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SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is not an instrument to blackmail innocents; Mere allegation not enough for arrest

Supreme Court: Acknowledging the abuse of law of arrest in cases under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (the Atrocities Act), the bench of AK Goel and UU Lalit, JJ said that the legislature never intended to use the Atrocities Act as an instrument to blackmail or to wreak personal vengeance nor was it intended to deter public servants from performing their bona fide duties. It was, hence, held that unless exclusion of anticipatory bail is limited to genuine cases and inapplicable to cases where there is no prima facie case was made out, there will be no protection available to innocent citizens.

The Court said:

“the Act cannot be converted into a charter for exploitation or oppression by any unscrupulous person or by police for extraneous reasons against other citizens as has been found on several occasions. … Any harassment of an innocent citizen, irrespective of caste or religion, is against the guarantee of the Constitution.”

The Court held:

“an accused is certainly entitled to show to the Court, if he apprehends arrest, that case of the complainant was motivated. If it can be so shown there is no reason that the Court is not able to protect liberty of such a person. There cannot be any mandate under the law for arrest of an innocent. The law has to be interpreted accordingly.”

Holding that mere unilateral allegation by any individual belonging to any caste, when such allegation is clearly motivated and false, cannot be treated as enough to deprive a person of his liberty without an independent scrutiny, the Court issued the following directions:

• there is no absolute bar against grant of anticipatory bail in cases under the Atrocities Act if no prima facie case is made out or where on judicial scrutiny the complaint is found to be prima facie mala fide.
• arrest of a public servant can only be after approval of the appointing authority and of a non-public servant after approval by the S.S.P. which may be granted in appropriate cases if considered necessary for reasons recorded. Such reasons must be scrutinized by the Magistrate for permitting further detention.
• to avoid false implication of an innocent, a preliminary enquiry may be conducted by the DSP concerned to find out whether the allegations make out a case under the Atrocities Act and that the allegations are not frivolous or motivated.
• any violation of the direction of the Court will be actionable by way of disciplinary action as well as contempt.

[Dr Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 243, decided on 20.03.2018]

Land records are neither private information nor ‘third party’ information

Central Information Commission (CIC): “The land records containing the names of different owners and describing boundaries and extent of the land are public records and the information such as names of persons and the extent of land owned or possessed by the public authority is neither private information nor ‘third party’ information,” held CIC while directing the Delhi Government to consider displaying the land records on the prominent walls of villages for the convenience of the people as done in Telangana and several villages in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. This order of CIC came upon an appeal filed by a person who sought information regarding number of plot holders, land covered by the plots and the extent of the land left for agriculture in Kamabavala Village. Said information was denied by the Delhi government officials on the ground that property details of other persons available in land records of the village constitute the ‘third party’ information of various owners and thus could not be given under RTI to the appellant. The Commission rejected the said contention and observed that the land is open and transaction of change of ownership of a particular piece of land is registered with Registrar for being recorded as admissible evidence of that ownership for public to know. Registration is notification to society and evidence of the transaction and not an affair to be kept secret. CIC further observed that being a public record held by the Revenue Department, it is the duty of the public authority to provide access to the public, as transparency is the only way by which corruption can be prevented. “Transparency of the land records is the mandate as per the Right to Information Act, 2005 and Public Records Act, 1993”, noted CIC while directing Delhi government to provide relevant information to the appellant and also to explore writing the record of rights on the prominent walls in villages. (Surender Pal Singh v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, GNCTD, Delhi, 2014 SCC OnLine CIC 10337, decided on December 29, 2014)

Property details, investments and assets can be accessed by one’s spouse under RTI

Property details, investments and assets can be accessed by one’s spouse under RTI

Central Information Commission (CIC): “Though certain documents like annual returns of assets, investments, IT returns etc were earlier declared as private/ personal or third party information, as far as spouses are concerned they are not private or personal or third party information between them, in the context of marital disputes especially for maintenance purposes”, held CIC while directing Delhi Transco Ltd. to provide property details, investments and assets of the husband, to an estranged wife and an alleged victim of domestic violence. This order of CIC came upon an appeal filed by a woman engaged in matrimonial and maintenance dispute with her husband who was a government employee and she sought to know details of his property including that given in dowry and action details against her husband for attempting to commit bigamy, etc. While rejecting the contention of Delhi Transco that income details of a person is “personal information”, CIC referred to the judgments of Delhi High Court, Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 6793, decided on 14th January 2015) and Puneet Kaur v. Inderjit Singh Sawhney, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3841, in which the court had asked both husband and wife to submit affidavits of income, assets and investments. CIC further observed that depending on the financial conditions and non-availability of support from parents, when husband does not maintain his wife, it challenges her right to live, and thus information related to maintenance becomes life related information. This information about assets, income and investments of spouses is no more private or personal information as against spouses, even if that information could be personal or private information as against any person other than spouse. The proviso to Section 8(1)(j) read with Section 8(2) of the Right to Information Act entitled the appellant to get information which she sought because of overwhelming public interest in securing the lives of deserted wives. So far, such information has been considered exempt under the RTI Act and treated as private or third party information. CIC also lashed the PIO and General Manager (HR) of Delhi Transco for suppressing the information and obstructing the furnishing of information to the appellant. (Prashansa Sharma v. Delhi Transco Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine CIC 258, decided on February 3, 2015)

427 Cr.P.C - Subsequent convictions.

Andhra High Court
V. Venkateswarlu vs State Of Andhra Pradesh on 24 March, 1987
Author: K J Reddy Bench: K J Reddy, S S Quadr JUDGMENT K. Jayachandra Reddy, J.

1. The offences against the property are dealt with in Chap. XVII, Penal Code, of them the offences of Robbery and Dacoity are aggravated offences and severe sentences are also prescribed. Some of the professional dacoits are getting involved in number of incidents and are being tried invariably in different Courts and are being sentenced to various terms of imprisonment depending upon the facts of each case. It is also common feature that in such cases, a convicted dacoit undergoing the sentences of imprisonment awarded in one case, is again convicted for similar offence in a different case by a different Court. Section 427, Cr.P.C. lays down that when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. Not infrequently, applications under S. 482, Cr.P.C. are sent through Jail to this Court with the prayer that this Court should exercise its inherent power and direct that the two sentences shall run concurrently.
2. The learned Public Prosecutor, having regard to the nature of the offence and the frequent occurrence of such offences, has argued before Radhakrishna Rao, J., who was hearing this case sitting single, that this Court should generally not exercise the inherent power under S. 482, Cr.P.C. in such cases, and it was also to some extent contended that such applications under S. 482, Cr.P.C. filed by the professional dacoits should not be entertained. The learned Public Prosecutor placed considerable reliance on the judgment of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court reported in Gopal Das v. State, 1978 Delhi 138 : (1978 Cri LJ 961) and also on certain observations made by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court reported in Mulain Singh v. State, 1974 Cri LJ 1397. The learned single Judge, after hearing the arguments on both sides felt that the question is of some importance and therefore is to be decided by a Division Bench. That is how this case has come up before us.
3. The principle question that arise for consideration is "Whether the High Court in exercise of its powers under S. 401 or 482, Cr.P.C. is competent to order the sentences to run concurrently when the convictions and sentences that have been passed by the two Criminal Courts of different Sessions Divisions have become final ?"
4. Incidentally we have to decide the scope of S. 427, Cr.P.C. also and consider when the convictions and sentences have been passed by the Sessions Judges of different Sessions Divisions whether one Sessions Judge can direct that the sentence awarded by him to an accused before him shall run concurrently with the sentence awarded by the other Sessions Judge and whether the case of a dacoit has to be treated differently from the case of an ordinary criminal with regard to the direction that may be given for the sentences to run concurrently.
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5. Section 482, Cr.P.C., 1973 is in the same language as S. 561-A of the old Code. The High Court is vested with the power to give effect to any order of any of the lower Courts over which it has overall jurisdiction with a view to prevent abuse of process of any such Court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This is an extraordinary power conferred on the High Court and it is laid down that it ought to be exercised sparingly with circumstances and in rare cases and that too to correct patent illegalities or to secure the ends of justice. In exercising this power, the High Court has to be careful to see that its decision is based on sound general principles of criminal jurisprudence and is not in conflict with them or with the intention of the Legislative. Apart from this power, the High Court has also its revisional powers under S. 397 read with 401, Cr.P.C. Section 397, Cr.P.C., lays down that the High Court or any Session Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceedings before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any such proceedings, and in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by Sections 386, 389, 390 and 391 or on a Court of Session by S. 307.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the High Court in exercise of its revisional power or in exercise of its inherent power, can direct the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous sentence already being served by a person who is convicted. The learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand, submits that, in the absence of any appeal or revision by the convicted person, the High Court should not exercise its inherent power and direct the sentence to run concurrently as provided under S. 427, Cr.P.C. It is also submitted that, when the aggrieved accused has not preferred any revision, then the question of exercising the suo motu power by the High Court also does not arise.
7. At the outset we must point that that there is no period of limitation to exercise the suo motu power by the High Court under its revisional jurisdiction as provided under S. 397, Cr.P.C. The High Court for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, can call for the records and exercise any of the powers conferred on the Court of Appeal. There cannot be any dispute that when an accused prefers an appeal questioning his conviction and sentence, he may also alternatively ask the appellate Court to direct the sentence to run concurrently as provided under S. 427, Cr.P.C. If that be so, we are unable to see as to how the High Court is precluded from exercising its revisional jurisdiction to direct the sentences to run concurrently as provided under S. 427, Cr.P.C. The exercise of revisional power can be suo motu or on an application filed by the convicted person. May be in a given case the convicted accused may not prefer revision, but when he files an application under S. 482, Cr.P.C. and when it comes to the knowledge of the High Court and the High Court wants to satisfy itself about the propriety of the sentence passed, it can call for the records and exercise the power of the appellate Court and direct, if necessary, that the sentence should run concurrently as provided under S. 427, Cr.P.C. Similarly, the High Court can also exercise its power under S. 48Z Cr.P.C. The question whether there is such a power or not is different from the manner of exercise of the same. It is always left to the discretion of the Court either to exercise its power or not, and in doing so, the facts and circumstances in each case assume importance. We have not come across any decision which goes to the extent of laying down that the High Court cannot exercise its power under S. 397 read with S. 401, Cr.P.C. or under S. 482, Cr.P.C. to direct the sentence to run concurrently under S. 427, Cr.P.C. if the facts and
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circumstances warrant.
8. We shall now refer to some of the decided cases which throw some light on the point. In Sitaraman v. Pattabhiraman, AIR 1958 Mad 453 the learned single Judge held that where the petitioner has exhausted all the remedies available to him under law and sentences have already been passed against him, there is no power in the High Court to review the Orders passed by the trial Court. There is no reference to any of the provisions of law and there is no discussion in this case. In Venkanna v. State of A.P., Mohamed Mirza, J., referred to the judgment of the Madras High Court and disagreed with the view taken therein. He also referred to the judgment of the Patna High Court. He agreed with the view taken by the Patna High Court reported in Baijnath v. State, where it was held that a petition seeking a direction that the sentence should be ordered to run concurrently does not raise any question either of altering or reviewing the Judgment of the High Court and overriding the specific provisions of S. 369, Cr.P.C. and the order passed under S. 561-A would be a separate order. The learned Judge, in other words, held that the High Court can exercise its inherent power and direct the sentences to run concurrently. In A. Satyam v. State of A.P., (1978) 2 Andh WR 451 : (1978 Cri LJ NOC 2 & 3) Sambasiva Rao, J., referred to the judgment of Mohamed Mirza, J., reported in Venkanna v. State of A.P. (supra) and also the Judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in A. S. Naidu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1975 Cri LJ 498 and held that the High Court can exercise its power under S. 397, Cr.P.C. which is an independent power and direct the sentence to run concurrently. The learned Judge, however, pointed out that even after the appeals or revisions preferred by the convict against his conviction in the said trials have been dismissed, the high Court can exercise its independent power under sub-section (1) of S. 397. The learned Judge did not go to the extent of laying down that the inherent power cannot be exercised at all. He simply observed that it may not be necessary to lay down a principle when there is a specific provision under S. 397, Cr.P.C. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Mulaim Singh v. State, 1974 Cri LJ 1397 also held that the Court is vested with a discretion to direct that the sentence under the subsequent conviction shall run concurrently with the previous sentence and the same can be exercised at the stage when the Court records the subsequent conviction. The Full Bench also held that the High Court is competent under S. 561-A to direct that the sentence of imprisonment under a subsequent conviction shall run concurrently with a previous sentence. They however, observed that the inherent power is to be exercised to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice. A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in A. S. Naidu v. State of M.P. (supra) observed that the High Court can exercise its discretion under sub-section (1) of S. 397 and direct the sentence awarded in a subsequent trial to run concurrently with the sentence awarded in a previous trial and such power can be exercised even after the disposal of the case on merits and the same does not amount to review of the judgment. In Mahesh v. State, 1971 Cri LJ 1674 (All) a Full Bench, after review of judicial decisions on the point held that the inherent power is to be exercised in exceptional circumstances and the same is not meant to reassess the evidence and has to be exercised to secure the ends of justice. In Baijnath v. State (1961 (1) Cri LJ 423) (supra) it has been held that a petition under S. 561A seeking a direction to direct the sentence to run concurrently does not raise any question either of altering or reviewing the judgment and, therefore, such a petition can be entertained. Therefore, almost all the High Courts have taken the view that an application is maintainable under S. 482, Cr.P.C. seeking the High Court to exercise its inherent power and give the necessary directions as provided under S. 427, Cr.P.C. We are also of
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the view that the High Court, suo motu, while exercising its jurisdiction under S. 397 read with S. 401, Cr.P.C. can also give the same directions as provided under S. 427, Cr.P.C. in appropriate cases.
9. The learned Public Prosecutor, however, laid considerable reliance on the judgment of the Delhi High Court reported in Gopal Das v. State (1978 Cri LJ 961) (supra) wherein it was held that the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, Calcutta High Court, Patna High Court as well as the Allahabad High Court is not good law in view of the decisions reported in R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, and Palaniappa Gounder v. State of T.N., . We have carefully gone through the judgment of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court and we are unable to see as to how the view taken by the A.P. High Court and the other High Courts can be said to be not good law. In R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (supra) which is popularly called 'Kapur's case', the inherent power of the High Court as provided under S. 561-A was considered and their Lordships held that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings only in appropriate cases. The principles laid down therein mainly apply to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction to quash the proceedings. Their Lordships did not go to the extent of laying down that the inherent power cannot be exercised at all. In Palaniappa Gounder v. State of T.N. (supra) the Supreme Court held that an application under S. 482, Cr.P.C. by the heirs of the deceased seeking compensation cannot be entertained since there is an express provision under S. 357 conferring power on the court to pass an order for payment of compensation. We are unable to see as to how the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in this case prevents the High Court from exercising the inherent power when an application is made under S. 482, Cr.P.C. seeking the court to give direction as provided under S. 427, Cr.P.C. The learned Public Prosecutor no doubt submits that when there is a specific power under S. 427, Cr.P.C. and when the lower court has not exercised the same for some reason or the other, then it is not open for the convict to come forward with an application under S. 482, Cr.P.C. We see no force in this submission. It must be remembered that S. 427, Cr.P.C. provides for directing the sentence awarded in the subsequent case to run concurrently with the previous sentence. It may be that the subsequent convicting Court was not apprised about the existence of the previous sentence. At any rate ordering of sentence to run concurrently does not amount to altering the finding. It may be noted that S. 31, Cr.P.C., provides for ordering the sentences to run concurrently in a given case. Likewise, under S. 427, Cr.P.C. while awarding a sentence in a subsequent case in respect of the person who is already undergoing sentence in a previous case, a discretion is given to the subsequent convicting Court to give such a direction and or-der the sentence to run concurrently with the previous sentence. As laid down in the above decisions, even after such a sentence has become final nothing prevents the High Court to exercise its suo motu revisional jurisdiction or entertain an application under S. 482, Cr.P.C. and give the necessary directions as provided under S. 427, Cr.P.C.
10. The learned Public Prosecutor, however, relied on certain passages in the judgment of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court reported in Mulain Singh v. State, (1974 Cri LJ 1397) (supra), wherein it was observed :
"The discretion to make the sentence on subsequent conviction run concurrently with the previous sentence must be based on some sound principle and is not meant to be exercised in an arbitrary manner. It would be proper exercise of discretion to make the sentence on a subsequent conviction
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to run concurrently with the previous sentence where separate trials are held for offence which while constituting distinct offences, are inherently or intimately connected with each other. A person employed to realise money for his master from persons who owe it to him in connection with business dealings may misappropriate money realised from some debtors during the course of a certain period and may be tried separately for each item of money misappropriated and may subsequently be sentenced to separate terms of imprisonment. It would be proper exercise of discretion to make the sentence run concurrently in the exercise of the discretion conferred by S. 397(1), Cr.P.C., and if that stage is over, by the High Court under S. 561A of the Code. A person may be put up for trial for offences punishable under S. 399/522, I.P.C. He may be separately tried for an offence punishable under S. 25, Arms Act, in respect of a weapon recovered from his possession at the time of his arrest. It would be a proper exercise of discretion if the sentence on subsequent conviction is made to run concurrently with the previous sentence. There may be a cause where although it is brought to the notice of the Court holding the subsequent trial or to the appellate Court hearing appeal from the subsequent conviction that the accused was already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment as a result of his conviction in an earlier criminal trial but due to an oversight the Court omits to exercise its discretion of making the sentence on subsequent conviction run concurrently with the previous sentence, it would be a fit case for exercise of the inherent power of the Court under S. 561A of the Code to make the two sentences run concurrently on the principle that the accused should not be made to suffer on account of the omission of the Court to apply its mind to the discretionary power vested in it under the Code. If the fact of the previous conviction and sentence is brought to the notice of the Court dealing with subsequent trial, whether as an original Court or as the appellate Court, it is the duty of the Court dealing with the subsequent trial to apply its mind to the question whether the sentence on subsequent conviction should be made concurrent with the previous sentence and if the Court for one reason or the other fails to apply its mind to that question, it should be in the interests of justice that the High Court rectifies that mistake under its inherent power. In such a situation the Court would not be acting contrary to any provisions of the Code or against any express or implied prohibition contained in it."
It can be seen that the Allahabad High Court was only laying down certain guidelines and we respectfully agree with these observations. But we are unable to accede to the contention that an application under S. 482, Cr.P.C., seeking directions under S. 427, Cr.P.C., cannot lie at all. The High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction suo motu or in exercise of its inherent power under S. 482, can direct the sentence to run concurrently as provided under S. 427, Cr.P.C., even though the convictions and sentences that have been passed by the Additional Sessions Judges of different Sessions Divisions have become final.
11. This leads us to the question whether any interference is called for in the instant case. As pointed out by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, this power should be exercised sparingly and not in an arbitrary manner, and the nature of the offence has also to be taken into consideration. It is needless to say that in the case of professional dacoits the Court has to exercise its extraordinary power sparingly with circumspection and in rare cases and that too to correct patent illegalities and to secure the ends of justice. In the instant case, the petitioner is convicted for the offence of dacoity in both the cases. Having regard to the nature of the offence, we do not think that this is a fit case where we should exercise our inherent power or suo motu revisional power in favour of the
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petitioners.
12. The petition is, therefore, dismissed.
13. Petition dismissed.
V. Venkateswarlu vs State Of Andhra Pradesh on 24 March, 1987

Every Award of Lok Adalath, whether passed in a civil case or in a criminal case, is executable. The Act does not make out any such distinction between the reference made by a civil court and criminal court. Apex Court Judgment

Supreme Court of India

K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon vs C.D. Shaji on 28 November, 2011

Bench: P. Sathasivam, J. Chelameswar

                                                                         REPORTABLE
                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                  CIVIL APPEAL NO.  10209  OF 2011
                (Arising out of SLP (C) No.2798 of 2010)

K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon                                    .... Appellant (s)

               Versus

C.D. Shaji                                                      .... Respondent(s)


                              J U D G M E N T 

P. Sathasivam, J. 

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

17. From the above discussion, the following propositions emerge:

1) In view of the unambiguous language of Section 21 of the Act, every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court and as such it is executable by that Court.

2) The Act does not make out any such distinction between the reference made by a civil court and criminal court.

3) There is no restriction on the power of the Lok Adalat to pass an award based on the compromise arrived at between the parties in respect of cases referred to by various Courts (both civil and criminal), Tribunals, Family court, Rent Control Court, Consumer Redressal Forum, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and other Forums of similar nature.

4) Even if a matter is referred by a criminal court under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and by virtue of the deeming provisions, the award passed by the Lok Adalat based on a compromise has to be treated as a decree capable of execution by a civil court.

18) In view of the above discussion and ultimate conclusion, we set aside the order dated 23.09.2009 passed by the Principal Munsiff Judge in an unnumbered execution petition of 2009 in CC No. 1216 of 2007 and the order of the High Court dated 24.11.2009 in Writ Petition (C) No. 33013 of 2009.

Consequently, we direct the execution court to restore the execution petition and to proceed further in accordance with law.

19) Before parting with this case, we would like to record our deep appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by the learned amicus curiae.

20) The civil appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

.................................................J.

(P. SATHASIVAM) ...............................................J.

(J. CHELAMESWAR) NEW DELHI;

NOVEMBER 28, 2011.

20 kInds of Suits, relevant provision for Court Fee under APCF and SV Act, Limitation and Place of suing.,

1]            Suit based on Demand Promissory note for Recovery Money:-

           Court Fee:-    Advalorem Fees U/Sec.20 of  A.P.C.F. & S.V.Act  r/w. Art 1 ©  of Schedule -I of Court Fee Act.

      Limitation:-     Art-31,34,35 36 and 37 – Three years

Sec:18:-            Effect of acknowledgment  of debt -  Extends  Limitation only against the person who  has made it in  writing and signed  and does’t  bind other promissors.

Sec.19:-            Effect of payment:- If payment is made  by any  one of the borrowers/promissors if binds  all promissors – 1974 (1) An WR -98.

Sec.25(3) of Indian  Contract Act:- Promise  to pay  a debt barred  by limitation Law.

Jurisdiction:-  U/Sec. 20 C.P.C.

(a)    Where the promissory note executed.

(b)   Where the defendant ordinarily resides, carries on business or personally works for gain.

(c)    If there are more than one defendants executed Demand Promissory note, suit can be filed where any one of the defendants resides, but leave of the court is to be obtained U/Sec.20 (b) C.P.C.

2]            Suit  for arrears of rent:

                Court Fee:           Ad valorem court fee U/Sec.20 r/w. Art. 1(c)

                Limitation:           Art.52 – When the arrears 3 years – becomes due.

Jurisdiction:           Where the lease hold property is situated   or where rent agreed to be paid as per lease deed or where defendant resides-

3]            Suit for eviction (Other than RCC)

                Court Fee:           Ad valorem court fee U/Sec.40 (2) r/w. Sec.20 and Art.1 (c) of Court Fee Act.

                Limitation:           Art.67 – When the tenancy determined.  12 years

Jurisdiction:           Where the demised premises is situated U/Sec.16 of CPC.

4]            Suit for Specific Performance of an agreement of sale:-

Court Fee:           Ad valorem court fee U/Sec.39 of Court Fee Act on the amount of the consideration.

Limitation:           Art.54 of Limitation Act – 3 years- the date fixed for Performance or if knows such date fixed when the Plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.

Jurisdiction:           Where the subject matter of the property is situated U/Sec.16 of CPC. 

5]            Suit by a Bank for recovery of loan:-

                1]            Based on Simple Agreement with  guarantors

                2]            Based on promissory note with guarantors

                3]            Based on Hypothecation Agreement with guarantors

                4]            Based on Mortgage:

                                A] Simple Mortgage

                                B] O deposit of Title Deeds (Equitable Mortgage)

Court Fee:           Ad valorem court fee the loan amount due  U/Sec.20 r/w.Art 1 (c)

Limitation:           Art.54 of Limitation Act – 3 years- the date fixed for Performance or if knows such date fixed when the Plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.

                                   (i)            Article  23 to 26                                 -3 years

                                   (ii)           Article 31,34,35,36 & 37 -3 years (From the date of default)

                                   (iii)          Article 23 to 26 years                      -3years (Hypothication Agreement)

                                                                                                                   Moveable property (Spl.Vehicles)

                                   (iv)         Article 62,63,65                                 -12 years

Jurisdiction:   (i) (ii) & (iii) Where the agreement is executed (or) Where the defendants resides U/Sec. 20 C.P.C.

                  (iv)          Where the subject matter of the suit i.e., immovable property is situated U/Sec.16 CPC.

(6) Suit for Maintenance:-

Court Fee:           On the arrears of maintenance U/Sec.22 r/w 20 of C.F.Act.

Limitation:           Article 113 of Limitation Act.        - 3 years.

Jurisdiction:           Where the defendants reside (or) where the cause of action arose in part or in whole. 

(7)   Suit for Partition:-

Court Fee: (i) If the suit is based  on joint possession fixed Court Fee payable U/Sec.34(2) of A.P.C.F. and S.V.Act.

              (ii)       If  the plaintiff  out of possession, if  he shall be paid on the market value of moveable  property (or)  3/4^th of the immovable property to extent  of plaintiff share.

              (ii)       When Court Fee is payable at fixed rate the value for the purpose of court fee and for the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction will be on and the same U/Sec.50 (2) of Court Fee Act.

Limitation:           Article  ________________                                    12 years.

            Jurisdiction:                (i) where the subject matter is situated U/Sec.16 CPC

              (ii)       In case where the subject matter is situated and within the local jurisdiction of two different courts, the suit can be filed in any one of the Court U/Sec.17 CPC.

8]            Suit for dissolution of partnership:-

Court Fee:           U/Secs.33 and 20 of Court Fee Act on the value of the Plaintiff’s Share in the partnership.

Limitation:           Article 113 of Limitation Act. (Residuary Provision)            - 3 years.

Jurisdiction:           Where the partnership business is carried on U/Sec.20 CPC.

9]            Suit for enforcement of Easement:-

Court Fee:           U/Sec.30 of Court Fee Act on the amount at which the relief sought by the Plaintiff or at which the relief is value, whichever is higher.

Limitation:           Article 113 of Limitation Act. (Residuary Provision)            - 3 years.

Jurisdiction:           Where the subjected matter is situated U/Sec. 16 CPC.

10]        Suit for Injunction:-

Court Fee:           The relief may be either prohibitory injunction or  Mandatory injunction for preventing from  the wrongful person from causing  breach or  a directory  relief against the person  causing  infringement and  in both the occasions  the Court Fee is to be valued notionally  U/Sec.26 of C.F.Act. or  as fixed by Court, whichever is higher.

Limitation:           Article 113 of Limitation Act. (Residuary Provision)            - 3 years.

Jurisdiction:        Where the subjected matter (Immovable Property) is situated U/Sec.16 CPC.  In other cases where the cause of action partly or wholly arises.

11]          Suit  for declaration and injunction:- ( Immovable Property).

Court Fee:           U/Sec.24 (b) of Court Fee Act  with reference to immovable property  the fee shall be computed  on  Half of the market value of the property  or on Rs.300/-, whichever is higher.  The relief of injunction is ancillary to main relief; hence no court fee is necessary.

Limitation:           Article 65 of Limitation Act.   When the Defendants claims title over plaintiffs claim           - 12 years. ( Cause of Action)

Jurisdiction:        Where the subjected matter i.e., immovable Property is situated U/Sec.16 CPC.  

12]          Suit for Possession U/Sec.6 of Specific Relief Act:- ( Immovable Property)

Court Fee:           U/Sec.28 of Court Fee Act on half of the market value of property or onRs.200/-, whichever is higher.

Limitation:           U/Sec. 6 (2) (a) of Specific Relief Act   the suit is to be filed within 6 months from the date of dispossession.

Jurisdiction:        Where the subjected matter i.e., immovable Property is situated U/Sec.16 CPC.  

13]          Suit for Possession and Injunction:

Court Fee:           U/Sec.29 of Court Fee Act on 3/4^th of the market value of property or on Rs.300/-, whichever is higher.

Limitation:           Article 65 of Limitation Act   the suit is to be filed within 12 years from the date of dispossession.

Jurisdiction:        Where the subjected matter i.e., immovable Property is situated U/Sec.16 CPC.  

14]          Suit for Damages for malicious prosecution:-

Court Fee:           Ad valoram U/Sec.20 r/w. Article 1 (c) of Court Fee Act.

Limitation:           Article 74 of Limitation Act within one year from the date of acquittal or termination of proceedings of prosecution.

Jurisdiction:        Where the case ended in acquittal U/Sec.20 of CPC.

15]          Suit for damages  for defamation:-

Court Fee:           Ad valoram Court Fee U/Sec.20 r/w. Article 1 (c) of Court Fee Act.

Limitation:           Article 75 and 76 of Limitation Act within one year from the date of defamatory statement or publication.

Jurisdiction:        Where the cause of action occurred U/Sec.20 of CPC.

16]          Suit for enforcement of right of pre-emption:-

Court Fee:           U/Sec.47 r/w. Article 1 (c) of Court Fee Act

Limitation:           Article 113 of Limitation Act when the right to sue accrues.

Jurisdiction:        Where the immovable property is situated U/Sec.16 of CPC.

17]          Suit for Declaration of title and Recovery of Possession:- ( Immovable Property).

 Court Fee:           U/Sec.24 (a) of Court Fee Act  with reference to immovable property  the fee shall be computed  on  3/4^th  of the market value of the property  or on Rs.300/-, whichever is higher.  The relief of possession is ancillary to main relief; hence no court fee is necessary.

Limitation:           Article 65 of Limitation Act.   When the Defendants claims title over plaintiffs claim           - 12 years. (Cause of Action)

Jurisdiction:        Where the subjected matter i.e., immovable Property is situated U/Sec.16 CPC. 

18]          Suit for Enforcing Mortgage:-

                A]           Suit by Mortgager for Redemption:-

 Court Fee:          U/Sec.31 (8) of Court Fee Act on the Mortgage amount or on 1/4^th of principle amount secured under the Mortgage, whichever is higher.

Limitation:           Article 61 of Limitation Act.   When the right to redeem or to recovery possession accrues                 -  30  years.

Jurisdiction:        Where the subjected matter i.e., immovable Property is situated U/Sec.16 CPC. 

                B]            Suit by Mortgagee to enforce payment:-

Court Fee:           U/Sec.31 (1) of Court Fee Act on the amount due on Mortgage.

Limitation:           Article 62 of Limitation Act.   When the money sued for becomes due. 12  years.

Jurisdiction:        Where the subjected matter i.e., immovable Property is situated U/Sec.16 CPC. 

19]          Suit for Adoptions:- ( Minors)   

Court Fee:           U/Sec.25 of Court Fee Act on half of the market value of the movable and immovable properties involved or affected by such declaration or on Rs.500/-, whichever is higher.

Limitation:           Article 57 or 58 of Limitation Act as per the relief asked for plaint--          3  years.

Jurisdiction:        Where the subjected matter is situated or where the cause of action wholly or partly arises.

20]          Suit for Cancellation:-

Court Fee:           U/Sec.37 of Court Fee Act for cancellation of Decree having money value or other property  or document which  purports to create  operates  any right  in moveable  or immovable properties, the fee shall be completed  on the value of subject matter of the suit.

Limitation:           Article 59 of Limitation Act --          3  years.

Jurisdiction:        Where the subjected matter is situated or where the cause of action wholly or partly arises U/Secs.16 CPC and 20 CPC.