Impounding of Documents in Criminal Cases- Section 33(2) (a) of Stamp Act

Andhra High Court
Preetesh Kumar vs Counsel For The on 19 January, 2017
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY
CRIMINAL PETITION No.10057 OF 2016
19-01-2017
Preetesh Kumar.petitioner
The State of Telangana and another. respondents
Counsel for the petitioner : M/s.Sri Pratap Narayan Sanghi
Counsel for the Respondents: Sri B.Chandrasen Reddy

1. This petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings dated 24.06.2016 in Crl.R.P.No.111 of 2016 passed by the IV Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, whereby confirmed the order dated 18.04.2016 in Crl.M.P.No.1704 of 2015 in C.C.No.33 of 2014 of

the IX Special Magistrate Court, Hyderabad.

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Thus, the basis for the claim is Memorandum of Understanding, which is unstamped and unregistered. Since the claim of the 2nd respondent/complainant is based on Memorandum of Understanding, the petitioner/accused filed a petition before the Special Magistrate under Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act, to impound the Memorandum of Understanding dated 14.02.2014. The 2nd respondent/complainant filed counter contending that the petition is not maintainable, besides raising several other contentions. Upon hearing argument of both the counsel, the Special Magistrate held that the document cannot be impounded and negated the relief. 3. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Special Magistrate, the petitioner preferred the Criminal Revision Petition No.111 of 2016 before the IV Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad,and by order dated 24.06.2016 the learned Judge confirmed the order passed by the Special Magistrate, dismissing the revision petition.

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7. In view of the specific contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, it is relevant to advert to the provisions of Section 33(2) proviso (a) and Section 35(d) of the Indian Stamp Act.

33. Examination and impounding of instruments :-- (1) Every person having by law or consent of parties, authority to receive evidence, and every person in charge of a public office, except an officer of a police, before whom any instrument, chargeable, in his opinion, with duty, is produced or comes

in the performance of his functions shall, if it appears to him that such instrument is not duly stamped, impound the same. (2) For that purpose every such person shall examine every instrument so chargeable and so produced or coming before him, in order to ascertain whether it is stamped with a stamp of the value and description required by the law in force in India when such instrument was executed or first executed : Provided that--

(a) nothing herein contained shall be deemed to require any Magistrate or Judge of a Criminal Court to examine or impound, if he does not think fit so to do, any instrument coming before him in the course of any proceeding other than a proceeding under Chapter XII or Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

(b) in the case of a Judge of a High Court, the duty of examining and impounding any instrument, under this section may be delegated to such officer as the Court appoints in this behalf. (3) For the purposes of this section, in cases of doubt--

(a) the State Government may determine what offices shall be deemed to be public offices; and                   (b) the State Government may determine who shall be deemed to be persons in charge of public

offices.

35. Instruments not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence etc :-- No instrument chargeable with

duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties

authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person

or by any public officer, unless such instrument is duly stamped: Provided that--(a) any such instrument not being an instrument chargeable with a duty of twenty paise or a mortgage of crop (Article 36(a) of Schedule I-A) chargeable under clause (aa) or (bb) of Section 3 with a duty of forty paise or a bill of exchange or promissory note, shall subject to all just exceptions,be admitted in evidence on payment of the duty with which the same is chargeable, or, in the case of an instrument insufficiently stamped, of the amount required to make up such duty, together with a penalty of * [fifteen rupees], or, when ten times the amount of the proper duty or deficient portion thereof exceeds * [fifteen rupees] of a sum equal to ten times such duty or portion;(b) where any person from whom a stamped receipt could have been demanded, has given an unstamped receipt and such receipt, if stamped would be admissible in evidence against him, then such receipt shall be admitted in evidence against him on payment of a penalty of * [three rupees] by the person tendering it;(c) where a contract or agreement of any kind is effected by correspondence consisting of two or more letters and any one of the letters bears the proper stamp, the contract or agreement shall be deemed to be duly stamped;

(d) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of any instrument in evidence in any proceeding in a Criminal Court, other than a proceeding under Chapter XII or Chapter XXXVI of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898;

(e) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of any instrument in any Court when such instrument has been executed by or on behalf of the Government, or where it bears the certificate of the Collector as provided by Section 32 or any other provision of this Act.

18 In all the above referred judgments, the dispute is with regard to civil rights and interpretation ofvarious provisions, but the petition before the Special Magistrate is filed in a proceedings in criminal trial i.e. for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. In the judgments referred supra, fiscal enactments and economic legislations must be construed directly and they have no application to the criminal proceedings. The Indian Stamp Act itself contains exemption to Section 33(1) and (2) and Section 35 of the Stamp Act. When such exemption is granted by the Act itself, there is no other scope for interpreting the provisions and the intention of the legislature in incorporating proviso (a) to sub- section (2) Section 33 and proviso (d) to Section 35 is only to enable the Courts to receive un-stamped or insufficient stamped documents in evidence without insisting for impound of a document as required under Section 33(i) and (2) and bar under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act is to see that no criminal proceedings shall be frustrated on account of such interdict contained in the Act and not to allow any criminal to escape from the criminal laws, un-punished. If the interpretation given by the Courts in civil proceedings is applied to the proceedings in a criminal case, it would frustrate the very object of the legislatures in incorporating true exemptions referred supra. Therefore, the interpretation to the provisions of the Stamp Act, as laid down by the Apex Court in the judgments referred supra, cannot be applied to the proceedings in a criminal case, in view of exemption clauses contained in proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of 33 and proviso (d) of Section 35 of the Stamp Act. Therefore, the principles laid down in the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner have no relevance to the present facts and when the Special Magistrate and the Revisional Courts have exercised their discretion under Sections 33(2) proviso (a) and 35 proviso (d), this Court cannot interfere with such orders while exercising inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Section 482 Cr.P.C. confers inherent power on the High Court being the highest Court of the State only for limited purpose of enforcing the orders passed under the Code, to prevent abuse of process of the Court and to meet the ends of justice in view of the limited power conferred on it, unless the order passed by the trial Court and confirmed by the revisional Court is prima facie erroneous and the court cannot interfere by exercising inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Therefore, I find no illegality in the order passed by the trial Court in exercising discretion that conferred on the Courts below to set aside the same, consequently, persuaded by the law laid down by Calcutta High Court in as early as in 1950 and in the latter judgment of the Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh High Courts and interpreting the provisions under Sections 33 and 35 of the Stamp Act. I am of the view that the orders passed by the Special Magistrate confirmed by the IV Additional  Metropolitan Sessions Judge at Hyderabad, by exercising jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C., are free from any illegality and legal infirmity calling for interference of this Court, while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Hence, petition is devoid of merits and liable to be dismissed.

19. In the result, the Criminal Petition is dismissed at the stage of admission.

Court can grant temporary injunction even U/s 151 CPC in circumstances which are not covered under Order 39 CPC

Person who filed copy application by paying requisite fee is a Consumer within the meaning of Consumer Protection Act.

National Consumer Disputes Redressal

Shri Prabhakar Vyankoba Aadone vs Superintendent, Civil Court on 8 July, 2002
Equivalent citations: I (2008) CPJ 427 NC
Bench: D W Member, R Rao, B Taimni

1. This Revision Petition is filed against the order passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Maharashtra, rejecting the appeal of the Petitioner in his absence. The Respondent is a Superintendent of Civil Court, Senior Division, Solapur against whom a complaint was filed alleging delay in issuance of certificate copy of the judgment by the office of the Respondent. The District Forum awarded compensation of Rs. 250/- and costs of Rs. 250/- holding that there is deficiency in service by the Appellant and further holding that the Complainant was consumer qua the Appellant. The State Commission upset the finding on the basis that the Appellant being a government agency was exercising sovereign function and any deficiency in service arising would not be amenable to the jurisdiction of the consumer fora functioning under the Consumer Protection Act. The order of the District Forum was set aside and the complaint was dismissed. The Complainant has filed this revision feeling aggrieved by the said order of the State Commission......................................................

13. It may be noted that the concept of sovereign function has undergone changes and in a welfare state, where the activities of the government extend to several spheres, the distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign for the purpose of immunity has largely disappeared. (N. Nagendra Rao v. State of A.P. (1194) 6 SCC 205 @ 235, pr. 25; Common Cause v. Union of India (1999) 6 SCC 667 @ 716; Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das (2000) 2 SCC 465 @ 485, pr. 41, and State of A.P. v. Challa Ramkrishna Reddy (2000) 5 SCC 712 @ 726-727.

14. While judicial officers may be protected from being arrayed in legal proceedings for their judicial function, (eg. See Section 28 of the Act) they do not enjoy such immunity for the administrative functions performed by them or by their staff. For instance, the functions performed by High Court in its administrative side are amenable to judicial review in its judicial side. See R.C. Sood v. High Court of Rajasthan (1994) supp. 3 SCC 711; High Court of Judicature, Rajasthan v. Ramesh Chandra Paliwal(1998) 3 SCC 72 @ 85, para 30.

15. The grant of certified copies of orders of courts is not a sovereign function but is an administrative function. Since this is not a judicial function, it does not partake the character of a 'sovereign function'.

16. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that an applicant for certified copy of a judicial order, who deposits a fee for obtaining such copy is a "Consumer" within the meaning of the act and the proceeding of such application and the preparation and delivery of the copy in consideration of the copying charges/fee by the concerned staff attached to the court would be a service within the meaning of the Act.

17. In the light of the above discussion, we cannot sustain the impugned order which is hereby set aside. The order of the District Forum is upheld. In the peculiar facts of this case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. Before parting with we place on record our appreciation of the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Murlidharan, the amicus curiae appointed in this case.

It is a rule of law that every member of the public is presumed to know the law, it follows that the public must have a right of access to the judgments of the Courts which express that law.

Kerala High Court

V.J. Thomas vs State Of Kerala on 23 January, 1970

Equivalent citations: 1970 CriLJ 1499

Author: E Moidu

Bench: E Moidu

ORDER E.K. Moidu, J.

1. This Criminal Petition by one V. J. Thomas is directed against the order dated 23-8-1969 by the Sub-Magistrate, Chengannur, refusing to issue certified copies of (1) Police Refer Charge-sheet in Crime No. 94/68 of the Chengannur police station, and (2) the order passed thereon by the Sub-Magistrate on the basis of his copy application dated 7-8-69.

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11. In Ladli Prasad v. Emperor AIR 1931 All 364 on construing Section 548, Criminal Procedure Code., it is hold:

I see no reason to construe the words "affected by a judgment or order" narrowly. It certainly cannot be said that they refer to a person who is a party to the judgment or order, for the rights of the accused to a copy of the judgment are dealt with elsewhere in the Code. The public as a whole cannot fail to be affected by every judgment of a Criminal Court. For example, as in this case, the judgment in a Criminal case dealing with sedition affects the general public as indeed any judgment dealing With any crime is bound to affect the general public. A knowledge of the law, it is true, in many cases is made available to the public by statute, but the construction of statutes by the Courts, as expressed in their judgments, is of even greater importance. It is a rule of law that every member of the public is presumed to know the law, it follows that the public must have a right of access to the judgments of the Courts which express that law.

12. Though it relates to the copy of a judgment being given to a stranger, who is not a party to the judgment, the same argument holds good in respect of an order if it comes within the scope of Section 548 Cr. P. C.

13. It is clear that the police refer charge-sheet and the order passed thereon are held by the Sub-Magistrate as a public document and that the revision petitioner is entitled to get a copy of those documents as he was bound to have the right to inspect the same within the meaning of Section 76 of the Evidence Act. Accordingly, I find that the petitioner is entitled to get copies of these documents.

14. In the result, this revision petition is allowed. The order passed by the Sub-Magistrate on 23-8-1969 is set aside. The Sub-Magistrate will give copies of the documents applied for by the petitioner.

Impounding of an unmarked document after disposal of the suit is illegal- Return of Unmarked documents which attract stamp duty and penalty

Andhra High Court

K. Sivakanth Reddy And 3 Ors. vs P. Ramanjaneyulu And 2 Ors. on 24 August, 2007

Equivalent citations: AIR 2008 AP 4, 2007 (6) ALD 77

Author: G Yethirajulu

Bench: G Yethirajulu

ORDER G. Yethirajulu, J.

1. This Civil Revision Petition has been filed by the plaintiffs in O.S.No.245 of 2007 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge at Bhongir, Nalgonda District.

2. The plaintiffs filed the above suit for injunction. Along with the plaint, they filed an agreement of sale and some other documents. During pendency of the suit, the counsel for the plaintiffs filed a Memo stating that the matter is settled amicably out of Court and the plaintiffs intends to withdraw the suit as not pressed. In view of the Memo and in the presence of both parties, the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Bhongir dismissed the suit as not pressed without costs, through the order dated 13.07.2007. Later the plaintiffs filed I.A.No.656 of 2007 under Order 13, Rule VII (2) read with Section 151 of C.P.C. requesting the Court to return the unmarked documents including the agreement of sale dated 17.10.2006. The trial Court ordered return of documents 2 to 5 and in respect of document No. 1 i.e., agreement of sale, the trial Court withheld the same observing that the document is insufficiently stamped and the same has to be treated as a document under Section 47(A) of the Indian Stamp Act and to be considered as a sale deed as the agreement was coupled with possession, which has to be impounded by collecting stamp duty and penalty. The trial Court further directed that if the plaintiffs are willing to pay the stamp duty and penalty in the Court, the Section to collect the amount or else to send the document to the Collector for levying of stamp duty and penalty and thereafter return the document to the plaintiffs.

3. Being aggrieved by the order of the Junior Civil Judge, Bhongir, dated 13.07.2007, the present Civil Revision Petition has been filed contending that as the suit was disposed of, the Court became functus officio, therefore, it ought to have returned the unmarked document without resorting to collect the stamp duty and penalty on agreement of sale; that the trial Court ought to have observed that no relief is sought for on the basis of the document and it is only a document filed for collateral purpose; that the trial Court has no power to impound the document after disposal of the suit and Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act has no application to the present case.

4. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioners-plaintiffs relied on a judgment of this Court in Lokara Om Kumar v. baikan Satyanarayana and Ors. wherein this Court held that a document not marked in evidence has to be returned to the parties, who produced the same, without retaining them till the disposal of the suit. The decision is not directly applicable to the facts of the present case.

5. However, the learned Counsel drew the attention of this Court to a judgment rendered by Kerala High Court in Varghese v. State of Kerala and Ors. representing that the question that arose in the present case was dealt with by the Kerala High Court in the above decision and by considering the scope of Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act, the Kerala High Court held as follows: "If the document is merely presented along with the plaint, it cannot be said that the document was produced as contemplated under Section 33 of the Stamp Act. If the plaintiff intended to use the document as an item of evidence, then only the court can consider that it was a document 'produced' and the same can be impounded by the court. The Court has to judicially determine the matter as soon as the document is tendered in evidence and before it is marked as an exhibit in the case. Once the case is over and the decree was signed and sealed or it can no longer be considered to be part of the judicial record and cannot therefore properly come before the court again in the performance of its function and the court is not competent to compound the same."

6. In the case covered by the above decision, the revision petitioner filed a suit for injunction against the respondents 2 and 3. The suit related to the building, which was under the occupation of the revision petitioner as a tenant. At the time of presentation of the plaint, the plaintiff produced a rent deed. The Chief Ministerial Officer of the Court noticed that the rent deed was not properly stamped and a sum of Rs. 41,217/- was payable as stamp duty and penalty. The learned Munsiff thereafter made an endorsement on the document 'pay stamp duty and penalty. The suit was not pressed and the same was dismissed on 02.07.1984. Later, the plaintiff filed an application for the return of the document. The document was not returned and the same was impounded by the learned Munsiff on 03.08.1984. The application to return the document was dismissed. The short question that arises for consideration is whether the order of the learned Munsiff impounding the document on 03.08.1984 was correct. Under the above set of facts, the Court rendered the above judgment.

7. For proper adjudication, it is appropriate to extract Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, which reads as under:

33. Examination and impounding of instruments - (1) every person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, and every person in charge of a public office, except an officer of police, before whom any instrument, chargeable, in his opinion, with duty, is produced or comes in the performance of his functions, shall, if it appears to him that such instrument is not duly stamped, impound the same.

(2) For that purpose every such person shall examine every instrument so chargeable and so produced or coming before him, in order to ascertain whether it is stamped with a stamp of the value and description required by the law in force in India when such instrument was executed or first executed: Provided that -

(a) nothing herein contained shall be deemed require any magistrate or Judge of a Criminal Court to examine or impound, if he does not think fit so to do, any instrument coming before him in the course of any proceeding other than a proceeding under Chapter XII or Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898);

(b) in the case of a Judge of a High Court, the duty of examining and impounding any instrument under this section may be delegated to such officer as the Court appoints in this behalf.

(3) For the purposes of this section, in cases of doubt -

(a) the State government may determine what offices shall be deemed to be public offices; and

(b) the State Government may determine who shall be deemed to be persons in charge of public offices.

8. Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 is as under:

35. Instruments not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence, etc.-No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer, unless such instrument is duly stamped: Provided that-

(a) any such instrument not being an instrument chargeable with a duty not exceeding ten naye paise only, or a bill of exchange or promissory note, shall, subject to all just exceptions, be admitted in evidence on payment of the duty with which the same is chargeable or, in the case of an instrument insufficiently stamped, of the amount required to make up such duty, together with a penalty of five rupees, or, when ten times the amount of the proper duty or deficient portion thereof exceeds five rupees, of a sum equal to ten times such dtuy or portion;

(b) where any person from whom a stamped receipt could have been demanded, has given an unstamped receipt and such receipt, if stamped, would be admissible in evidence against him, then such receipt shall be admitted in evidence against him, then such receipt shall be admitted in evidence against him on payment of a penalty of one rupee by the person tendering it;

(c) where a contract or agreement of any kind is effected by correspondence consisting of two or more letters and any one of the letters bears the proper stamp, the contract or agreement shall be deemed to be duly stamped;

(d) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of any instrument in evidence in any proceeding in a Criminal Court, other than a proceeding under Chapter XII or Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898.;

(e) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of any instrument in any Court when such instrument has been executed by or on behalf of the Government or where it bears the certificate of the Collector as provided by Section 32 or any other provision of this Act.

9. A question of similar nature came up before various High Courts. In Khetra Mohan Saha v. Jamini Kanta Dewan AIR 1927 Calcutta 472 a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court held that if the suit has already been disposed of and decree signed and sealed, Section 35 of the Stamp Act was wholly inapplicable.

10. A similar question arose in Puran Chand v. Emperor AIR 1942 Lahore 257. In the case covered by the above decision, a suit was filed for recovery of possession of certain properties. The defendant contended that he bought the properties from the original owner. Along with the written statement, the defendant produced two receipts. The stamp auditor pointed out to the Sub-Judge that one of the receipts amounted to a conveyance and therefore, it was under stamped. On 10th June 1938, the Sub-Judge ordered for the return of that document. But it was not taken off and remained on the record. In August 1938, the Sub-Judge passed an order impounding the very same document and the document was sent to the Collector for realization of stamp duty. But, by mistake a wrong receipt was sent for collection. The question arose whether the order of impounding passed after the order for the return of document was proper. The court was of the view that the impounding order was illegal. The Special Bench of Lahore High Court held as follows:

When a Court orders a document to be returned because it is not proved it can no longer be considered to be part of the judicial record and cannot therefore properly come before the Court again in the performance of its functions, unless, of course by any chance, the order is reviewed and the document is allowed to be tendered again in evidence. But otherwise, it would remain in the custody of the Court after such order only for being returned to the party concerned.

11. In Paiku Kashinath v. Gaya AIR 1949 Nagpur 214 the Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court held that a Court has no jurisdiction to reopen a case to impound a document after the decree is signed and to order the recovery of the stamp duty and penalty.

12. In Javer Chand v. Pukhraj Surana the Supreme Court of India considered the question of impounding the document and held as follows:

Where a question as to the admissibility of a document is raised on the ground that it has not been stamped, or has not been properly stamped it has to be decided then and there when the document is tendered in evidence. Once the Court, rightly or wrongly, decides to admit the document in evidence, so far as the parties are concerned, the matter is closed Parties to a litigation, where such a controversy is raised, have to be circumspect and the party challenging the admissibility of the document has to be alert to see that the document is not admitted in evidence by the Court. The Court has to judicially determine the matter as soon as the document is tendered in evidence and before it is marked as an exhibit in the case.

Once a document has been marked as an exhibit in the case and the trial has proceeded all along on the footing that the document was an exhibit in the case and has been used by the parties in examination and cross-examination of their witnesses, S. 36 of the Stamp Act comes into operation. Once a document has been admitted in evidence, as aforesaid, it is not open either to the trial Court itself or to a court of Appeal or revision to go behind that order.

13. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the revision petitioners/plaintiffs submits that in the light of the above legal position, it has to be held that the trial Court is not entitled to impound the document by ordering collection of stamp duty and penalty and requested to allow the petition by setting aside the order.

14. After going through the above decisions, it is clearly indicated that the impounding of a document cannot be made after the Court has become functus officio. If the document is merely presented along with the plaint, it cannot be said that the document was produced as contemplated under Section 33 of the Stamp Act. If the plaintiff intended to use the document as an item of evidence, then only the court can consider that it was a document 'produced' and the same can be impounded by the Court. The Court has to judicially determine the matter as soon as the document is tendered in evidence and before it is marked as an exhibit in the case. Once the case is over and the decree was signed and sealed or it can no longer be considered to be part of the judicial record and cannot therefore properly come before the court again in the performance of its function and the court is not competent to compound the same.

15. In the present case also, the trial Court resorted to impound an unmarked document after disposal of the suit. Therefore, the impounding of an unmarked document after disposal of the suit is illegal and the order passed by the trial Court is not sustainable.

16. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the order of the trial Court dated 13.07.2007 is set aside.

The application covered by I.A.No. 656 of 2007 is allowed.

The trial Court is directed to return the document to the revision petitioners- plaintiffs without impounding the same through proper acknowledgement. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.

In an offence under 306 IPC, before conviction, prosecution must establish active role of accused by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide

Mentioning of specific day, date, year and time in summons is a statutory requirement

Standard operating procedures calendar released Judicial Academy

Denial of Maintenance to the wife who is residing separately without reasonable cause

In execution petition reliefs more than one also can be prayed for

Andhra High Court A. Ramesh vs Chintala Prabha And Anr. on 14 August, 2001 Equivalent citations: 2001 (6) ALD 240, 2001 (6) ALT 529 Bench: P Narayana

ORDER

1. The revision petitioner who is the Judgment Debtor in E.P.No. 12 of 1997 in O.S.No. 431 of 1993 on the file of the Principal District Munsiff at Karimnagar, filed the present revision, aggrieved by the order of issuing warrant of delivery of possession against him on 22-10-1998. For the purpose of deciding the present, revision, the other factual details may not be necessary. 2. Sri Ramesh Sagar, learned Counsel for revision petitioner/ judgment debtor had raised the following contentions. Learned counsel submitted that in E.P.No. 12 of 1997, two reliefs have been prayed for, one is for recovery of rents and another is for delivery of property. The learned counsel had drawn my attention to Rule 55 and Rule 218 of A. P. Civil Rules of Practice, and also had drawn my attention to Order 21 Rule 11 of the C.P.C. and contended that the relief of recovery of money cannot be prayed for and in this view of the matter, the very E.P. containing two prayers is not maintainable and hence the order of delivery made in pursuance of such Execution Petition is unsustainable in law. 3. Sri P.V.Narayana Rao, learned counsel representing respondent/decree holder had submitted that Rule 55 and Rule 218 of the A.P. Civil Rules of Practice, 1990, are applicable only to interlocutory proceedings and also to execution applications which would be filed in the main E.P. proceedings. Learned counsel had also drawn my attention to Rule 209 of the A.P. Civil Rules of Practice, 1990 (in short hereinafter called as the Rules for the sake of convenience) and contended that in view of the specific provisions, it cannot be said that Rule 55 and Rule 218 of the Rules are applicable. The learned counsel had drawn my attention to Order 21 Rule 11 (J) of C. P. C. and contended that the reliefs prayed for in the E.P. are in accordance with law and that there is no illegality and placed reliance on VIRYALA PERRAJU v. PILLI ACHANNA, and judgment of Division Bench in D.NARAYANASWAMY NAIDU v. T.T. DEVASTHANAMS, TIRUPATI, 1994 (3) ALT 29 and contended that in the light of the ratio in the above decisions, it cannot be said that two prayers cannot be prayed for in Execution Petition as such. 4. After hearing both the parties at length, it may be appropriate to deal with the relevant provisions on this aspect before proceeding further, 5. Rule 55 of the Rules, falls under the interlocutory proceedings, which reads as follows: "Separate Application for each distinct prayer:- There shall be separate application in respect of each distinct relief prayed for. When several reliefs are combined in one application, the court may direct the applicant to confine the application only to one of such reliefs unless the reliefs are consequential and to file a separate application in respect of each of the others." A. Ramesh vs Chintala Prabha And Anr. on 14 August, 2001 Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1698525/ 1 6. It is relevant to look into Rule 53 of the Rules here itself, which deals with the form of interlocutory applications: "Form of Interlocutory Application :--Interlocutory applications shall be headed with the cause title of the plaint, original petition, or appeal, as in Form No. 13." 7. It is no doubt true that Rule 218 of the Rules dealing with application of rules specifies that Rules 53 to 59 and 213 supra shall apply to all applications by a party to the suit or matter made in or with respect to pending execution petition." 8. Rule 213 of the Rules reads as follows:-- Determination of question arising in execution of Decree:--If any question arises for the determination of the Court executing a decree the same shall be heard and determined upon the hearing of the petition or an application made therein, and, if evidence is taken orally, the court shall record the evidence of the witness, and mark all exhibits admitted in evidence, in accordance with Order XVIII, Rules 4 and 9 to the Code. The Court shall, in any case records its judgment and draw up its order in the same manner as upon the hearing of a suit. 9. Rule 209 of the Rules deals with application for execution, which reads as follows: ' 1. Except when made under Order XXI Rule 11 (1) of the Code, an application for execution of a decree shall be by petition and, in addition to the particulars set forth in Order XXI, Rule 11(2) of the Code, shall be headed with the cause title of the suit and separately numbered in each suit. 2. The Petition shall, if it relates to any property of the judgment debtor, pray for the realisation thereof, in the manner appropriate to the nature of the property, as in Form No-53 and shall also set out the whole of the relief which the Applicant requires at the time of presenting the same. The Court shall not grant any relief not claimed by the execution petition." 10. Now coming to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is relevant to note Order 21 Rule 11 of C.P.C. Order 21 Rule 11(1) of C. P. C. deals with oral application and Order 21 Rule 11 (2) of C.P.C. deals with written application. The relevant portion is Order 21 Rule 11 (2) (J) which deals with the modes in which the assistance of the Court is required and the said provision reads as under: "(J) the mode in which the assistance of the Court is required, Whether:-- (i) the delivery of any property specifically decreed; (ii) by the attachment, or by the attachment and sale, or by the sale without attachment, of any property; (iii) by the arrest and detention in prison of any person; A. Ramesh vs Chintala Prabha And Anr. on 14 August, 2001 Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1698525/ 2 (iv) by the appointment of a receiver; (v) otherwise, as the nature of the relief granted may require. 11. In the light of these provisions, now the question that has to be decided is whether there is any illegality in the order impugned in the present revision. 12. It is no doubt true that in E.P.12 of 1997 in O.S.No. 431 of 1991 on the file of Principal District Munsiff, Karimnagar, two reliefs have been sought for. It is pertinent to note that the relief granted is only issuance of delivery warrants, that too on the ground that the Appeal itself was dismissed. Under Order 21 Rule 11(2) (J), it is pertinent to note that apart from the relief of delivery of any property specifically decreed, the relief by the attachment or by the attachment and sale or sale without attachment of any property and also by the arrest and detention in prison of any person have been specified. Here itself, it is made clear that the Code of Civil Procedure is the parent legislation and the A.P. Civil Rules of Practice, 1990, at any stretch of imagination cannot over-ride the aforesaid rules. 13. Be that as it may, the main Execution Petition, in my opinion can contain more than one relief for the reason that E.P. could be filed for execution of a decree. A decree will be drafted on the strength of a judgment, the judgment and decree may grant several reliefs to a party and while putting the reliefs granted by virtue of a decree into execution, 1 do not think that any such restriction can be placed in filing the execution petition. In the light of the above provisions read with Order 21 Rule 11(2)(J) of CPC, I am of the opinion that in execution petition reliefs more than one also can be prayed for since execution petition will be filed only for the purpose of execution of the decree and if the decree grants several reliefs, in the execution petition, the decree holder need not be driven to file separate E. Ps for each relief and for the purpose of convenience decree holder is at liberty to execute the whole decree claiming all the reliefs in one execution petition or otherwise, at least at his own choice and convenience and hence such restriction as contended by Sri Ramesh Sagar cannot be imposed, even in the light of the provisions referred to supra. 14. However, the view which I am expressing is also supported by the decisions of this Court (cited 1 and 2 supra) wherein it was held that the decree holder has a right to proceed simultaneously against two judgment debtors and also ask for more than one relief. 15. Apart from this, while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 115 of C.P.C., I am satisfied that since it was represented that the Appeal also was dismissed, the Court below was justified in issuing delivery warrant and if the impugned order is allowed to stand, it will not occasion in any failure of justice. Unless this additional ingredient also is satisfied, I am not inclined to interfere with the order of the Court below. 16. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the considered opinion that the present revision petition is devoid of merits and it is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed. No costs. A. Ramesh vs Chintala Prabha And Anr. on 14 August, 2001 Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1698525/ 3