRA O
RDER Order No. 24.07.2023 . 
1. This matter is taken up through hybrid mode. 
2. Mr. Basu, learned counsel appearing for Opposite Party Nos.1 and 7 also files Vakalatnama on behalf of Opposite Party Nos. 2 to 4 in Court, which is taken on record. He also files an affidavit of Opposite Party No.7 stating that Opposite Party No.11-Mamata Parida has died issueless since 2021 and hence no substitution vide Opposite Party No.11 is necessary in this case
. 3. Mr. Panda, learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that the name of Opposite Party No.11 may be deleted at the risk of Opposite Party Nos.1 to 7
. 4. Taking into consideration the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, name of Opposite Party No.11- Mamata Parida be deleted from the cause title at the risk of Opposite Party Nos.1 to 4 and 7.
 5. Order dated 3rd December, 2022 (Annexure-1) passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), 2nd Court, Cuttack in CS No.134/58 of 2008/2003 is under challenge in this CMP, whereby an application for amendment of the plaint filed by the // 2 // Page 2 of 5 Plaintiffs/Petitioners has been partly allowed. Petitioners in this CMP assail part of the order refusing amendment of the plaint. 
 6. Mr. Panda, learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that CS No.58 of 2003 has been filed for declaration that the partition deed executed between Shyam Sundar and Radhu Parida is outcome of fraud and also for consequential relief. During pendency of the suit, Plaintiffs/Petitioners filed an application for amendment of the plaint to incorporate some of the Defendants as parties to the suit and in consequence to change the serial number of the proforma Defendants. A prayer for incorporation of the pleading with regard to validity of RSD No.1896 dated 30th April, 1999 was also sought for. Further, a prayer to declare such sale deed as null and void was also sought for in the plaint by way of amendment. Learned trial Court, while allowing the prayer for impletion of parties and change of serial number of proforma Defendants rejected the prayer for amendment to incorporate foundational pleadings as well as prayer to declare the sale deed dated 30th April, 1999 as null and void. Hence, this CMP has been filed. 6.1 Mr. Panda, learned counsel for the Plaintiffs/Petitioners submits that learned trial Court rejected the amendment, as aforesaid on two grounds, more particularly that the amendment sought for is barred by limitation and it will take away the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. It is his submission that the question of limitation can be decided at the time of hearing by framing an additional issue. Validity of the sale deed dated 30th April, 1999 depends upon the adjudication with regard to validity of the partition deed, which is under challenge. Instead of filing a separate suit, Plaintiffs/Petitioners sought for amendment of the // 3 // Page 3 of 5 plaint to save judicial time of the Court for adjudication of the lis between the parties. He further submits that only because the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court will be taken away by virtue of amendment of the plaint, that itself cannot be a ground to refuse the prayer. He, therefore, prays for setting aside the impugned order to the extent of rejecting amendment of the plaint and to permit the Petitioners to incorporate the proposed amendment as sought for. 
 7. Mr. Basu, learned counsel for Opposite Party Nos.1 to 4 and 7 vehemently objects the above submission. It is his submission that the sale deed in question was well within the knowledge of the Plaintiffs on the date of filing of the suit. The Plaintiffs also did not take any step to amend the plaint at the time of impleading the purchasers of the aforesaid sale deed under Order I Rule 10 (2) CPC. When the suit was posted for hearing, such a plea has been taken to linger the proceeding. It is his submission that earlier, Plaintiffs/Petitioners had moved this Court in W.P.(C) No.659 of 2011 in which they had assailed the order refusing to stay further proceeding of the suit. Ultimately, Plaintiffs/Petitioners withdrew the said writ petition. Thus, the Plaintiffs are adopting different methods to linger the proceeding of the suit. As such, learned trial Court has committed no error in rejecting the prayer for amendment, as aforesaid.
 8. Considering the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, this Court finds that hearing of the suit has not yet commenced. Of course, the suit is of the year 2003 and is pending before learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), 2nd Court, Cuttack. Only because the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court will be taken away by the amendment of the plaint, the same cannot be the sole // 4 // Page 4 of 5 ground to refuse the prayer. Since the Plaintiffs/Petitioners have prayed for declaration that the deed of partition as aforesaid to be null and void, learned trial Court should have considered the amendment to incorporate the pleadings as well as prayer with regard to validity of the RSD dated 30th April, 1999, as it is an consequence of such partition, which is under challenge. If the Petitioners/Plaintiffs are not permitted to incorporate such amendment at this stage, it may lead to multiplicity of litigations. In order to shorten the time for complete adjudication of the lis between the parties with regard to validity of partition as well as consequential execution of sale deed, this Court feels that learned trial Court should have allowed the amendment; which is of course subject to the question of limitation. If objection to the prayer for amendment is raised on the ground of limitation, the amendment sought for should not be thrown out at the threshold, more particularly when objection on limitation depends upon interpretation of materials on record. In such cases, question of limitation can also be decided by framing an issue to that effect. 8.1 In that view of the matter, this Court feels that the amendment sought for should have been allowed. 
 9. Accordingly, the impugned order under Annexure-1 rejecting the amendment, as aforesaid, is set aside. The petition for amendment filed by the Plaintiffs/Petitioners is allowed. Keeping in mind the suit is of the year 2003 and prayer for amendment was made in the year 2022, this Court feels that the contesting Defendants should be compensated by adequate cost. 
 10. Accordingly, this Court directs that consolidated plaint shall be accepted subject to payment of cost of Rs.10,000/- (rupees ten thousand only), which shall be paid to the Defendants // 5 // Page 5 of 5 along with copy of the amended plaint within a period of fifteen days hence. Needless to say that the Defendants are at liberty to file additional written statement to the amended plaint within a period of two weeks thereafter. It is made clear that if the consolidated plaint is not filed along with the cost as aforesaid within the time stipulated as above, the order under Annexure-1 impugned herein shall be revived. Learned trial Court shall also make an endeavour to see that the suit is disposed of at an early date.
 11. Interim order dated 11th January, 2023 passed in IA No.5 of 2023 stands vacated. Issue urgent certified copy of the order on proper application. (K.R. Mohapatra) Judge s.s.satapathy


SECOND CITATION : KOKA VENKATA RMANAIAH NAIDU VS KARNAM VENKATA RATNAM   2010(6)ALT 133
THIRD CITATION 
When the claim as originally made is within the courts' jurisdiction but if the said claim is amended, the court might have no further jurisdiction, the said court itself is competent to allow such amendment. Thereafter, it would decide whether the amended plaint should be returned for presentation to the proper court, (see Vhavana v. Mangamma AIR 1949 Mad 208; Govardhan Bang v. Govt. of the Union of India AIR 1953 Hyderabad 212; Kundan Mal v. Thikaha Siyari, ; T.K. Sreedhan v. P.S. Job, ."

Monday 19 February 2024

Injunction suit can be amended to a suit for recovery of possession, if the Plaintiff is disposseesed after filing suit for injunction.

 CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 5839 of 2002 PETITIONER: SAMPATH KUMAR RESPONDENT: AYYAKANNU AND ANR. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/09/2002 BENCH: R.C. LAHOTI & BRIJESH KUMAR JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT 2002 Supp(2) SCR 397

 The following Order of the Court was delivered : Leave granted. The plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for issuance of permanent prohibitory injunction alleging the plaintiff-appellant’s possession over the suit property which is an agricultural land. The defendant in his written statement denied the plaint averments and pleaded that on the date of the institution of the suit he was in possession of the suit property and therefore the suit for injunction was liable to be dismissed. The suit was instituted in the year 1988.

 In the year 1999, but before the commencement of the trial, the plaintiff moved an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC seeking an amendment in the plaint. It is alleged in the application that in January 1989, that is, during the pendency of the suit, the defendant has forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff. On such averment the plaintiff sought for relief of declaration of title to the suit property and consequential relief of the delivery of possession. The suit was proposed to be valued accordingly along with payment of court fee. The prayer for amendment was opposed on behalf of the defendant-respondent submitting that the plaintiff was changing the cause of action through amendment which was not permissible and also on the ground that the defendant has perfected his title also by adverse possession over the suit property rendering the suit for recovery of possession barred by time and therefore a valuable right had accrued to the defendant which was sought to be taken away by the proposed amendment. 

The Trial Court rejected the application for amendment. During the course of its order the Court observed that the appropriate course for the plaintiff was to bring a new suit. This order has been maintained by the High Court in revision. Although the plaintiff had sought for some more amendment so as to correct the description of the suit property; however the pan of the prayer for amendment was not later pressed by the plaintiff before the Court. 

The short question arising for decision is whether it is permissible to convert through amendment a suit merely for permanent prohibitory injunction into a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession.

It is true that the plaintiff on the averments made in the application for amendment proposes to introduce a cause of action which has arisen to the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. According to the defendant the averments made in the application for amendment are factually incorrect and the defendant was not in possession of the property since before the institution of the suit itself. 

In our opinion, the basic structure of the suit is not altered by the http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 3 proposed amendment. What is sought to be changed is the nature of relief sought for by the plaintiff. In the opinion of the Trial Court it was one to the plaintiff to file a fresh suit and that is one of the reasons which has prevailed with the Trial Court and with the High Court in refusing the prayer for amendment and also in dismissing the plaintiffs revision. We fail to understand, if it is permissible for the plaintiff to file an independent suit, why the same relief which could be prayed for in a new suit cannot be permitted to be incorporated in the pending suit. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, allowing the amendment would curtail multiplicity of legal proceedings. 

In Mst. Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan and Ors., AIR (1960) 335, this Court has taken the view that where a suit was filed without seeking an appropriate relief, it is a well settled rule of practice not to dismiss the suit automatically but to allow the plaintiff to make necessary amendment if he seeks to do so.

 Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC confers jurisdiction on the Court to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings at any stage of the proceedings and on such terms as may be just. Such amendments as are directed towards putting-form and seeking determination of the real questions in controversy between the parties shall be permitted to be made. The question of delay in moving an application for amendment should be decided not by calculating the period from the date of institution of the suit alone but by reference to the stage to which the hearing in the suit has proceeded. Pre-trial amendments are allowed more liberally than those which are sought to be made after the commencement of the trial or after conclusion thereof. In former case generally it can be assumed that the defendant is not prejudiced because he will have full opportunity of meeting the case of the plaintiff as amended. In the latter cases the question of prejudice to the opposite party may arise and that shall have to be answered by reference to the facts and circumstances of each individual case. No strait-jacket formula can be laid down. The fact remains that a mere delay cannot be a ground for refusing a prayer for amendment. 

An amendment once incorporated relates back to the date of the suit. However, the doctrine of relation back in the context of amendment of pleadings is not one of universal application and in appropriate cases the Court is competent while permitting an amendment to direct that the amendment permitted by it shall not relate back to the date of the suit and to the extent permitted by it shall be deemed to have been brought before the Court on the date on which the application seeking the amendment was filed. (See observation in Siddalingamma and Anr. v. Mamtha Shenoy, [2001] % SCC 561. 

In the present case the amendment is being sought for almost 11 Years after the date of the institution of the suit. The plaintiff is not debarred from instituting a new suit seeking relief of declaration of title and recovery of possession on the same basic facts as are pleaded in the plaint seeking relief of issuance of permanent prohibitory injunction and which is pending. In order to avoid multiplicity of suits it would be a sound exercise of discretion to permit the relief of declaration of title and recovery of possession being sought for in the pending suit. The plaintiff has alleged the cause of action for the reliefs now sought to be added as having arisen to him during the pendency of the suit. The merits of the averments sought to be incorporated by way of amendment are not to be judged at the stage of allowing prayer for amendment. However, the defendant is right in submitting that if he has already perfected his title by way of adverse possession then the right so accrued should not be allowed to be defeated by permitting an amendment and seeking a new relief which would relate back to the date of the suit and thereby depriving the defendant of the advantage accrued to him by lapse of time, by excluding a period of about 11 years in culcating the period of prescriptive title claimed to have been earned by the defendant. The interest of the defendant can be protected by directing that so far as the reliefs of declaration of title and recovery of possession, now sought for, are concerned the prayer in that regard shall be deemed to have been made on the date on which the application for amendment has been filed. 

On the averments made in the application, the same ought to have been allowed. If the facts alleged by plaintiff are not correct it is open for the defendant to take such plea in the written statement and if the plaintiff fails in substantiating the factual averments and/ or the defendant succeeds in substantiating the plea which he would obviously be permitted to raise in his pleading by way of consequential amendment then the suit shall be liable to be dismissed. The defendant is not prejudiced, more so when the amendment was sought for commencement of the trial. 

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders of the High Court and the Trial Court are set aside. The plaintiff is permitted to incorporate the pleas sought to be raised by way of amendment in the original plaint foregoing the plea to the extent given up by him before the Trial Court, However, in view of the delay in making the application for amendment, it b directed that the plaintiff shall pay a cost of Rs. 2,000 (Rupees Two Thousand only) as a condition precedent to incorporating the amendment in the plaint. The prayer for declaration of title and recovery of possession shall be deemed to have been made on the date on which the application for amendment was filed.






SECOND JUDGEMENT 


Rengarajan vs Rajendran on 5 May, 2017 

Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2017 MAD 92 

Author: G.Jayachandran Bench: G.Jayachandran 

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED: 05.05.2017 

CORAM THE HONOURABLE DR.JUSTICE G.JAYACHANDRAN C.R.P(PD)(MD)No.2132 of 2015 and M.P(MD)No.1 of 2015

 1.Rengarajan 2.Venkatesh Mathavan .. Petitioners/ Plaintiffs Vs. 1.Rajendran 2.Padma .. Respondents/ Defendants

 This revision petition is filed praying to set aside the fair and decretal order dated 11.08.2015 made in I.A.No.313 of 2015 in O.S.No.43 of 2014 on the file of the District Munsif, Thiruvaiyaru. 2.Heard the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 3.This revision petition is directed against the dismissal of the application filed by the plaintiffs to amend the plaint under Order 6 Rule 17 of C.P.C. 4.The brief facts of the case is that the revision petitioners, who are the plaintiffs, have filed the suit for bare injunction against the respondents herein on the ground that the suit schedule property was allotted to the plaintiffs, as per the partition took place between the brothers on 12.10.1966. As per the partition deed, the 'C' schedule property, which is now the subject matter of the suit, was allotted to the first plaintiff. On 02.01.2009, the first plaintiff has settled the property in favour of the son who is shown as second plaintiff. While so, the first defendant, misusing the power of attorney document given in his favour by the first plaintiff and his brother in the year 2003, has alienated the suit property in favour of his wife on 30.01.2009, knowing fully well that a week ago the first plaintiff has settled the property in favour of his son, the second plaintiff. Since, there was a threat of trespass and illegal encroachment, initially suit for bare injunction was filed. But, later in the course of cross examination, having found that the property has been transferred to the second defendant by misusing the power of attorney document issued in favour of the first defendant, it has now become necessary to amend the plaint by including the reliefs of declaration and possession. 5.The said petition for amendment has been opposed by the defendants on the ground that the petition for amendment is not maintainable after commencement of trial. The plaintiff has not disclosed any cause of action for seeking relief of possession. While filing the injunction suit itself, it was made known to the first plaintiff that he has executed the power of attorney after receiving full consideration and also given possession to the first defendant. Pursuant to the power of attorney, he has sold the property to his wife on 30.01.2009. Having made known about this fact even while replying to the pre-suit notice, the plaintiff ought to have filed composite suit for all the reliefs whatever he thought fit and entitled. Having failed to claim the reliefs of declaration and possession at the inception, the present amendment petition to include the reliefs of possession as well as the declaration of title is unsustainable under Proviso to Order 6 Rule 17. Further, the defendants will be put grave prejudice if such an amendment is allowed, since the relief of declaration is barred by the limitation. 6.The said contention of the respondents/defendants has been accepted by the Trial Court and the Trial Court has dismissed the application. Aggrieved by the said order of dismissal, the plaintiffs have filed this revision petition on the ground that the relief sought is not barred by limitation. Though, it was filed after commencement of trial, in the circumstances stated by the revision petitioners, amendment ought to have been allowed. The fraudulent act of misusing the power of attorney document and creating a sale deed in favour of his own wife by the first defendant, has come to light only during the examination of the first defendant. The very fact that after the settlement of the property in favour of the second plaintiff by the first plaintiff on 02.01.2009, which Rengarajan vs Rajendran on 5 May, 2017 Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/148262691/ 2 has been registered on 23.01.2009, the first defendant knowing about the settlement, has made use of the defunct power of attorney document and had created sale deed in favour of his wife one week later, that is on 30.01.2009. Since, the said fraudulent transaction has come to light in the course of the cross-examination of the defendant (D.W.1), it is just and necessary to permit the plaintiffs to carry out the amendment sought. Further, there is also an error in the extent of the suit property. Hence, the same should be amended for proper identification. 7.The facts of the case is that originally the plaint was laid on the premise that the property is owned and possessed by the plaintiffs whereas the defendant trying to trespass into the land and occupy it by force. The consistent stand of the defendants is that they were cultivating tenants under the plaintiff's father and they continued to be in possession. In the year 2003, a power of attorney was executed by the first plaintiff after receiving full sale consideration. While so, on 30.01.2009, the first defendant has sold the property to the second defendant on the strength of the power of attorney executed by the first plaintiff. Though this fact was made known to the plaintiffs by way of a reply to the pre-suit notice and also in the written statement, the plaintiffs have chosen to amend the plaint and include the reliefs of declaration and possession only after the commencement of the trial. Further as pointed out by the Trial Court, the revision petitioners herein have not even disclosed when and how the defendants have taken possession of the property. Nowhere in their petition, they have mentioned date or circumstances under which the defendants have taken possession of the property. When the suit was originally filed on the premise that the plaintiffs are in possession of the property and their peaceful possession is likely to be disturbed by the defendants, all of a sudden, the plaintiffs have thought fit to amend the prayer after the commencement of the trial. Order 6, Rule 17 of C.P.C. reads as under: ?Amendment of pleadings: The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial?. 8.Catena of Judgments would say that even after commencement of trial, if the Court deems fit and necessary to permit amendment of the pleadings even after the commencement of trial, if it will not prejudice to the defendants and the relief sought is not barred by limitation. 9.The learned counsel for the revision petitioners has cited some of those Judgements which are listed as under: (i)(2009)10 Supreme Court Cases 626 [Surender Kumar Sharma V. Makhan Singh]. (ii)(2015)4 Supreme Court Cases 182 [Mount Mary Enterprises V. Jivratna Medi Treat Private Limited]. Rengarajan vs Rajendran on 5 May, 2017 Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/148262691/ 3 (iii)2015-5-L.W.761 [Kaleeswaran V. Uma]. (iv)2009 (3) CTC 522 [UCO Bank, Chetpet Branch V. Nest Tours & Travels P.Ltd., rep. by its Director, Ram and Others. 10.In all these Judgements, the underlying principle is that amendment can be allowed in any stage, provided the character of the suit and limitation are not affected or altered. 11.In the case in Surender Kumar Sharma V. Makhan Singh cited supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider belated plea for amending the plaint and whether prayer for amendment of plaint allowed will change the nature and character of the suit. In so far as, belated prayer for amendment is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held under: ?As noted herein earlier, the prayer for amendment was refused by the High Court on two grounds. So far as the first ground is concerned i.e., the prayer for amendment was a belated one, we are of the view that even if it was belated, then also, the question that needs to be decided is to see whether by allowing the amendment, the real controversy between the parties may be resolved. It is well settled that under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, wide powers and unfettered discretion have been conferred on the Court to allow amendment of the pleadings to a party in such a manner and on such terms as it appears to the Court just and proper. Even if, such an application for amendment of the plaint was filed belatedly, such belated amendment cannot be refused if it is found that for deciding the real controversy between the parties, it can be allowed on payment of costs. Therefore, in our view, mere delay and laches in making the application for amendment cannot be a ground to refuse the amendment?. 12.In so far as the second principle whether the amendment if allowed will change the nature and character of the suit, in the case in hand, the real controversy between the parties is in respect of the suit property which admittedly stands in the name of the plaintiffs and the defendant's father was a cultivating tenant under the plaintiffs. While the plaintiffs claim that the possession is with them and had filed the suit for injunction, the contra case of the defendants is that as a cultivating tenant, they are in possession of the property for years together and the possession is not with the plaintiffs. Further, by virtue of power of attorney document executed by the first plaintiff in favour of the first defendant, the first defendant has sold away the property to the second defendant. Therefore, altering the suit for bare injunction into suit for title and recovery of possession, amounts to changing the nature and character of the suit prejudicing the defendants. 13.In an identical situation, when the matter was taken up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sampath Kumar V. Ayyakannu and Another, [(2002)7 SCC 559], where, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt an application for amendment made after 11 years from the date of institution of the suit to convert through amendment a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction into the suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The words of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which are extracted below: Rengarajan vs Rajendran on 5 May, 2017 Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/148262691/ 4 ?The short question arising for decision is whether it is permissible to convert through amendment a suit merely for permanent prohibitory injunction into a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. It is true that the plaintiff on the averments made in the application for amendment proposes to introduce a cause of action which has arisen to the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. According to the defendant the averments made in the application for amendment are factually incorrect and the defendant was not in possession of the property since before the institution of the suit itself. In our opinion, the basic structure of the suit is not altered by the proposed amendment. What is sought to be changed is the nature of relief sought for by the plaintiff. In the opinion of the Trial Court it was one to the plaintiff to file a fresh suit and that is one of the reasons which has prevailed with the Trial Court and with the High Court in refusing the prayer for amendment and also in dismissing the plaintiffs revision. We fail to understand, if it is permissible for the plaintiff to file an independent suit, why the same relief which could be prayed for in a new suit cannot be permitted to be incorporated in the pending suit. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, allowing the amendment would curtail multiplicity of legal proceedings. ... ... ... ... ... ... Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC confers jurisdiction on the Court to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings at any stage of the proceedings and on such terms as may be just. Such amendments as are directed towards putting-form and seeking determination of the real questions in controversy between the parties shall be permitted to be made. The question of delay in moving an application for amendment should be decided not by calculating the period from the date of institution of the suit alone but by reference to the stage to which the hearing in the suit has proceeded. Pre-trial amendments are allowed more liberally than those which are sought to be made after the commencement of the trial or after conclusion thereof. In former case generally it can be assumed that the defendant is not prejudiced because he will have full opportunity of meeting the case of the plaintiff as amended. In the latter case the question of prejudice to the opposite party may arise and that shall have to be answered by reference to the facts and circumstances of each individual case. No strait-jacket formula can be laid down. The fact remains that a mere delay cannot be a ground for refusing a prayer for amendment?. 14.In this case, the amendment is sought after commencement of trial. Though, the fact of alienation of the suit property by the first defendant to and in favour of the second defendant has been brought to the notice of the plaintiffs as early as in the year 2013, both in the reply to the pre-suit notice and Rengarajan vs Rajendran on 5 May, 2017 Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/148262691/ 5 in the written statement, the plaintiff has thought fit to amend the prayer only after commencement of the trial. 15.The apprehension of the defendants is that if the prayer of declaration and possession is included by way of amendment which is barred by limitation, if suit is filed afresh, the right accrued to the defendants will be jeopardized. The amendment once incorporated relates back to the date of suit and therefore a belated plea of declaration and recovery of possession which is otherwise barred by limitation, cannot be entertained through amendment. 16.The learned counsel for the revision petitioners submits that the illegal transaction of the property by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant is only in the year 2009, whereas the suit was filed in the year 2014 and the amendment was sought by I.A.No.313 of 2015 filed on 06.06.2015. Since the relief sought is well within the period of limitation, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, amendment sought by the plaintiffs ought to have been allowed by the Trial Court. 17.Considering the rival submissions of the respective counsels, as pointed out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sampath Kumar V. Ayyakannu and Another, [(2002)7 SCC 559], by allowing the amendment incorporating reliefs of declaration and possession in the suit filed for injunction, will avoid the multiplicity of legal proceedings. At the same time, if the doctrine of relation back in the context of amendment of pleading is applied, the plaintiff may have the advantage of saving limitation, which cannot be entertained. The answer for that issue is given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the same Judgement in In Re Sampath Kumar in the following words: ?An amendment once incorporated relates back to the date of the suit. However, the doctrine of relation back in the context of amendment of pleadings is not one of universal application and in appropriate cases the Court is competent while permitting an amendment to direct that the amendment permitted by it shall not relate back to the date of the suit and to the extent permitted by it shall be deemed to have been brought before the Court on the date on which the application seeking the amendment was filed?. 18.In the recent Judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in L.C.Hanumanthappa represented by his L.Rs. V. H.B.Shivakumar after referring the Judgements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Court dealing Order 6 Rule 17 including Sampath Kumar V. Ayyakannu and Another, [(2002)7 SCC 559] has concluded as under: ?Applying the law thus laid down by this Court to the facts of this case, two things become clear. First, in the original written statement itself dated 16th May, 1990, the defendant had clearly put the plaintiff on notice that it had denied the plaintiff's title to the suit property. A reading of an isolated para in the written statement, namely, para 2 by the Trial Court on the facts of this case has been correctly commented upon adversely by the High Court in the judgement under appeal. The original written statement read as a whole unmistakably indicates that the defendant had not accepted the plaintiff's title. Secondly, while allowing the amendment, the High Court Rengarajan vs Rajendran on 5 May, 2017 Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/148262691/ 6 in its earlier judgement dated 28th March, 2002, had expressly remanded the matter to the Trial Court, allowing the defendant to raise the plea of limitation. There can be no doubt that on an application of Khatri Hotels Private Limited (Supra), the right to sue for declaration of title first arose on the facts of the present case on 16th May, 1990 when the original written statement clearly denied the plaintiff's title. By 16th May, 1993, therefore a suit based on declaration of title would have become time-barred. It is clear that the doctrine of relation back would not apply to the facts of this case for the reason that the Court which allowed the amendment expressly allowed it subject to the plea of limitation, indicating thereby that there are no special or extraordinary circumstances in the present case to warrant the doctrine of relation back applying so that a legal right that had accrued in favour of the defendant should be taken away. 19.Applying the principle laid down in the above Judgement, even though the plea to amend the plaint has been filed by the plaintiff belatedly, it can be entertained, if such leave will avoid multiplicity of proceedings, provided the plea is not barred by limitation, if the doctrine of relation back is not applied. 20.In this case even if doctrine of relation back is not applied ex facie the relief is not barred by limitation. The plaintiff was put to notice about the alienation only on 08.05.2013 through the reply notice of the respondents/ defendants. Later, the same has been reiterated in the written statement dated 04.07.2014. The present application for amendment is filed on 06.06.2015, well within the period of 3 years. Therefore, the declaration prayer prima faciely is not barred by limitation. Therefore, going by the guidelines of the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down in Surender Kumar Sharma V. Makhan singh, Sampath Kumar V. Ayyakannu and Another and L.C.Hanumanthappa (Since dead) Represented by His LRs. V. H.B.Shivakumar, the plaintiff is entitled to seek amendment of his plaint, provided he established through evidence that the relief is not barred by limitation. Therefore, this Court considers merit in the revision petition. Hence, this revision petition is allowed. The order dated 11.08.2015 passed in I.A.No.313 of 2015 in O.S.No.43 of 2014 by the District Munsif, Thiruvaiyaru, is hereby set aside and the petition is allowed, preserving the right of respondents/defendants, questioning the declaration relief on the point of limitation. For the purpose of reckoning limitation, the amendment permitted shall not date back to the suit and it shall be deemed to have been brought before the Court on the date on which the application seeking the amendment was filed, i.e., 06.06.2015. 21.In the result, this revision petition is allowed with the above said observation. No order as to costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. To 1.The District Munsif Court, Thiruvaiyaru. 2.The Record Keeper, V.R.Section, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.. Rengarajan vs Rajendran on 5 May, 2017 Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/148262691/ 7

Friday 16 February 2024

When limitation is a mixed question of fact and law, Plaint cannot be rejected at the stage of numbering.


C.R.P.No.4188 of 2016 Date 13.10.2023.  2024(1) ALT 746(AP)

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI 

 N. Lakshmikantha Reddy and Others … Petitioners Vs. $ S. Mohammed Hussain and another … Respondents

 ORDER: 

Aggrieved by the orders dated 13.06.2016 passed in C.F.R.No.3310 of 2016 in unnumbered suit, on the file of the Court of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kurnool, (in short ‘the court below’) the present revision is filed. 

2. The petitioners herein are the plaintiffs; respondents herein are the defendants before the court below. 

3. The petitioners herein has filed a suit for amendment of registered sale deed No. 2904 of 2004, dated 18.03.2004. The court below taken objection 06.04.2016 and returned the plaint and the counsel for the petitioners represented the same, which was taken up by the court below on 02.05.2016. The court below after perusal of the plaint, came to conclusion that as per Article 137 of Limitation Act, when there is no specific provision in the Act, for the relief 3 years is the limitation. Therefore as per Limitation Act, the suit is not within time and that rejected the plaint. Assailing the same, the present revision came to be filed. 

4. Heard Mr. Shafath Ahmed Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. G. Sravan Kumar, learned counsel for the 1st respondent. The 2nd respondent is shown as formal party to the revision. 


5. Learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that the court below ought to have numbered the suit holding that the question of limitation is mixed question of fact and law and such issue of limitation has to be decided only after full trial, but not at the threshold of numbering the suit. The court below went wrong in taking the objection of the non issue of notice under Section 80 of CPC, when the 2nd defendant being the Government Servant is the party but the court below ought to have held that no relief is sought for against the 2nd defendant, but the 2nd defendant is added as party proforma for which no such notice is necessary. Therefore the impugned rejection order is liable to be set aside. 

6. Whereas learned counsel for the 1st respondent would contend that the court below rightly rejected the plaint on the ground of limitation and vehemently opposed to allow the revision. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent placed on record the 3 decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in “Sukhbiri Devi and Others v. Union of India and Others”1 wherein it was held as follows: “15……In the said contextual situation it is worthy and appropriate to refer to Paragraphs

 51, insofar as it is relevant, and 52 of the decision in Nusli Neville Wadia’s case (supra) and they read thus: "51. [..] As per Order 14 Rule of fact or arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by the one party and denied by the other. The issues are framed on the material proposition, denied by another party. There are issues of facts and issues of law. In case specific facts are admitted, and is the question of law arises which is dependent upon the outcome of admitted facts, it is open to the Court to pronounce the judgment based on admitted facts and the preliminary question of law under the provisions of Order 14 Rule 2. In Order 14 Rule 2(1), the Court may decide the case on a preliminary issue. It has to pronounce the judgment on all issues. Order 14 Rule 2(2) makes a departure and the Court may decide the question of law as to jurisdiction of the Court or a bar created to the suit by any law for the time being in force, such as under the Limitation Act. 52. [...] In a case, question of limitation can be decided based on admitted facts, it can be decided as a preliminary issue under Order 14 Rule 2(2)(b). Once facts are disputed about limitation, the determination of the question of limitation also cannot be made under Order 14 Rule 2(2) as a preliminary issue or any other such issue of law which requires examination of the disputed facts. In case of dispute as to facts, is necessary to be 1 2022 (6) ALD 98 (SC) 4 determined to give a finding on a question of law. Such question cannot be decided as a preliminary issue. In a case, the question of jurisdiction also depends upon the proof of facts which are disputed and the question of law is dependent upon the outcome of the investigation of the facts, such question of law cannot be decided as a preliminary issue, is settled proposition of law either before the amendment of CPC and post amendment in the year 1976” (Emphasis added). 

7. Perused the record.

 8. It is the contention of the petitioners that when the 1st respondent has filed a suit in O.S.No.384 of 2012 on the file the court of II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kurnool against one B. Krishna by suppression of material facts and which the registered sale deed dated 18.03.2004 came into existence and that the petitioners gave evidence on behalf of said B. Krishna in the said suit. The 1st respondent has right only to an extent of Ac. 0.24 cents in Sy.No.327/3A3. Therefore the revision is liable to be allowed. 

9. In support of their contentions, learned counsel for the petitioners placed on record the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court 5 in “Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd., v. Hanuman Seva Trust and Others”2, wherein it was held as follows: “8. After hearing counsel for the parties, going through the plaint, application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC and the judgments of the trial court and the High Court, we are of the opinion that the present suit could not be dismissed as barred by limitation without proper pleadings, framing of an issue of limitation and taking of evidence. Question of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. Ex facie in the present case on the reading of the plaint it cannot be held that the suit is barred by time. The findings recorded by the High Court touching upon the merits of the dispute are set aside but the conclusion arrived at by the High Court is affirmed. We agree with the view taken by the trial court that a plaint cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure”. 

10. As per Article 137 of Limitation Act, when there is no specific provision in the Act, for the relief 3 years is the limitation as held by the court below. Therefore the suit is not maintainable as per the Limitation Act and rejected the plaint. As per the decision relied by the learned counsel for the petitioners cited supra-2, wherein it is categorically held that the suit could not be dismissed as barred by limitation without proper pleadings, framing of issue of limitation and taking of evidence. The question 2 (2006) 5 SCC 658 6 of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and ex facie on reading of the plaint, suit cannot be held to be barred by limitation. In the instant case, the court below failed to take into consideration such aspects and simply said that the suit is not filed within time. 

11. Therefore, there is an error committed by the court, while rejecting the plaint. The decision relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner is applicable to the facts of the case and the court below is inevitably number the suit. The court went beyond jurisdiction has dealt the issue at the stage of numbering is unsustainable. The court below shall be taken into consideration with regard to limitation aspect as a preliminary issue while deciding the main suit, but not numbering stage, particularly in a suit of this nature. Hence, the revision is liable to be allowed. 

12. Accordingly, the C.R.P is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. 7 As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed. __________________________________

Monday 5 February 2024

Power of attorney holder can maintain a private complaint filed under Section 200 of the Code.

 

Mr. Jakka Vinod Kumar Reddy vs State Of Telangana on 5 February, 2021

Author: K. Lakshman

Bench: K. Lakshman

         HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN

             CRIMINAL PETITION No.222 OF 2021

ORDER:

This Criminal Petition is filed under Section - 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Code') seeking a direction to VIII Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge - cum - Special Court for Economic Offences at Nampally, Hyderabad (for short 'Sessions Court') to take cognizance of the complaint in CC (SR) No.2628 of 2020 and consequently number the same.

2. Heard Mr. S. Ravi, learned Senior Counsel representing M/s. R.S. Associates, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has filed a memo vide USR No.5288 of 2021 dated 02.02.2021 mentioning that respondent Nos.2 and 3 herein are not necessary parties.

4. The petitioner herein has filed a complaint in CC (SR) No.2628 of 2020 under Section - 200 of the Code against respondent Nos.2 and 3 herein for the offences punishable under Sections - 447, 448, 451 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Sections - 628 and 629A of the Companies Act, 1956 and Sections - 405, 415, 420, 425, 464, 468, 471 and 120-B of IPC. The said complaint has been filed by the Power of Attorney Holder of the complainant, who is authorized to file the said complaint vide Power of Attorney dated 13.12.2019.

KL,J

5. The said complaint was filed on 21.09.2020, and the same was returned on 02.12.2020 by the learned Sessions Judge with an objection as to maintainability of said complaint by Power of Attorney Holder of the complainant. The petitioner herein has re-submitted the said complaint along with a memo stating that:

"It is respectfully submitted that a Power of Attorney Holder can maintain a Private Complaint under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. at the behest of the original Complainant. This position has been confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.C. Narayanan Vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 2014 SC 630). A copy of the Judgment is annexed.
Though The Judgment in A.C. Narayanan Vs. State of Maharashtra was in respect of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the general principles in relation to Section 200 of Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in CrlP.No.1174 of 2012 has applied the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.C. Narayanan Vs. State of Maharashtra in a private complaint instituted in respect of offence under IPC. A copy of the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka is annexed.
It is further submitted that the present Complaint has been instituted under the provisions of the Companies Act 1956 as well as the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013. The Complainant undertakes to withdraw the prosecutions under the 1956 Act, if found to be not maintainable at the time of framing of charges."

KL,J

6. Thereafter, the Sessions Court has returned the said complaint with the following endorsement on 05.01.2021:

"Explain the locus standi of the GPA Holder of the complainant to file the complaint before this Court under Companies Act, 2013."

7. Mr. S. Ravi, learned Senior Counsel, would submit that the petitioner herein has re-submitted the said complaint specifically explaining that Power of Attorney can maintain a private complaint under Section 200 of the Code at the behest of the original complainant. Reliance was also placed on the principle laid down by the Apex Court in A.C. Narayanan v. State of Maharashtra1 and Nagarajappa v. H.D. Kumar Swamy2. But, the Sessions Court instead of taking cognizance of the said complaint and numbering it, returned the same with the above said objection and, therefore, the present petition.

8. The above said facts would reveal that the Sessions Court has returned the complaint only on the ground that the complaint filed by the petitioner herein through Power of Attorney Holder is not maintainable. Though a memo dated 18.12.2020 said to have filed by the petitioner along with the aforesaid decisions, there is no reference with regard to the same and in the endorsement dated 05.01.2021, there is no consideration of the principle laid down in the aforesaid decisions by the Sessions Court.

. (2014) 11 SCC 790 . Crl.P. No.1174 of 2012 decided on 11.10.2018 KL,J

9. In A.C. Narayanan1, a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court had an occasion to deal with the issue of maintainability of complaint filed by a original complainant through power of attorney holder. In the said case, the complaint was filed under Section 200 of the Code for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The complaint was filed through a power of attorney holder. The Apex Court by referring to various judgments rendered by it earlier, held as under:

"19). As noticed hereinabove, though Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra), relates to powers of Power of Attorney holder under CPC but it was concluded therein that a plaint by a Power of Attorney holder on behalf of the original plaintiff is maintainable provided he has personal knowledge of the transaction in question. In a way, it is an exception to a well settled position that criminal law can be put in motion by anyone [vide Vishwa Mitter (supra)] and under the Statute, one stranger to transaction in question, namely, legal heir etc., can also carry forward the pending criminal complaint or initiate the criminal action if the original complainant dies [Vide Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas vs. State of Maharashtra (1967) 1 SCR 807]. Keeping in mind various situations like inability as a result of sickness, old age or death or staying abroad of the payee or holder in due course to appear and depose before the Court in order to prove the complaint, it is permissible for the Power of Attorney holder or for the legal representative(s) to file a complaint and/or continue with the pending criminal complaint for and on behalf of payee or holder in due course.

KL,J However, it is expected that such power of attorney holder or legal representative(s) should have knowledge about the transaction in question so as to able to bring on record the truth of the grievance/offence, otherwise, no criminal justice could be achieved in case payee or holder in due course, is unable to sign, appear or depose as complainant due to above quoted reasons. Keeping these aspects in mind, in MMTC (supra), this Court had taken the view that if complaint is filed for and on behalf of payee or holder in due course, that is good enough compliance with Section 142 of N.I. Act."

10. Following the said principle held by the Apex Court in A.C. Narayanan1, the Karnataka High Court held in Nagarajappa2 that power of attorney holder can maintain a private complaint filed under Section 200 of the Code. In the said case, a complaint was filed by the original complainant through his General Power of Attorney Holder for the offences punishable under Sections 500501 and 502 of IPC.

11. The Karnataka High Court applying the principle laid down by the Apex Court in A.C. Narayanan1 and other judgments held that in view of the fact that there being no power under Section 199 of the Code for filing a petition through power of attorney holder, the complaint filed by the original complainant through power of attorney holder is maintainable.

KL,J

12. In view of the above stated authoritative principle laid down by the Apex Court, followed by the Karnataka High Court, coming to the facts of the case on hand, the original complainant, Mr. Jakka Vinod Kumar Reddy, has filed a complaint under Section 200 of the Code against respondent Nos.2 and 3 herein for the aforesaid offences through his power of attorney holder, Mr. Jakka Kiran Reddy. In the said complaint, it is specifically mentioned that the power of attorney holder is well acquainted with the facts of the case and he has been duly authorized by the original complainant to file the complaint at his behest. A copy of the power of attorney dated 13.12.2019 executed by the said Mr. Jakka Vinod Kumar Reddy is also filed. In the said power of attorney, it is specifically mentioned that the original complainant is living in Bangkok, Thailand, being pre-occupied to pursue the professional badminton training of his daughter, Miss. Jakka Vaishnavi Reddy, who represents India in Badminton on the International Circuit, was being ranked as Junior World No.2, as such, he will not be in a position to travel to Hyderabad, thereof as such, he has appointed Mr. Jakka Kiran Reddy as his power of attorney holder to file complaints, civil proceedings etc. It is also mentioned in the power of attorney that he does hereby agree to ratify and confirm all the acts and deeds done by his attorney in his name and on his behalf in respect to all the Courts of India, to be constituted as acts and deeds done by him as if personally present.

KL,J

13. Thus, the above said facts would reveal that the petitioner herein has executed the above said power of attorney on 13.12.2019 to do certain acts on his behalf including filing of complaints. In the complaint, power of attorney holder has specifically mentioned that he is well acquainted with the facts of the case and he has been authorized by the complainant to file the complaint on his behalf. A perusal of the record would also reveal that the petitioner herein has filed a memo dated 18.12.2020 before the Sessions Court stating that the power of attorney holder can maintain a private complaint and also mentioned the principle laid down by the Apex Court and followed by the Karnataka High Court referred supra. Though, the said memo was filed, the Sessions Court has returned the complaint with the above said endorsement.

14. Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, followed by the Karnataka High Court and on perusal of the record including the contents of power of attorney and the complaint, this Court is of the view that power of attorney holder can maintain a private complaint filed under Section 200 of the Code.

15. Accordingly, the present Criminal Petition is allowed, and the learned VIII Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge - cum - Special Court for Economic Offences at Nampally, Hyderabad, is directed to take cognizance of the complaint filed in CC (SR) No.2628 of 2020 by the petitioner herein and number the same if it is otherwise KL,J in order, and proceed with further in accordance with law for trying the said complaint.

As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Criminal Petition shall stand closed.

_________________ K. LAKSHMAN, J 05th February, 2021 Mgr