P.V.Kranthi Kiran, Hyd -9542350436

Sunday, 28 January 2024

no act of Courts should harm a litigant and it is the bounden duty of Courts to see that if a person is harmed by a mistake of the Court he should be restored to the position he would have occupied but for that mistake

Supreme Court of India

Jang Singh vs Brijlal And Ors on 20 February, 1963

Equivalent citations: 1966 AIR 1631, 1964 SCR (2) 145

Author: M. Hidayatullah

Bench: M. Hidayatullah, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, J.C. Shah

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 687 of 1962. Appeal -by special leave from the judgment and decree dated December 1, 1961, of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh, in Execution Second Appeal No. 586 of 1960.

K. L. Mehta, for the appellant.

K. L. Gosain, K. K. Jain and P. C. Khanna, for the respondents Nos. 2 to 6.

1963. February 20. The judgment of the Court was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH J.-This appeal with the special leave of this Court arises out of execution of a decree for pre-emption passed in favour of the appellant Jang Singh. By the order under appeal the High Court has held that jang Singh had not deposited the full amount as directed by the decree within the time allowed to him and his suit for pre-emption must therefore be ordered to be dismissed and also the other proceedings arising therefrom as there was no decree -of which he could ask execution.

The facts of the case are simple. Jang Singh filed a suit for pre-emption of the sale of certain lands against Brij Lal the first respondent (the vendor), and Bhola Singh the second respondent (the vendee) in the Court of Sub-judge 1st Class, Sirsa. On October 25, 1957, a compromise decree was passed in favour of jang Singh and he was directed to deposit Rs. 5951 less Rs. 1000 already deposited by him by May 1, 1958. The decree also ordered that on his failing to make the deposit punctually his suit would stand dismissed with costs. On January 6, 1958, jang Singh made an application to the Sub judge, Sirsa, for making the deposit of the balance of the amount of the decree. The Clerk of the Court, which was also the executing Court, prepared a challan in duplicate and handed it over with the application to jang Singh so that the amount might be deposited in the Bank. In the challan (and in the order passed on the application, so it is alleged) Rs. 4950 were mentioned instead of Rs. 4951. jang Singh took the challan and the application and made the deposit of the wrong balance the same day and received one copy of the challan as an acknowledgement from the Bank.

In May, 1958, he applied for and received an order for possession of the land. It was reported by the Naib Nazir that the entire amount was deposited in Court. Bhola Singh then applied on May 25, 1958, to the Court for payment to him of the amount lying in deposit and it was reported by the Naib Nazir on that application that Jang Singh had not deposited the correct amount and the deposit was short by one rupee. Bhola Singh applied to the Court for dismissal of jang Singh's suit, and for recall of all the orders made in jang Singh's favour. The Sub Judge, Sirsa, accepted Bhola Singh'sapplication observing that in pre-emption cases a Court had no power to extend the time fixed by the decree for payment of the price and the preemptor by his failure to deposit the correct amount had incurred the dismissal of the suit under the decree. He ordered also the reversal of the earlier orders passed by him in favour of Jang Singh and directed that possession of the fields be restored to the opposite party.

jang Singh appealed against that order. The District judge recorded the evidence of the Execution Clerk, the Revenue Accountant, Treasury ice and jang Singh. He also examined Bhola Singh. the learned District judge held that the record of the case showed that on the day the case was compromised and the decree was passed Jang Singh was not present and did not know the exact decretal amount. The learned District judge assumed that it was the duty of jang Singh to be punctual and to find out the exact amount before he made the deposit. He, however, held that as jang Singh had approached the Court with an application intending to make the deposit to be ordered by the Court, and the Court and its clerk made a mistake by ordering him to deposit an amount which was less by one rupee, jang Singh was excused in as much as the responsibility was shared by the Court. The learned District Judge, therefore, held that this was a case in which jang Singh deserved to be relieved and he came to the conclusion that jang Singh was prevented from depositing the full amount by the act of the Court. He concluded "thus the deposit made was a sufficient compliance with the terms of the decree". The order of the Sub Judge, Sirsa dismissing the suit was set aside.

Bhola Singh appealed to the High Court. This appeal was heard by a learned single.judge who was of the opinion that the decree which was passed was not complied with and that under the law the time fixed under the decree for the payment of the decretal amount in pre-emption cases could not be extended by the Court. He also held that the finding that the short deposit was due to an act of the Court was unsupported by evidence. He accordingly set aside the decision of the learned District judge and restored that of the Sub-judge, Sirsa.

The facts of the case almost speak for themselves. A search was made for the application on which the order of the Court directing a deposit of Rs. 4950 was said to be passed. That application remained untraced though the District Judge adjourned the case more than once. It is, however, quite clear that the challan was prepared under the Court's direction and the duplicate challan prepared by the Court as well as the one presented to the Bank have been produced in this case and they show the lesser amount. This challan is admittedly prepared by the Execution Clerk and it is also an admitted fact that Jang Singh is an illiterate person. The Execution Clerk has deposed to the procedure which is usually followed and he has pointed out that first there is a report by the Ahmed about the amount in deposit and then an order is made by the Court on the application before the challan is prepared. It is, therefore, quite clear that if there was an error the Court and its officers largely contributed to it. It is no doubt true that a litigant must be vigilant and take care but where a litigant goes to Court and asks for the assistance of the Court so that his obligation-, under a decree might be fulfilled by him strictly, it is incumbent on the Court, if it does not leave the litigant to his own devices, to ensure that the correct information is furnished. If the Court in supplying the information makes a mistake the responsibility of the litigant, though it does not altogether cease, is at least shared by the Court. If the litigant acts on the faith of that information the Courts cannot hold him responsible for a mistake which it itself caused. There is no higher principle for the guidance of the Court than the one that no act of Courts should harm a litigant and it is the bounden duty of Courts to see that if a person is harmed by a mistake of the Court he should be restored to the position he would have occupied but for that mistake. This is aptly summed up in the maxim:

"Actus curiae neminem gravabit".

In the present case the Court could have ordered Jang Singh to make the deposit after obtaining a certified copy of the decree thus leaving it to him to find out the correct amount and make the correct deposit. The Court did not do this. The Court,, on the other hand, made an order and through its clerk prepared a challan showing the amount which was required to be deposited. jang Singh carried out the direction in the order and also implicit in the challan, to the letter. There was thus an error committed by the Court which the Court must undo and which cannot be undone by shifting the blame on jang Singh. To dismiss his suit because Jang Singh was also partly negligent does not exonerate the Court from its responsibility for the mistake. Jang Singh was expected to rely upon the Court and its officers and to act according to their directions. That he did so promptly and fully is quite clear. There remains, thus, the wrong belief induced in his mind by the action of the Court that all he had to pay was stated truly in the challan and for this error the Court must take full responsibility and it is this error which the Court must set right before the suit of jang Singh can be ordered to be dismissed. The learned single judge of the High Court considered the case as if it was one of extension of time. He reversed the finding given by the District Judge that the application made by Jang Singh did not mention any amount and the ice reported that only Rs'. 4950 were due. The learned single judge exceeded his jurisdiction there. It is quite clear that once the finding of the District judge is accepted-and it proceeds on evidence given by jang Singh and the Execution Clerk-the only conclusion that can be reached is that jang Singh relied upon what the Court ordered and the error, if any, was substantially the making of the Court. In these circumstances, following the well-accepted principle that the act of Court should harm no one, the District Judge was right in reversing the decision of the Sub. Judge, Sirsa. The District judge was, however, in error in holding that the decree was "sufficiently complied with". That decree could only be fully complied with by making the deposit of Re. 1 which the District judge ought to have ordered.

In our opinion the decision of the learned single judge of the High Court must be set aside. The mistake committed by the Court must be set right. The case must go back to that stage when the mistake was committed by the Court and the appellant should be ordered to deposit the additional rupee for payment to Bhola Singh. If he fails to make the deposit within the time specified by us his suit may be dismissed but not before. We may point out however that we are not deciding the question whether a Court after passing a decree for re-emption can extend the time originally fixed for deposit of the decretal amount. That question does not arise here. In view of the mistake of the Court which needs to be righted the parties are relegated to the position they occupied on January 6, 1958, when the error was committed by the Court which error is being rectified by us nunc pro tune.

The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The appellant is ordered to deposit Re.1 within one month from the date of the receipt of the record in the Court of the Sub-judge, Sirsa. In view of the special circumstances of this case there shall be no order about costs throughout.

Appeal allowed.

Gist of Judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Telangana in resepct of Inam Lands

Thursday, 25 January 2024

Purchaser of land from an Inamdar is not a successor‐in‐interest and cannot apply for ORC and only a legal heir is a successor‐in‐interest to Inamdar who can continue to occupy the inam land can apply to get ORC. Gist of full Bench Judgment of Telangana High Court Dt: 21-11-2022

Case Details: The Executive officer group of Temples Vs The Joint Collector Mahaboobnagar in W.P.No 913 of 2002 & batch (Click here for full Judgment)

Date of Judgment: 21‐11‐2022.

Facts: In W.P.No.913 of 2002, petitioner assailed the order dated 27.O7.2OO1 in Appeal No.F2lll2OOO confirming the order dated 22.12.1999 of the original authority rejecting the claim of petitioner to grant Occupancy Right Certificate (ORC) under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955. Before learned single Judge, two decisions of two Division Benches were cited, namely B.Ramender Reddy and others vs. The District Collector, Hyderabad District and others (1993 (2) An.wR 84 (DB)) and S.Veera Reddy and another vs. Chettapalli Chandraiah and others. (1994 SCC Online AP 510) On consideration of these two decisions, learned Judge opined that there is conflict of opinion in these two decisions on the entitlement of purchaser of inam land from Inamdar to apply for ORC under the Act. Learned Judge therefore opined that the conflict should be resolved by a Bench of two Judges or more. The relevant paragraphs of the Order dated 24,03,2014 in W.P.No.913 of 2002 read as under:

“From the brief summary of respective submissions what emanates is that this Court in the decisions reported in Kodithala Keshavulu v. The Govemment of Andhra Pradesh (1978 (2) An.W.R. page 31) S.Veera Reddy and another v. Chetlapalli Chandraiah and others [1995 (2) ALT 172 (DB)], S.Narasimha and others v. Joint Collector‐ll, Ranga Reddy and another (2006 (2) ALD 621) and Bhimavarapu Venkaiah and another v. R.D.O., Kothagudem and others [1999 (4) ALD 219] has taken the view that the Purchaser of land from an Inamdar after the abolition of Inams can also maintain an application for grant of ORC but in the decisions reported in B.Ramender Reddy' and others vs. District Collector, Hyderabad and others (1993 (2) An.W.R.84 (DB)), Chama Narsimha Reddy and others v. Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy district at Hyderabad and others [2007(3) ALT 265], this Court has taken a contrary view that once the Inam is abolished, all the pre‐ existing rights are abolished and a purchaser from the Inamdar cannot maintain an application for grant of O.R.C.

In my opinion, the views expressed by the learned Judges in B.Ramender Reddy's case (supra) and S.Veera Reddy's case (supra) are conflicting with each other on the entitlement of a purchaser from an Inamdar to apply for ORC under the Act, Ramender Reddy's case is decided by their Lordships Mr. Page | 16 Justice V.Sivaraman Nair and Ms.Justice S.V.Maruthi, S.Veera Reddy's case (supra) was decided by their Lordships Mr.Justice S.S.M.Quadri (as he then was) and Ms.Justice S.V.Maruthi. One of the learned Judges Justice S.V.Maruti, is a party to both these decisions. I am of the opinion that it is desirable that the conflict be resolved by an authoritative pronouncement of a Bench of two Judges or more."

When the matters were placed before a Division Bench, the Division Bench requested Hon'ble The Chief Justice to place the matters before a Full Bench. Accordingly, the Honble Chief Justice constituted the Full Bench. That is how the matters have come up before this Full Bench to resolve the conflict of opinion.

While in Ramender Reddy, the Division Bench held that the Inamdar has no right to alienate a land already vested in the State, in S.Veera Reddy, another Division Bench held that such alienation is valid and enforceable by the subsequent purchaser to secure ORC. This is the conflict of opinion that requires consideration and resolution.

The issue for consideration is whether a purchaser of inam land from Inamdar after 20.07.1955 would acquire right to claim ORC? Incidental issue for consideration would be whether the purchaser of inam land qualifies as a (‘successor‐in‐lnterest’ to Inamdar?

Held: In the combined State of Andhra Pradesh, the State Legislature brought out separate Inams Abolition Act called "the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956" applicable to Andhra area. The salient feature of this Act is land never vested in the State and on abolition of inams the State envisaged granting Ryotwari Patta to Inamdar. The Act was amended by Act 20 of 1975. By this amendment, Section 10B is added. (Sec.10B. conferment of ryotwari pattaa on transferees of unenfranchised Inams; where, before commencement of the Andhra Pradesh {Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and conversion into Ryotwari) amendment Act, 1975 an Inamdar, other than an institution, of any unenfranchised inam has sold or otherwise transferred his interest in the inam and held by him, the transferee, who has acquired the said interest in good faith and for, valuable consideration, or his successor in title, who is in possession of such land on the date of such commencement, shall be, deemed to be the Inamdar for the purpose of this Act)

Section 10B recognizes the alienation made by Inamdar before commencement of 1975 Amendment Act and holds the transferee as deemed to be Inamdar.

The legislative intent is very clear. While in 'The Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956' applicable to Andhra area, the legislature leans in favour of recognizing alienee as also an Inamdar in Andhra Area Page | 17 of then combined State, the same legislature has chosen not to envisage sale of inam land by Inamdar before ORC is granted and does not recognize alienee to succeed to Inamdar in Telangana area governed by the 1955 Act.

If the State legislature had intended to extend the same benefit in Telangana area, it could have made similar provision in the 1955 Act. It is thus safe to assume that in the scheme of the Act, a ‘successor‐in ‐lnterest' means only a legal heir and not a purchaser of inam land and such purchaser is not entitled to apply for ORC, The decision of learned single Judge in Kodithala Keshavulu v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh (1978 (2) An.W.R. page 31) is thus overruled.

In the light of the above discussion, we answer the reference as under:

(1) The 1aw laid down in S.Veera Reddy and another v. Chetlapalli Chandraiah and others [1995 (2) ALT 172 (DB)] is not correct having regard to the scheme of the 1955 Act. We agree with the law laid down in B.Ramender Reddy and others vs. The District Collector, Hyderabad District and others (1993 (2) An.wR 84 (DB)) as correct and overrule the decision in S.Veera Reddy.

(2) We hold that purchaser of land from an Inamdar is not a successor‐in‐interest and cannot apply for ORC.

(3) ' Only a legal heir is a successor‐in‐interest to Inamdar who can continue to occupy the inam land can apply to get ORC.

(4) The decision in Kodithala Keshavulu (supra) does not lay down the correct law and is overruled. For that matter, all the decisions of learned single Judges and the Division Benches which have taken contrary view stands overruled.

(5) We make it clear that an inamdar, Kabiz‐e‐Kadam permanent tenant, protected tenant and non‐protected tenant can acquire saleable interest only after they obtain ORC and cannot create third party rights and/or interest in any other person before obtaining ORC.

As the issue for consideration is to resolve the conflict of opinion in the two decisions of two Division Benches in B.Ramender Reddy and S.Veera Reddy on the entitlement of a purchaser from an Inamdar to apply for ORC under the 1955 Act after 20.07.1955 and before ORC was granted to Inamdar, the other issues raised in the Writ Petitions and Writ Appeals including scope and application of Section 43 of Transfer of Property Act do not fall for consideration and, therefore, no opinion is expressed. All other issues urged in the Writ Appeals and Writ Petitions are left open to .be urged in the Writ Appeals and Writ Petitions as the case may be. Page | 18 The reference is answered accordingly. The registry is directed to place the Writ Appeals and Writ Petitions before appropriate Bench after obtaining orders from the Honble Chief Justice.

Wednesday, 24 January 2024

Election offences

Tuesday, 23 January 2024

Certified copy of unmarked document can be given- Madras High Court Judgment

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Madras High Court

K. Nagarajan vs K.S. Ramasamy, S/O Sennimalai ... on 17 July, 2003

Author: S A Kumar

Bench: S A Kumar

ORDER S. Ashok Kumar, J.

1. The plaintiff is the petitioner. The plaintiff has filed the suit O.S. No. 430/2002 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Karur for permanent injunction against the two defendants - husband and wife.

2. The defendants filed I.A. No. 577/2002 with a prayer to send for certain documents from the custody of the District Court. Along with the application, they also filed a copy of the document called `complaint' given by the defendants to the Sub-Court, Karur.

3. The plaintiff filed a copy application on 6.11.2002 requesting a copy of the complaint dated 30.10.2002 mentioned in the I.A. No. 577/2002 filed by the defendants. On the same day, the learned Additional District Munsif returned the copy application with the following remark.

`How to petitioner is entitled to get c/c of the document. Since it has not mark.

Sd/ A.D.M.

6.11.2002' Once again on 12.11.2002, the plaintiff represented the copy application with the following endorsement:

`Under Rule 127 of C.R.P. the certificate copy can be obtained without being marked as on exhibit. Hence certificate copy may be issued.

Sd/ 12.11.02.' The learned Additional District Munsif again returned the copy application with the following remark:

`Retd.

This E.A. Retd. on that reffred as above is not applicable to this C.A.

Sd/ A.D.M.

14.11.02.' The rejection of the copy application filed by the learned Additional District Munsif is the cause for this revision petition.

4. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contends that under Order XI Rule 15 of C.P.C. a party has got the right to inspect any document produced by the opposite party in Court and under Rule 127 of Civil Rules of Practice, the Court is bound to grant copy of the document produced in Court, whether it forms part of the record of the suit or not.

5. The learned counsel for the respondents Ms. Subraja would strenuously contend that under Rule 62 of Civil Rules of Practice only documents referred to in the plaint or written statement and filed along with the above pleadings or thereafter alone can be granted copies if required by the other side and not all the documents filed.

6. Heard the rival contentions of both side and also perused the materials available on record.

7. The complaint dated 30.10.2002 given by the defendants to the Subordinate-Judge, Karur as admitted by the learned counsel for the respondents was to keep the sale agreement produced in previous proceeding in safe custody for the purpose of marking the same in this case also.

8. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contends that it contains certain defamatory, false and malicious allegations against the plaintiff and probably, the plaintiff may prefer to take legal action for giving such a complaint.

9. We are not concerned about the contents of the complaint or the intention of the complainant. What we are concerned is whether a party is entitled to get the certified copy of a document produced in Court, but not marked and which has not become a part of the record of that case.

10. What is a `proceeding' has been defined in rule 2(10) of the Civil Rules of Practice and Circular Orders.

`Proceeding' includes all documents presented to or filed in court by any party, or commissioner or other officer of court, other than documents produced as evidence;' Rule 62 of Civil Rules of Practice permits a party to inspect and obtain a copy of any document received or referred to in a plaint or written statement and filed in court therewith or thereafter.

11. In this case the document was not filed either with the plaint or with the written statement, but along with the I.A. petition in I.A. No. 577/2002. The I.A. itself was filed to send for some other documents in which the defendants have enclosed a copy of the complaint dated 30.10.2002 said to have been given to the Subordinate-Judge, Karur. Therefore, it is clear that the complaint dated 30.10.2002 of the defendants have been produced in Court by the defendants themselves along with the I.A. No. 577/2002.

Under Rule 63 of Civil Rules of Practice,`every party and his pleader desiring to inspect any proceeding filed in court by him or any other party, or a commissioner or officer of court, in the suit, appeal or matter, to which, he, or his client is a party, shall present a memorandum to the chief ministeretial officer specifying the proceeding of which inspection is required and inspection will be allowed without the payment of any fee, during the pendency of such suit, appeal or matter.' In Chapter VII while dealing with Copies and Copyists establishment in Rule 127 of Civil Rules of Practice, it is defined as follows:

`When a person is entitled to obtain a copy of a proceeding or document filed in or in the custody of the court, he may present an application therefor to the superintendent of copyists or where there is no such officer, to the chief ministerial officer in person or by his pleader or the latter's authorised clerk between the hours of 11.30 a.m. and 3.p.m. If the proceeding of document has been sent to another court, the application may at the option of the applicant, be forwarded to the said court for compliance, or be returned to him, for presentation to the said court:

12. So far as this case is concerned, there is no dispute that the petitioner filed an application for grant of certified copy. But, the learned Additional District Munsif, returned the application on the sole ground that it has not been marked. Even after the petitioner resubmitted his application by making endorsement that he is entitled under Rule 127 of Civil Rules of Practice, with the same reason once again the copy application has been returned.

13. In JAGATBHAI PUNJABHAI PALKHIWALA AND OTHERS V. VIKRAMBHAI PUNJABHAI PALKHIWALA AND OTHERS while dealing with such a situation the Gujarat High Court has held as follows:

`5.This reason given by the learned Trial Judge is not correct and is too technical. If the inspection of the documents could be granted by the court, there is no reason why the persons who were permitted to take inspection cannot take zerox copy of the same. The purpose of the inspection is to know and study the documents. The person who takes inspection can also take notes and even make copies of the same. In view of very large number of documents, the petitioners wanted that they may be permitted to take xerox copies of the same. Their say is that instead of taking inspection and looking at the documents by their own-eyes, they would like to have their view from the camera eye. The request for xerox copies at their own cost is reasonable. Once the court has granted inspection, this request is merely to make that inspection more effective. By allowing the plaintiffs to take xerox copies, the court is neither verifying nor certifying them to be true and correct copies. The plaintiffs will be taking copies for their own purpose in order that they can make effective and detailed study and have proper consultation with their lawyers. That would not only serve the cause of the petitioners, but will also enable the Counsel to render proper assistance to the court, since the court is not verifying or certifying the correctness of the copies, there is no need of the documents to have become part of the record. Since the documents happen to be in the custody of the court, the parties cannot take xerox copies of the same without permission of the court. But that does not mean that the court can refuse such permission only on the ground that they have not become part of the record. The reason given is fundamentally erroneous and merely technical.

6. If the xerox copies are not permitted to be taken, the purpose of the inspection will become ineffective and would be frustrated. No harm or prejudice can occur to the other side if the xerox copies are permitted to be taken. However, only care is required to be taken to see that while the xerox copies are being taken, an officer of the Court appointed by the trial court remains present and retains the custody of the documents and the representative of the other side is also allowed to remain present so that no allegation is made in future. The cost and remuneration of the court officer appointed for that purpose will have to be borne by the petitioners and the amount will have to be deposited by them as may be quantified by the trial court. The defendants would also be entitled to have the same facility subject to the similar conditions.'

14. In any suit apart from the documents marked, there is likelihood of presence of other unmarked documents like warrant issued to the Commissioner or notice given to the Commissioner by the parties etc. Assuming that a party disputes receipt of notice issued by the Advocate Commissioner, then notice said to have been given by the Commissioner will become an important document and certainly copy of such notice shall be required by the other party who claims that actually notice has been given to the party who disputes it. Though the notice given by the Commissioner to the party may not be a part of the record as far as the suit is concerned, since it is not marked as an exhibit in the suit, still a notice can become necessary for a particular party for which he may require copy. Therefore, the document produced in Court even though not marked as a document in evidence in a suit, still necessity may arise for requirement of a certified copy of such a document. That is why under Order 62 and Order XI Rule 15 of Civil Rules of Practice, it is clearly mentioned that any document produced in Court can be inspected. The terms mentioned in Rule 62 and Order XI Rule 15 of Civil Rules of Practice are wider in nature, in the sense that the documents referred are not only marked but also produced in Court.

15. In the above circumstances, I hold that the order of the learned Additional District Munsif, Karur in rejecting the prayer of the petitioner to grant certified copy of the document produced by the defendants in Court along with the petition in I.A. No. 577/2002 is not correct and the said order is set aside and the learned Additional District Munsif, Karur is directed to give a copy as prayed for.

16. The C.R.P. is allowed. No costs. Consequently, C.M.P. No. 18081/2002 is closed.

Wednesday, 17 January 2024

Senior Civil Judge Courts to entertain Original Petitions filed under the Indian Succession Act

GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

ABSTRACT

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Courts – Indian Succession Act – Issuance of Succession Certificates in succession Ops – Conferment of powers on Senior Civil Judge Courts to entertain Original Petitions filed under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 – Notification - Orders – Issued

LAW (LA&J-HOME-COURTS-C2) DEPARTMENT

G.O.Ms.No. 11 Dated: 08-02-2012.

Read : From the Registrar General, Andhra Pradesh High Court, Hyderabad, letter No.Roc.No.408/SO-3/2009, dated:01-11-2011.

***

ORDER

The Registrar General, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, in his letter read above, has forwarded the Draft Notification with regard to the Conferment of powers on Senior Civil Judge Courts to entertain Original Petitions filed under the Indian Succession Act, 1925.

2. The Government after careful examination of the matter have decided to approve the Draft Notification with regard to the Conferment of powers on Senior Civil Judge Courts to entertain Original Petitions filed under the Indian Succession Act, 1925.

3. Accordingly, the following Notification will be published in an Extraordinary issue of the Andhra Pradesh Gazette.

NOTIFICATION

In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 388 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (Central Act 39 of 1925) and of all other powers here unto enabling the Governor of Andhra Pradesh hereby confers powers on all the Principal Senior Civil Judges, where there are more than one Senior Civil Judge’s Court and Senior Civil Judge’s Court where only one Court is functioning at such station to entertain original petitions filed under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and shall exercise the functions of District Judge under Part-X of the said Act within their respective jurisdictions.

[BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF ANDHRA PRADESH] A.SHANKAR NARAYANA, SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS & JUSTICE.