All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to automatically arrest when a case under Section 498-A of the IPC is registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41 Cr.P.C.Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of Court to be instituted before High Court having territorial jurisdiction.

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.PRAVEEN KUMAR
CRIMINAL PETITION No.15315 of 2014
ORDER:
The petitioner, who is accused in Crime No.11 of 2014 on the file of the S.J.F.C.M. for Railways, Nellore, filed the present application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. seeking release in the event of his arrest in connection with the above crime registered for an offence punishable under Section 3(a) of the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Amendment Act, 2012.
Though the learned counsel for the petitioner filed the present petition seeking anticipatory bail in Crime No.11 of 2014, he restricts his prayer seeking a direction to the Investigating agency to follow the conditions stipulated in Section 41 CrPC. Heard learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent- State.
Section 41 Cr.P.C. reads as under:
When police may arrest without warrant.
(1) Any police officer may without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest any person (a) who commits, in the presence of a police officer, a cognizance offence;
(b) against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists than he has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years whether with or without fine, if the following conditions are satisfied, namely:-
(i) the police officer has reason to believe on the basis of such complaint, information, or suspicion that such person has committed the said offence;
(ii) the police officer is satisfied that such arrest is necessarya) to prevent such person from committing any further offence; or
b) for proper investigation of the offence; or
c) to prevent such person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tampering with such evidence in any manner; or d) to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the
Court or to the police officer; or
e) as unless such person is arrested, his presence in the Court whenever required cannot be ensured, and the police officer shall record while making such arrest, his reasons in writing; (Provided that a police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of this sub-section, record the reasons in writing for not making the arrest.) In Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and another (Crl.Appeal No.1277 of 2014), the Apex Court held as under: 

1) All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to automatically arrest when a case under Section 498-A of the IPC is registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41 Cr.P.C.
2) All police officers be provided with a check list containing specified sub-clauses under Section 41 (1) (b) (ii);
3) The police officer shall forward the check list duly filed and furnish the reasons and materials which
necessitated the arrest, while forwarding/producing the accused before the Magistrate for further detention;
4) The Magistrate while authorizing detention of the accused shall peruse the report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorize detention;
5) The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks from the date of the institution of the case with a copy to the Magistrate which may be extended by the Superintendent of police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;
6) Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41 A of Cr.P.C. be served on the accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the District for the reasons to be recorded in writing;
7) Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of Court to be instituted before High Court having territorial jurisdiction.
8) Authorising detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate high court.
The Apex Court also held that “ the directions aforesaid shall not only apply to the cases under Section 498-A of the IPC or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the case in hand, but also such cases were offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years; whether with or without fine.”
From the above it is clear that the police officer, before arresting any person, has to be satisfied that such an arrest is necessary in terms of clauses (a) to (e) of Section 41(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. and he has to record reasons while making such arrest. For the aforesaid reasons and having regard to the nature of allegations made, it is ordered that the investigating officer while exercising discretion, whether or not to arrest the petitioners herein, under Section 41 Cr.P.C. shall scrupulously follow the conditions stipulated therein and also the judgment of the Apex Court, before taking any coercive steps against the petitioner. With the above direction, the Criminal Petition is disposed of. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any in this criminal petition, shall also stand closed.

C.PRAVEEN KUMAR,J
16th December, 2014

at scrutiny stage of the case, no court can appreciate merits of case and reject plaint on the ground that case of plaintiff is not well founded or devoid of any merits unless defect goes to root of matter

HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
KUDUMULA KISHORE REDDY V/S KUDUMULA KRISHNA REDDY AND ORS
Date of Decision: 20 July 2010
Citation: 2010 LawSuit(AP) 270
Hon'ble Judges: Gopala Krishna Tamada
Appeal T ype: Civil Revision Petition
Appeal No: 2729 of 2010
Subject: Civil, Constitution
Acts Referred:
Constitution Of India Art 227
Code Of Civil Procedure, 1908 Or 7R 10A, Or 7R 11, Or 7R 10
Final Decision: Petition allowed
Eq. Citations: 2010 (5) ALD 232, 2010 (5) ALT 130, 2010 (3) APL J 188
Advocates: K Sreenivas
CASES REFERRED :
BOSE & CO. V. G. SRIKANTH, 2006 4 ALT 589
RAM PRAKASH GUPTA V. RAJIV KUMAR GUPTA, 2007 TLS 44721
SURYALAXMI COTTON MILLS LIMITED, SECUNDERABAD V. SABHAVATH KISHORE, 2008 5 ALD 82
THANAMKI PRASAD V. GUNTAMADUGU PULLAMMA AND ORS., 2005 4 ALD 247
JUDGMENT TEXT:-
Gopala Krishna T amada, J.
[1] This revision, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is directed against the order dated
28.06.2010 passed by the learned District Judge, Mahaboobnagar in CFR No. 2552 of 2010 whereby the plaint filed by the petitioner herein was returned.
[2] Facts, in brief, are that the revision petitioner filed the suit for partition in C.F.R. No. 2552 of 2010 before the learned District Judge, Mahaboobnagar seeking partition and separate possession of his due share out of the suit schedule property basing on a W ill dated 27.12.2006 said to have been executed by his paternal grand father by name Kudumula Janga Reddy, who is the half share holder of the suit schedule property. However, the court below took an objection stating that the suit for partition is not maintainable basing on a W ill and returned the plaint by its order dated 28.06.2010. The same is questioned in this revision.
[3] Since the present issue is in between the Court and the petitioner, the usual notice to the respondents is dispensed with.
[4] The learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. K. Srinivas contended that at the stage of numbering of the suit itself, the court below had gone into the merits of the case and decided the issue involved in the suit which amounts to final disposal of the matter. He further contended that by virtue of the said W ill dated 27.12.2006, after the death of Janga Reddy the petitioner stepped into the shoes of the said Jangareddy who is a coparcener of respondents 1 to 4 and can seek for partition of the suit schedule properties as per the said W ill. He finally contended that though the Court below had simply returned the plaint, but, it amounts to rejection of plaint since the plaint is returned not for presentation of the same before proper court as envisaged under Order VII Rule 10 CPC and hence the order impugned in this revision amounts to an order passed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and becomes a reversible order. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on 1) Suryalaxmi Cotton Mills Limited, Secunderabad v. Sabhavath Kishore, 2008 5 ALD 82, Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta,2007 TLS 44721, Thanamki Prasad v. Guntamadugu Pullamma and Ors., 2005 4 ALD 247 and Bose & Co. v. G. Srikanth, 2006 4 ALT 589.
[5] Keeping in view of the specific contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, this Court deems it appropriate to refer to Order VII Rule 10 CPC, which reads as under:
Return of Plaint: (1) Subject to the provisions of Rule 10-A, the plaint shall at any stage of the suit be
returned to be presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted.
[6] In view of the above legal provision, this Court, when it looks into the order impugned in this revision, is of the opinion that the said order passed by the learned District Judge, Mahaboobnagar is contrary to the above said legal provision since the plaint was not returned for want of jurisdiction and for presentation of the same before the competent court having jurisdiction. So on that aspect the order impugned is contrary to the legal provision since the language of Order VII Rule 10 of the Code is not attracted. Hence it should be treated as an order passed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC i.e. rejection of plaint, which reads as under:
Rejection of Plaint: The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:
a) W here it does not disclose a cause of action,
b) W here the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so;
c) W here the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so;
d) W here the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
[7] As seen from the order impugned it is clear that the learned District has gone deep into the merits and probabilities of the case and came to the conclusion that as per the documents field by the petitioner already a partition was effected between the father of the petitioner and his brothers and further stated that since the plaintiff is relying on the W ill deed in support of his case, the suit for partition is not maintainable. This finding, in the considered opinion of this Court is unwarranted at the stage of numbering the suit.                                                                                                                     [8] Further, as seen from the impugned order, the learned District Judge observed that the claim for partition of part of ancestral property is not maintainable, which in my considered opinion is also not correct inasmuch when there are numerous cause of actions joined in one claim, it is not permissible to the court to reject the claim if it is possible to give a decree for some of the cause of actions. So instead of taking some part of the averments of the plaint, the court should have taken the pleadings of the plaint entirety.
[9] In Thanamki Prasad case (3 supra) a learned Judge of this Court held that at scrutiny stage of the case, no court can appreciate merits of case and reject plaint on the ground that case of plaintiff is not well founded or devoid of any merits unless defect goes to root of matter.
[10] In the facts and circumstances above, this Court is of the view that the court below, as rightly
contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, has not returned the plaint for presentation before the proper court, but it had straight away returned the same without any further course of action to be followed, which in the considered opinion of this Court is not correct. Accordingly the said order passed by the court below is liable to be set aside.
[11] In the result, this revision is allowed and the order dated 28.06.2010 passed by the learned District Judge, Mahaboobnagar in CFR No. 2552 of 2010 is hereby set aside. The court below is hereby directed to number the suit and proceed in accordance with law. No costs.

Change of name procedure

Procedure for change of Name: Major applicant
1. As per Government Order GO (P) No. 483, GA (General C), 8th December,
1977, applicant (Native of Andhra Pradesh) must file application in
Annexure 1 to District Magistrate (District Collector) enclosing following
documents ( As per circular No. D5/7096/2003 of District Collector
Hyderabad dated 30-08-2008) :

a. Two latest passport size colour photograph

b. Two independent citizenship certificate issued by Gazetted Officer
c. Personal sworn and signed affidavit of the applicant on Non – Judicial
stamp paper of Rs.10/- attested by notary stating exact reason for
change of his/her name.
d. Educational certificate from class I to Class Xth attested by Gazetted
Officer. In case of illiterate person any other proof of his name, age
such as ration card, voter list, electricity bill, water bill etc copy
attested by Gazetted Officer
e. Certificate from local Police station certifying that the applicant has
not come to any adverse records during last 5 years.
f. A certificate from the astrologer/numerologist in case request for
change for name is on such reasons.

2. District Magistrate after such enquiry as he think fit, will issue order in a
Forma as per Annexure II to the applicant.
3. Applicant then will send another application to Commissioner, Government
Printing Press along with order of District Magistrate for publication as
private advertisement in Andhra Pradesh Gazette on payment of publication
charges. Publication charges of Rs.50 for weekly Gazette and Rs 375 for
ExtraOrdinary Gazette Per application can be paid to Commissioner,
Government Printing Press in shape of Bank Challan or Demand Draft.

4. Minor applicant: If applicant is minor, as per Government Order, GO (P)
No. 332 General Administration (Genl. C) Dept dated 06.06.1983, Parent or
Guardian of a minor child can apply for change of name of child in
Annexure III and by following the procedure indicated for major applicant.
5. Applicant is a Government servant: As per Government Order GO (P)
No. 182, General Administration (General C) Dept dated 24-04-1985, the
Governmnet servant need not obtain order from District Magistrate in
annexure II but should execute a Deed as per Annexure IV on Non –Judicial
stamp paper of Rs. 5/- attested by two witnesses preferably those known to
the Head of the office in which Government employee is serving. The Deed
should be published in prominent local newspaper as well as in Andhra
Pradesh Gazette at his own cost. Process for publication in AP Gazette is
same as that for other applicants.
3
CHANGE OF NAME BY CITIZEN OF INDIA, RESIDING IN THE ANDHRA PRADESH
STATE – PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED AFTER LIFTING UP THE EMERGENCY.
(G.O.(P)No. 819, General Administration (General-C), 8th December, 1977)
In the G.O. (P) No. 483, G.A. (General-C) Department, dated 13th April, 1972, procedure was laid
down for change of name by the Citizens of India residing in the Andhra Pradesh State. Consequent on
the revocation of the proclamation of emergencies and the cessor of Rules made under the Defence and
Internal Security of India Act, it has become necessary to review the procedure that had been in vogue in regard to the change of name. The Government after careful examination, hereby lay down the following revised procedure in supersession of the procedure prescribed in the Government Order read above.
2.(1) Any person residing in the State of Andhra Pradesh, who intends to change his name, shall apply, in the first instance, in the form in Annexure-I to this Order, to the District Magistrate, the Additional
District Magistrate or an Executive Magistrate having jurisdiction, for issue of an official communication in the form of a letter or memorandum to the effect that he is a Citizen of India.
(2) The District Magistrate, the Additional District Magistrate or the Executive Magistrate having
jurisdiction, may on the basis of information furnished by the applicant and after such inquiry as he
thinks fit, issue a letter or memorandum in the form in Annexure-II to this Order, to the effect that on the
basis of the information available, he is qualified for recognition as a Citizen of India. The Magistrate
concerned shall exercise due caution and satisfy himself about the applicant’s claim to Indian Citizenship before issuing the letter or memorandum.
(3) The applicant shall, thereafter, send another application to the Director of Government Printing and
Stationery (Printing Wing) along with the letter or memorandum issued by the Magistrate concerned for
publication of a private advertisement in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, on payment of the publication
charges.

ANNEXURE-I
To
The District Magistrate/Additional District Magistrate/
Executive Magistrate,
………………………………………………………..
………………………………………………………..
………………………………………………………..
………………………………………………………..
Sir,
1. A.B. (existing full name of the person concerned in block letters) of (here insert his full present
address showing Door No., locality, village or town or city, Police Station, Taluk and District)
was born at ……………………….. and as a Citizen of India.
2. My age on the date of application is ………………………….. (date of birth in Christian era and
age).
3. My father’s full name is/was (in block letters) ……………………………………
4. My mother’s full name is/was (in block letters) …………………………………..
5. I am single/married/a widow/a widower/a divorcée :
6. My wife/husband’s full name is/was :
7. Marks of identification :
(1)
(2)
8. Occupation:
9. I am in the service of the State Government or the Government of India (State the
name of the Department, designation and date of his appointment).
10. Profession or occupation other than Government service (here state details
regarding designation, name and address or employer station of posting etc.).
11. I intend to change my existing name as (full name in block letters):
12. I, A.B., do solemnly and sincerely declare that the foregoing particulars stated in this application
are true and make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the same to be true.
SIGNATURE OF THE APPLICANT.

ANNEXURE – II
OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT/ADDITIONAL DISTRICT/ EXECUTIVE MAGISTRATE
With reference to the application of Sri. Smt./Kumari …………………………….
he/she is informed that on the basis of information available he/she
………………………………….. Son/daughter/wife of ………………………………..
native of ……………………….. village/taluk/district ……………………….. qualifies for
recognition as a Citizen of India. This communication has been issued to him/her so as
to enable him/her to change his/her name, and therefore it has no legal validity
whatsoever.
DISTRICT/ADDITONTAL DISTRICT/
EXECUTIVE MAGISTRATE.
Place :
Date :
To
Sri/Smt./Kum. …………………………………………..
…………………………………………..
……………………………………………

GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
ABSTRACT
Change of name – Change of name by Citizen of India, residing in the Andhra Pradesh State –
Procedure to be followed in respect of minor child – Amendment to the G.O. – Issued.
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION (GENL.C) DEPARTMENT
G.O.(P) No. 332 Dated: 16/6/1983.
Read:-
1. G.O.Ms.No.819, G.A. (Genl.C)Dept. dt. 08.12.1977.
*******
ORDER:-
The following amendment is issued to G.O. (P) No. 819, G.A. (Genl.C) Dept. dt.
08.12.1977 published in part II of Andhra Pradesh Gazette dt. 15.12.1977 as sub para (4) of
para 2 of the said G.O.
“The parent or guardian of a minor child can apply for the change of name of the child
and follow the procedure laid down in this G.O. The form in this regard shall be as in Annexure-
III.
(By order and in the name of the Governor of Andhra Pradesh)
B.N.RAMAN,
CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVT.

ANNEXURE – III
To
The District Magistrate/
Additional District Magistrate/
Executive Magistrate.
………………………………………
………………………………………
………………………………………
Sir,
The following particulars in respect of My Son/Daughter/Ward are furnished:
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
(existing full name of the person concerned in block letters) of
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
(here insert his full present address showing Door No. locality, village or town or city, Police
Station, Taluk and District) was born at ………………………………………………. And is a
Citizen of India.
2. Age on the date of application Date of Birth
in the Christian era and age
3. Father’s full name is/was :
(in block letters)
4. Mother’s full name is/was:
(in block letters)
5. Marks of identification
(1)
(2)
6. Occupation :
7. I intend to change his/her existing name as
(full name in block letters)
8. I ………………………… do solemnly and sincerely declare that the foregoing particulars
stated in this application are true and make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the
same to be true.
SIGNATURE OF THE PARENT/GUARDIAN.

GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
ABSTRACT
CHANGE OF NAME – CHANGE OF NAME BY GOVERNMENT SERVANTS IN THE ANDHRA
PRADESH STATE – PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED – ORDERS –ISSUED
[G.O. (P) No. 182, General Administration (GENERAL-C) Dept., Dated 24th April, 1985]
Read the following:
1. G.O. (P) No.819, G.A. (Genl-C), Dept., dated. 8-12-1977.
2. From the Government of India, M.(H.A), New Delhi, Lr. No. 23012/IC, dated 18-5-1983.
ORDER:
According to the orders issued in the G.O. read above, if a citizen of India residing in the Andhra
Pradesh State, intends to change, his name he shall secure a certificate from the District Magistrate or
Additional District Magistrate or Executive Magistrate to the effect that he is a Citizen of India and with the certificate so secured shall apply to the Director of Printing for publication of his changed name as a private advertisement in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette. The above procedure is being followed in respect of all persons including Government employees residing in Andhra Pradesh State.
2. The Government of India in the letter read above have prescribed a revised procedure for change of
name by Government employees according to which the individual need not obtain a certificate from the District Magistrate but should execute a Deed. The Government after careful examination prescribes the following procedure for change of name by a Government employee.
3. A Government employee of Andhra Pradesh State wishing to adopt a new name or to effect any
modification in his existing name should be asked to adopt the change formally by a Deed changing his
name. In order that execution of the document may not be in doubt, it is desirable that it should be attestedby two witnesses preferably those known to the Head of the Office in which the Government employee isserving. A sample Deed form for change of name is enclosed for reference. The execution of the said deed should be followed by publication of the change in a prominent local newspaper as well as in Andhra Pradesh Gazette. The publication should be undertaken by the Government employee at his own expense in both cases. The said Deed Form should be on the stamp paper (non-judicial) of value of Rs. 5(Rupees five only) and the same need not be registered.
4. After the aforesaid formalities are complied with, and satisfactory evidence of identity and execution of the Deed is adduced by the Government employee, the adoption of the new name or change in the
existing name would be recognized officially and then the entries in Government records may be made
accordingly True copies of the relevant documents should be retained by the concerned Head of the
office.
(BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF ANDHRA PRADESH)
SHRAVANKUMAR,
Chief Secretary to Government.


ANNEXURE
FORM OF THE DEED FOR CHANGE OF NAME
By this Deed: I the undersigned A.B.C. (new name) of etc., now lately called A.C. (Old name)
employed as…………………………………………………………..(Designation of the Post held at the time by the Government Servant concerned) at…………………………………..(Place where employed) in the Department.
1. For and on behalf of myself and my wife and children and remoter issue wholly renounce,
relinquish and abandon the use of my former name of A.C. (only) and in place thereof do assume
from the date here the name of A.B.C. and so that I and my wife and children and remoter issue
may hereafter be called known and distinguished not by my former name of A.C. (only) but by
my assumed name of A.B.C.
2. For the purpose of evidence such my determination declare that shall at all times hereafter in all
records deeds and writings and in all proceedings, dealings and transactions as well as private
publish and upon all occasions whatsoever use and sign by name of A.B.C. as my name in place
of and in substitution for my former name of A.C. (only).
3. Expressly authorize and request all persons at all times hereafter to designate and address me and
my wife and children and remoter issue by such assumed name of A.B.C. accordingly.
4. I hereby acknowledge and indemnify all acts, deeds and liabilities by me as (old name) and
known to all men, I declare that change of name is not to cause any prejudice and not with any
fraudulent intention.
IN WITNESS WHERE OF I have hereunto subscribed my former and adopted names of A.C.
and A.B.C. and affixed my Seal this…………………………………day of ……..
.…………………
Signed, sealed and delivered A.C. Signature with Original Surname.
By the above named A.B.C.
Formerly A.C. in the presence of (b) A.B.C. Signature with Assumed Surname.
11
SPECIMEN OF PUBLICATION MATTER
I, ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Son of /
Daughter of ------------------------------------------------------- Qualification -------------------------------Designation ------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- shall henceforth be known as ----------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Son of / Daughter of -----------------
---------------------------------------------------------------- for the purpose of correction of wrong entries occurred in
School Records due to parental mistake.
Station: Signature.
Dated:
(Previous name in block letters)
SPECIMEN OF PUBLICATION MATTER
I, ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Son of /
Daughter of -------------------------------------------------------- Qualification-------------------------------Designation ------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- shall henceforth be known as ----------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Son of / Daughter of------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------- for the purpose of correction of wrong entries occurred in
School Records due to parental mistake.
Station: Signature.
Dated:
(Previous name in block letters)
SPECIMEN OF PUBLICATION MATTER
I, ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Son of /
Daughter of -------------------------------------------------------- Qualification-------------------------------Designation ------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- shall henceforth be known as ----------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Son of / Daughter of------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------- for the purpose of correction of wrong entries occurred in
School Records due to parental mistake.
Station: Signature.
Dated:
(Previous name in block letters)

Notice to otherside in unnumbered suit- The condonation of the delay in re-presentation of the plaint is strictly a matter between the court, on the one hand, and the suitor, who has filed the proceedings on the order. At that stage and for those limited purposes, persons, who are proposed as the opposite parties in the plaint really have no locus standi. They cannot have any say in the matter of delay or its condonation

Madras High Court
Madras High Court
S. Mahalingam And Ors. vs Nedungadi Bank Limited, ... on 28 December, 1995
Equivalent citations: (1996) 2 MLJ 158
Author: Thanikkachalam
ORDER
Thanikkachalam, J.

1. This civil revision is directed against the order passed in I.A. No. 199 of 1987 in an unnumbered plaint, by the Principal Subordinate Judge, Madurai. Defendants 3 to 6 in the un-numbered plaint are the petitioners herein. The plaintiff filed a suit against the defendants to recover a sum of Rs. 47,493.65 with interest at the rate of 20 per cent per annum. The plaintiff is Nedungadi Bank Limited, Madurai. The plaint was returned due to certain defects as pointed out by the office of the court of the Principal Sub Judge, Madurai. The plaint could not be re-presented within the time stipulated. There was a delay of 633 days in re-presenting the plaint.The matter came up by way of check slip before the Principal Sub Judge, Madurai. The advocate appearing for the plaintiff filed an affidavit stating that the plaint was returned and return was taken. In his office the plaint and other connected papers got mixed up with other papers. When the papers relating to one Periyathambi Velar were returned to him, the plaint in the present case as well as the connected papers were also inadvertently returned along with the papers belonging to the said Periyathambi Velar. A day prior to the filing of the petition for condonation of delay, the said Periyathambi Velar brought back the plaint in the present case and other papers and handed over the same to the counsel for the plaintiff by stating that the plaint and other papers belonging to the Nedungadi Bank were given along with his papers and he was able to find out the same only now and therefore he is returning the papers relating to the Nedungadi Bank to the counsel for the plaintiff. The said Periyathambi Velar also filed an affidavit to the abovesaid effect. The lower court issued notice to the defendants in the plaint.



5. The point for consideration is:
Whether the defendants in an un-numbered plaint can question the power of the court to condone the delay in re-presenting the un-numbered plaint?
6. A Division Bench of this Court in Y. Kusbar v. Subbarayan 1993 T.L.N.J. 375, while considering a case of similar nature held as under:
This is not a case where the appeal has been filed out of time. This is a case in which the appeal is filed in time. Therefore it cannot be said that the decree under appeal has assumed finality and the right has been accrued to the respondents. The delay in re-presentation of the papers in the instant case cannot be put to the account of the party. Several times it happens due to the mistake on the part of the advocate's clerk or the advocates in presenting the appeal. Therefore the court has to take care to see that the justice does not suffer in such cases. If there is any undue delay in re-presentation of the papers it can be compensated by awarding costs. Therefore we are of the view that when the appeal has been filed in time, but there is delay in re-presentation of the papers returned for rectification of the defects by the appellate court, the delay can be condoned on taking a lenient view by compensating the other side on payment of costs.
7. A similar question came up for consideration before this Court in General Manager, H.V.F., Avadi v.
Shadrak 1978 T.L.N.J. 332, wherein this Court held as under:

There is a clear distinction between the delay in re-presentation of a proceeding and the delay in
re-presentation of the papers with reference thereto. In view of the basic difference between the two, the consideration relevant to the former will not apply to the latter and an application for excusing the delay in re-presenting the papers, if any, proceeding whether it be a suit a civil revision petition, first appeal or a second appeal in any court, notice to the respondent in the main case is not necessary and even if such notice is given to the respondent and he is heard and over ruling his objection, the delay is condoned, he cannot be said to have been aggrieved in the sense that there being a judicial determination against him so as to entitle him to approach the High Court under Section 115, C.P.C.
In the abovesaid decision, it was further held" that in this context the difference between the condonation of delay in the proper presentation of a particular proceedings pursuant, to Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the condonation of delay in representation of a particular proceeding obviously under Section 151, C.P.C. has to be noticed. In the former case there is a specific provision in the statute viz., the Limitation Act, which imposes an obligation on the court itself suo motu, to reject proceeding if it is barred by limitation. The decision is not available or applicable to a case of delay in the re-presentation of the papers in question.
Consequently, the provision and consideration applicable to excusing the delay under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act will not apply to the question of excusing the delay in representing the papers.
8. So also in Khallur Rahman v. Rajagopal Gounder 1983 T.L.N.J. 37, this Court, while considering the delay in re-presentation of the plaint held as under:
There was a delay on the part of the plaintiffs to re-present the plaint, which was returned by the court for some compliance. When re-presenting the plaint after delay, the plaintiffs filed an affidavit explaining the reasons therefor. The court was satisfied with the plaintiffs' explanation and accepted the plaint on re-presentation after excusing the delay. This civil revision petition has been brought by parties, who are named as defendants in the plaint. The suit has not yet been numbered. Because the plaintiffs committed an indiscretion in giving notice to them of their application for excusing the delay was considered by the court below after notice to the parties, who figured as defendants, naturally those individuals had the opportunity of making their representation against the plaint being re-presented after delay. The court below having heard them had gone into their objections only to over-rule them. The fact that the court below had gone into their objections itself might be regarded as a good ground for dismissing the present civil revision petition filed by
those parties, for that shows that the court did not shut them out. But I wish to affirm the order of the lower court on a broader principle, a principle which goes counter to the procedure adopted by the court in this case." It was further held that, "the parties proposed to be added as defendants to the suit, in my judgment, do not have any locus standi to figure in the preliminaries before the suit gets numbered and suit summons goes to them. Admission of the plaint is the court's job. The condonation of the delay in re-presentation of the plaint is strictly a matter between the court, on the one hand, and the suitor, who has filed the proceedings on the order. At that stage and for those limited purposes, persons, who are proposed as the opposite parties in the plaint really have no locus standi. They cannot have any say in the matter of delay or its condonation.
9. A similar question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantang v. Katiji , while considering the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Supreme Court held as under:
The Legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits." The expression "sufficient cause employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other
courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that:
S(1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
(2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
(3) Every days' delay must be explained does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made, Why not every hour's delay every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
(4) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in justice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
(5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
(6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
10. But, however in M. Subramania Mudaliar v. Janardhanam (1994)1 M.L.J. 152 a Division Bench of this Court, while considering the request to condone the delay of six years in re-presentation, held that the reasons given by the Junior advocate for condonation of delay in re-presentation of six years are not convincing. Therefore the delay was not excused.
11. The above decision was rendered on the facts and circumstances arising in that case. In the present case, there was a delay of 633 days in re-presenting the plaint. The advocate for the plaintiff filed an affidavit stating that the plaint in question along with other papers, was wrongly returned to one of his clients inadvertently. The person, who took away the plaint in the present case returned back the papers after he came to know that he has wrongly taken away the plaint belonging to Nedungadi Bank. Immediately the advocate for the plaintiff re-presented the plaint with a petition to condone the delay in re-presentation. A supporting affidavit was also filed by the person, who took away the plaint along with his papers stating that after he found that the plaint belonging to Nedungadi Bank was returned to him wrongly, he returned back the said plaint to his advocate. The reasons given by the plaintiff's advocate were accepted by the trial court and the delay in re-presentation was excused. However, this order was passed by the lower court after issuing notice to the defendants in the plaint and after hearing them. Since the notices were sent to the defendants and an order was passed after hearing them, they came forward with the present revision, being aggrieved over the order passed by the trial court in excusing the delay in re-presentation. Therefore, it cannot be said that the revision filed by the petitioners herein is not maintainable If the lower court wants to dispose of the application filed to condone the delay in representation, it could have done so without notice to the defendants
in the un-numbered plaint, since the condonation of delay in re-presentation is a matter between the court and the plaintiff. But the lower court thought fit to issue notice to the defendants in the unnumbered plaint and after hearing them a final order was passed in condoning the delay, accepting the reasons given by the counsel for the plaintiff. Under such circumstances, I consider that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the trial Court in condoning the delay in re-presenting the plaint. Accordingly, this Court does not want to interfere with the order passed by the lower court in I. A. No. 199 of 1987. 12. In the result, the order passed by the trial court in I.A. No. 199 of 1987 in condoning the delay in
representing the plaint is in order and this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs.

S. Mahalingam And Ors. vs Nedungadi Bank Limited, ... on 28 December, 1995
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/402007/ 4

Apex Court summarise the situations, wherein recoveries by the employers, would be impermissible in law:

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11527 OF 2014
(Arising out of SLP(C) No.11684 of 2012)
State of Punjab and others etc. … Appellants
versus
Rafiq Masih (White Washer) etc. … Respondent(s)

 J U D G M E N T
Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.

Paras 1,2,3 and 12 of the Judgment
1. Leave granted.
2. All the private respondents in the present bunch of cases, were given monetary benefits, which were in excess of their entitlement. These benefits flowed to them, consequent upon a mistake committed by the concerned competent authority, in determining the emoluments payable to them. The mistake could have occurred on account of a variety of reasons; including the grant of a status, which the concerned employee was not entitled to; or payment of salary in a higher scale, than in consonance of the right of the concerned employee; or because of a wrongful fixation of salary of the employee, consequent upon the upward revision of pay-scales; or for having been granted allowances, for which the concerned employee was not authorized. The long and short of the matter is, that all the private respondents were beneficiaries of a mistake committed by the employer, and on account of the said unintentional mistake, employees were in receipt of monetary benefits, beyond their due.
3. Another essential factual component in this bunch of cases is, that the respondent-employees were not guilty of furnishing any incorrect information, which had led the concerned competent authority, to commit the mistake of making the higher payment to the employees. The payment of higher dues to the private respondents, in all these cases, was not on account of any misrepresentation made by them, nor was it on account of any fraud committed by them. Any participation of the private respondents, in the mistake committed by the employer, in extending the undeserved monetary benefits to the respondent-employees, is totally ruled out. It would therefore not be incorrect to record, that the private respondents, were as innocent as their employers, in the wrongful determination of their inflated emoluments.


12. It is not possible to postulate all situations of hardship, which would govern employees on the issue of recovery, where payments have mistakenly been made by the employer, in excess of their entitlement. Be that as it may, based on the decisions referred to herein above, we may, as a ready reference, summarise the following few situations, wherein recoveries by the employers, would be impermissible in law:
(i) Recovery from employees belonging to Class-III and Class-IV service (or Group ‘C’ and Group ‘D’ service).
(ii) Recovery from retired employees, or employees who are due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery.
(iii) Recovery from employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued.
(iv) Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid accordingly, even though he should have rightfully been required to work against an inferior post.
(v) In any other case, where the Court arrives at the conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer’s right to recover.
13. We are informed by the learned counsel representing the appellant-State of Punjab, that all the cases in this bunch of appeals, would undisputedly fall within the first four categories delineated hereinabove. In the appeals referred to above, therefore, the impugned orders passed by
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana (quashing the order of recovery), shall be deemed to have been upheld, for the reasons recorded above.14. The appeals are disposed of in the above terms.
…..…………………………….J.
(Jagdish Singh Khehar)
…..…………………………….J.
(Arun Mishra)
New Delhi;
December 18, 2014.

Successive bail applications shall be disposed by the same judge-Apex Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2335 OF 2014
[Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 8355 of 2014]
Jagmohan Bahl & Anr. ... Appellants
Versus
State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. ... Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.



Para 9 on wards of the Judgment

In this context, we may refer with profit to the
decision in Shahzad Hasan Khan V. Ishtiaq Hasan
Khan and Anr3 wherein this Court took note of the fact
that three successive bail applications made on behalf of
the accused had been rejected and disposed of finally by
one Judge of the High Court. However, another learned
Judge, despite being aware of the situation, granted bail to
the respondent. In that context, this Court held that long
standing convention and judicial discipline requires bail
application to be placed before the learned Judge who had
passed earlier orders. Proceeding further this Court
observed:
“...... The convention that subsequent bail
application should be placed before the same
Judge who may have passed earlier orders has
its roots in principle. It prevents abuse of process
of court inasmuch as an impression is not
created that a litigant is shunning or selecting a
1 (2012) 9 SCC 446
2 Crl. Appeal No. 2587 of 2014 (judgment pronounced on 16.12.2014)
3 (1987) 2 SCC 684
7
court depending on whether the court is to his
liking or not, and is encouraged to file successive
applications without any new factor having
cropped up. If successive bail applications on the
same subject are permitted to be disposed of by
different Judges there would be conflicting orders
and a litigant would be pestering every Judge till
he gets an order to his liking resulting in the
credibility of the court and the confidence of the
other side being put in issue and there would be
wastage of courts’ time. Judicial discipline
requires that such matters must be placed before
the same Judge, if he is available for orders.
Since Justice Kamleshwar Nath was sitting in
court on June 23, 1986 the respondent’s bail
application should have been placed before him
for orders”.
10. In State of Maharashtra V. Captain Buddhikota
Subha Rao4, the Court, placing reliance on Shahzad
Hasan Khan (supra), opined that:
“...... In such a situation the proper course, we
think, is to direct that the matter be placed
before the same learned Judge who disposed of
the earlier applications. Such a practice or
convention would prevent abuse of the process of
court inasmuch as it will prevent an impression
being created that a litigant is avoiding or
selecting a court to secure an order to his liking.
Such a practice would also discourage the filing
of successive bail applications without change of
circumstances. Such a practice if adopted would
be conducive to judicial discipline and would also
save the court’s time as a judge familiar with the
4 (1989) Supp (2) SCC 605
8
facts would be able to dispose of the subsequent
application with despatch. It will also result in
consistency”.
11. In M. Jagan Mohan Rao v. P.V. Mohan Rao5, this
Court reiterating the principle laid down in Shahzad
Hasan Khan (supra), Buddhikota Subha Rao (supra) and
Harjit Singh V. State of Punjab6 held as under:
“In view of the principle laid down by this Court,
since the learned Judge who had refused bail in
the first instance was available, the matter
should have been placed before him. This Court
has indicated that such cases of successive bail
applications should be placed before the same
Judge who had refused bail in the first instance,
unless that Judge is not available”.
12. In this context, we may refer to a two-Judge Bench
decision in Vikramjit Singh V. State of Madhya
Pradesh7, wherein bail granted by one Judge of the High
Court was cancelled by another Judge. This Court, on
being moved by the accused, opined that such a practice is
not consistent with judicial discipline which is expected to
be maintained by courts. Proceeding further, the Court
observed:-
5 (2010) 15 SCC 491
6 (2002) 1 SCC 649
7 AIR 1992 SC 474
9
“..... Otherwise, a party aggrieved by an order
passed by one Bench of the High Court would be
tempted to attempt to get the matter re-opened
before another Bench, and there would not be
any end to such attempts. Besides, it was not
consistent with the judicial discipline which
must be maintained by Courts both in the
interest of administration of justice by assuring
the binding nature of an order which becomes
final, and the faith of the people in the judiciary.”
13. On a perusal of the aforesaid authorities, it is clear to
us that the learned Judge, who has declined to entertain
the prayer for grant of bail, if available, should hear the
second bail application or the successive bail applications.
It is in consonance with the principle of judicial decorum,
discipline and propriety. Needless to say, unless such
principle is adhered to, there is enormous possibility of
forum-shopping which has no sanction in law and
definitely, has no sanctity. If the same is allowed to prevail,
it is likely to usher in anarchy, whim and caprice and in
the ultimate eventuate shake the faith in the adjudicating
system. This cannot be allowed to be encouraged. In this
regard we may refer to the pronouncement in Chetak
Construction Ltd. V. Om Prakash and others8, wherein
8 (1998) 4 SCC 577
10
this Court has observed that a litigant cannot be permitted
“choice” of the “forum” and every attempt at
“forum-shopping” must be crushed with a heavy hand. In
Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare
Association V. S.C. Sekar and others9, it has been
observed that the superior courts of this country must
discourage forum-shopping.
14. Though the said decisions were rendered in different
context, the principle stated therein is applicable to the
case of present nature. Unscrupulous litigants are not to
be allowed even to remotely entertain the idea that they can
engage in forum-shopping, depreciable conduct in the field
of law.
15. In the instant case, when the Additional Sessions
Judge-6 had declined to grant the bail application, the next
Additional Sessions Judge-04 should have been well
advised to place the matter before the same Judge.
However, it is the duty of the prosecution to bring it to the
notice of the concerned Judge that such an application was
rejected earlier by a different Judge and he was available.
9 (2009) 2 SCC 784
11
In the entire adjudicatory process, the whole system has to
be involved. The matter would be different if a Judge has
demitted the office or has been transferred. Similarly, in
the trial court, the matter would stand on a different
footing, if the Presiding Officer has been superannuated or
transferred. The fundamental concept is, if the Judge is
available, the matter should be heard by him. That will
sustain the faith of the people in the system and nobody
would pave the path of forum-shopping, which is decryable
in law.
16. Having said what we have stated hereinabove, the
natural corollary would have been to set aside the order as
it has been passed in an illegal manner. Ordinarily we
would have issued that direction but, a significant one, in
the present case, the allegations, as we find, are quite
different. The FIR was instituted under Section 420/34
IPC and relates to execution of an agreement. In such a
situation, we do not intend to set aside the order and direct
the appellants to move a fresh application for bail under
Section 438 CrPC. We are only inclined to direct that the
12
bail order granted in their favour shall remain in force and
the appellants shall abide by the terms and conditions
imposed by the Court and would not deviate from any of
the conditions.
17. Consequently, we dispose of the appeal concurring
with the reasoning given by the High Court, but in the facts
and circumstances of the case, we set aside the direction
cancelling the order of bail.
........................................J.
[DIPAK MISRA]
........................................J.
[UDAY UMESH LALIT]
NEW DELHI
DECEMBER 18, 2014.

Section 50 -Valuation of Suits- Jurisdicton of Courts

Andhra High Court

Kalla Yadagiri And Others vs Kotha Bal Reddy on 13 November, 1994

Equivalent citations: 1999 (1) ALD 222, 1999 (1) ALT 211

Author: B. Subhashan Reddy

Bench: U C Banerjee, B Reddy, Chelameswar

ORDER B. Subhashan Reddy, J

1. The question at issue is whether the provisions of the A.P. Civil Courts Act, 1972 deal with thevaluation of suits determining pecuniary jurisdiction overriding the provisions contained in the A.P. Court Fees & Suits Valuation Act, 1956. The matter is of practical importance and the reference has been made to the Full Court to resolve the divergence of opinion.

2. We may narrate the events leading to the reference. This CRP 4858 of J994 first came up before the learned single Judge. It is directed against the order passed by the Court of Subordinate Judge,  Siddipet in OS No.72 of 1994 on preliminary objection raised by the defendants in the said suit, who are the petitioners herein. The objection was with regard to jurisdiction on the ground that the value of the subject matter of the suit was shown as Rs.68,000/- and the relief of declaration and consequential injunction under Section 24(b) of A.P. Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956  (hereinafter referred to as "the Court Fees Act") was mentioned as Rs.34,000/- being half of the value of the properties involved in the said suit. The contention of the petitioners was that, it is not the value of the properties which determines the jurisdiction, but it is the value of the relief which has to be constmcd as the value of the suit determining the jurisdiction. This contention was repelled by the lower Court and it was held that the said Court had jurisdiction construing the value of the properties involved which was at Rs.68,0007 - as the value of the suit determining the jurisdiction, relying upon a judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in G. Venkataratnam v.G, Kesuva RaO, 1991 (1) APLJ 485. The question there was with regard to jurisdiction of the High Court to maintain the appeal and Section 17(1) of A.P. Civil Courts Act (for short "the Civil Courts Act") was construed to the effect that the entire value of the property is relevant for the purpose of determining jurisdiction under the above provision and not 3/4th of the value of the subject-matter as in Section 24 read with Section 50(1) of the Court Fees Act. It is pertinent to mention that the value of the property in the said suit was arrived at Rs. 18,000/- and the Court-fees was paid on the amount of Rs. 13,500/- being three-fourth of the said value under Section 24(a) of Court Fees Act and Rs.13,500/- was construed as the value of the suit and was tried by the Court of the Subordinate Judge and the Registry had raised objection that the appeal has to be valued tat Rs. 13,500/- and according to the then existing provisions of Civil Courts Act, the appeal was maintainable only before the District Court and not the High Court, but the learned single Judge overruled the objections of the Registry holding that for appeal under Section 17(1) of Civil Courts Act, it is the entire value of the property of Rs. 18,000/- which is the criterion and not the three-fourth of the  same as was construed in the suit. The learned Judge did not rely upon Section 5(1) of the Court Fees Act on the ground that Section 17(1) of Civil Courts Act made a specific provision and as such, the said provision will prevail. There is an earlier Division Bench judgment of this Court quite contra to the view taken by the learned single Judge. But, the same was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge. The earlier judgment of the Division Bench was rendered in the case of Sidramappa v. Sangappa, . Dealing with the provisions ofthe Court Fees Act and particularly, Section 50(1), it  was held by the Division Bench that it is the valuation which is mentioned in the suit for the purpose of paying Courf-fees that determines the jurisdiction of the Court and not the value of the property involved.

3. When this CRP came-up for hearing, having regard to the divergent views of the learned single Judge on one hand and of the Division Bench on the other, the learned single Judge was of the prima facie view that the judgment of 1991 may be a good law. But, as there is a Division Bench judgment to the contra, the learned single Judge has referred the matter to the Division Bench and the Division Bench because of the conflict, thought it fit to refer to the Bench of a larger strength for resolving the conflict. May be, both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench were of the view that Section 16 of Civil Courts Act lays down the criteria for valuation of the suit and that  Section 50(1) of the Court Fees Act being general and is subject to any specific provision made to the contrary, the market value of the property is the criterion and not the value of the suit made for the payment of the Court-fees.

4. While the learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment in Sidramappa's v case (supra) and asked us to set aside the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge and to transmit the matter to the concerned District Munsif, the learned Counsel for the respondents supported the order of the lower Court.

5. As the matter is of utmost importance, as it occurs daily in all the subordinate Courts of the State of Andhra Pradesh, there should not be any confusion left in the minds of either the litigant public or the advocates appearing for them with regard to the jurisdiction which results in multiplicity of  proceedings and long-drawn litigations. While deciding the case of this magnitude, reference to a single provision either in the Court Fees Act or in the Civil Courts Act will not do and the object, purpose and scope of legislations i.e., Civil Courts Act and the Court Fees Act have to be gone into in detail. What are the aspects of the respective legislations have also to be gone into. It is also to be seen as to whether there is any overlapping of the said aspects or as to whether subject matter of each of the Act is separate and distinct. It is needless to mention that the provisions of the Civil  Procedure Code and particularly, Section 6, only say that no Court shall try a cause beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction. The limits of pecuniary jurisdiction arc not stated in the said provision. That task is taken up by the Civil Courts Act, 1972. Before enacting the above law, Telangana area, a part of the erstwhile State of Hyderabad was being governed by the provisions of Hyderabad Civil Courts Act, while the Andhra area, carved out of erstwhile Madras State and forming separate State of Andhra, was being governed by the provisions of the Madras Civil Courts Act. While in Hyderabad Civil Courts Act, the original suits were tried by the Munsif Court with pecuniary jurisdiction upto Rs.5000/-, the Subordinate Judges were invested to deal the suits with pecuniary jurisdiction over  Rs.5000/- but upto Rs.20,000/-. District Court had unlimited jurisdiction over Rs.20,000/-. In Madras Civil Courts Act, while pecuniary jurisdiction was prescribed for Munsif Magistrate upto a  limit, the Court of Subordinate Judge was having unlimited jurisdiction. Occasionally, the suits were being withdrawn to the Court of the District Judge. By repealing both the Acts, as also the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Small Causes Courts Act, 1313 Fasli, the A.P. Civil Courts Act, 1972 (Act No.19 of 1972) was enacted. The said Act originally followed the pattern of Madras Civil Courts Act. But, a later amendment effective from December, 1997 (A.P. Act No.29 of 1997) created a three-tier system for trying the original civil matters with Munsifs (upto Rs.1,00,000/-), Subordinate Judges (above Rs.1,00,000/- and upto Rs.5,00,000/-) and District Judges (unlimited jurisdiction above Rs.5 lakhs). Section 3 speaks of establishment of a City Civil Court for the District of Hyderabad and appointment of Judges to the said Court like Chief Judge, Additional Chief Judges, Additional Judges of the rank of Subordinate Judge and Assistant Judges of the rank of District Munsif. The jurisdiction of the Judges of the City Civil Court in original suits and other proceedings is earmarked in Section 5 of the Act. Section 6 speaks of distribution of work in the City Civil Court. Section 9 prescribes forum for filing appeals against the orders/decisions rendered by the City Civil Court. Part-Ill comprises of the establishment and constitution of Courts in Districts other than the District of Hyderabad. Section 10 deals with establishment of District Courts, Section 1 1 deals with appointment of Additional District Judges, Section 12 deals with establishment of the Courts of  Subordinate Judges and District Munsifs, Section 13 deals with the appointment of Principal and Additional Sub-ordinate Judges and District Munsifs, Section 14 deems the existing Courts as the  one constituted under the Act. Section 15 deals with the territorial limits of the District Courts, Subordinate Courts and District Munsifs. Section 16 deals with the jurisdiction of the above Courts in original suits and other proceedings. Section 17 deals with appeals against the orders/decisions rendered by the Courts mentioned in Section 16. Section 18 deals with the establishment of Courts  for Subordinate Judges for two or more districts. Section 19 deals with the exercise by Subordinate Judge of jurisdiction of District Judge in certain proceedings. Section 21 prescribes the places for the  sitting of the Courts. Section 22 prescribes the Court working days, Section 23 vests the District Judge with control over all Courts in a District, Section 24 confers power of small causes jurisdiction. Section 26 deals with the administration of law by Courts in deciding questions regarding succession, inheritance, marriage etc. Section 28 deals with the temporary discharge of  the duties of the District Judge or the Chief Judge, City Civil Court. Section 29 requires witness or party to suit to make oath or affirmation. Section 30 envisages duties of ministerial officers of the Court. Section 31 prescribes the limit of vacation as two months in a year. Section 32 deals with appointment of a Vacation Civil Judge during vacation. Section 33 empowers the High Court to receive suits and appeals when no Vacation Civil Judge is appointed.

6. The title of the Court Fees Act is "The Andhra Pradesh Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956" and it has to be borne in mind that it deals with the valuation of the suits as also the quantum of Court-fees payable thereon. It is a law relating lo Court-fees and valuation of the suit in the State of  Andhra Pradesh. "Court" is defined under Section 3(ii) as any Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court and includes a Tribunal or other authority having jurisdiction under any special or local law to decide  questions affecting the rights of parties. Section 4 deals with the levy of fees in Courts and public offices. Section 5 deals with the collection of proper fees on documents. Section 6 deals with the  multifarious suits, Section 7 deals with the determination of market value as on the date of the presentation of the plaint, Section 8 deals with the set-off or counterclaim and levying the fees in the  same manner as a plaint. Section 10 requires the statement of particulars of subject matter of suit and plaintiff's valuation thereof and Section 11 invests the Courts to decide as to proper fees. Section  12 deals with the relinquisliment of portion of claim, Section 13 deals with the fees payable on written statements, Section 14 deals with fees payable on appeals, Section 15 deals with fees payable  on petitions, applications etc. Section 16 confers powers on Court-fee Examiners relating to valuation of subject matter and sufficiency of fees, Section 17 provides for enquiry and Commission  for the purpose of deciding whether the subject matter of a suit or civil proceeding has been properly valued and whether the fees paid is sufficient. Section 18 contemplates notice to the State Government in any enquiry relating to the fees payable on the plaint, written statement, petition, memorandum of appeal or other document relates insofar as such valuation affects the fees payable. Chapter IV deals with computation of fees and Section 19 says that the fees payable under this Act shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of the said Chapter, as also Chapter V11I and 

Schedules I and II. Section 20 deals with suits for money and the fees shall be computed on the

amount claimed. Section 21 deals with suits for immovable property and fees is computed on 

three-fourths of the market value of the property, subject to other provisions of the Act. Section 22

deals with suits for maintenance and annuities and in a suit for maintenance, the fees payable is on 

the amount claimed for one year and insofar as the annuities are concerned, on five times the

amount claimed to be payable for one year. Section 23 deals with suits for movable property and 

where the subject matter has a market value, on such value or where the subject matter has no

market value on the amount at which such relief sought is valued in the plaint or at which such relief 

is valued by the Court, whichever is higher. Section 24 deals with suits for declaration coupled with

possession or consequential injunction. Section 25 deals with the adoption suits and the fees is 

computed on one-half of the market value of the movable and immovable property involved in, or

affected by such declaration or on Rs.500/- whichever is higher. Section 26 deals with injunction

suits and under subsection (a) if the plaintiffs title to the property is denied, fees shall be computed

on one-half of the market value of the property or on Rs.200/- whichever is higher and under 

subsection (b), where the relief sought relates to the plaintiffs exclusive right to use, sell, print or

exhibit any mark, etc., fees shall be computed on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in

the plaint or at which such relief is valued by the Court, whichever is higher and under sub-section

(c) whether the subject matter of the suit has the market value or not, fees shall be paid on the 

amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or at which such relief is valued by the

Court, whichever is higher. Section 27 deals with suits relating to trust property and the fees shall be 

computed on one-fifth of the market value of the property subject to a maximum fees of Rs.200/- or

where the property has no market value, on rupees one thousand. Section 27 (2) is significant which 

says "Where the property has no market value, value for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction

of Courts shall be the amount stated in the plaint." Section 28 deals with suits for possession under

the Specific Relief Act and the fees shall be computed on one-half of the market value of the property

or Rs.200/- whichever is higher. Section 29 deals with suits for possession not otherwise provided 

for and the fees shall be computed on three-fourths of the market value of the property or on Rupees

3007- whichever is higher. Section 30 deals with suits relating to easements, be it dominant or the

servient owner, fees shall be paid on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or

at which such relief is valued by the Court, whichever is higher. Section 31 deals with suits relating

to mortgages and the fees shall be computed on the amount claimed. Section 32 deals with suits for

accounts and the fees shall be paid on the amount estimated in the plaint, of course, if there is

excess amount determined over the ascertained amount, then for the difference, the Court-fees has

to be paid. Section 33 deals with suit for dissolution of partnership and the fees shall be computed

on the value of the plaintiffs share in the partnership as estimated by the plaintiff. Under subsection

(2) of Section 33, the plaintiff has to deposit the difference for the purpose of final decree and under

sub-section (3), no final decree shall be passed in favour of the defendant until the fees computed on

the amount or the value of his share is paid. Section 34 deals with partition suits and under

sub-section (I), the fees shall be computed on the market value of the movable property or

three-fourths of the market value of the immovable property included in the plaintiffs share. Under

sub-section (2) which deals with the joint possession, fees shall be paid at the following rates:When the plaint is presented to:

(i) a District Munsif's Rupees fifty Court(ii) a Subordinate Judges Rupees one hundred

Court or a District Court if the value of theplaintiffs share is lessthanRs.10,000/-.Rupees two hundred,

if the value is not lessthanRs.10,000/-.Section 35 deals with suit for joint possession and the fees shall be computed on the market value ofthe movable property or three-fourths of the market value of the immovable property included in the plaintiffs share. Section 36 deals with the administration suits and the fees is levied on the plaint at the rates specified in Section 47. Section 37 deals with suits for cancellation of decrees. Fees shall be computed on the value of the subject matter of the suit and such value shall be deemed to be (a) if the whole decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, the amount or value of the property  for which the decree was passed or other document was executed; (b) if a part of the decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, such part of the amount or value of the property. Section 37(2)  says that if the decree or other document is such that the liability under it cannot be split-up and the relief claimed relates only to particular item of property belonging to the plaintiff or to the plaintiff's  share in any such property, tecs shall be computed on the value of such property or share or on the amount of (he decree, whichever is less. Section 38 deals with suits to set aside attachment and the fees shall be computed on the amount for which the property was attached or on one-fourth of the market value of the property attached, whichever is less. Section 39 deals with the suit for specific performance. In sub-section (a), fees is computed on the amount of consideration in a contract of sale, under sub-section (b), it is computed on the amount agreed to be secured by the mortgage in a 

contract of mortgage, under subsection (c), it is computed on the aggregate amount of the penalty or

premium and of the average of the annual rent agreed to be paid in a contract of lease and under subsection (d) in the case of a contract of exchange, it is computed on the amount of consideration

or as the case may be, on the market value of the movable property or three-fourths of the market 

value of the immovable property sought to be taken in exchange and under sub-section (e) in other

cases, where the consideration for the promise sought to be enforced has a market value, the fees is 

computed on the market value of the property or three-fourths of the market value of the immovable

property or where such consideration has no market value, at the rates specified under Section 47. 

Section 40 deals with suits between landlords and tenants and the Court-fees is on the amount of

rent for the immovable property to which the suit relates payable for the year next before the date of 

presenting the plaint. The rent includes damages for use and occupation payable by a tenant holding

over. Under Section 42, in a suit under A.P. Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923, fees shall be 

computed on one-half of the market value of the property affected by the determination of the

boundary or on Rs.300/- whichever is higher. Section 43 deals with suits to alter or cancel entry in a 

register and the fixed fees payable is Rs.15. The said suit deals with alteration or cancellation of any

entry in a register of the names of proprietors of revenue paying estates. Under Section 44, suits 

relating to public matters, the fees payable shall be Rs.50 and under Section 45 which is an

inter-pleader suit, fees shall be payable on the plaint at the rates specified in Section 47. Subsection 

(3) of Section 45 is important as it states "Value for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of

Courts shall be the amount of the debt, or the sum of money or the market value of the movable 

property or three-fourths of the market value of the immovable property to which the suit relates."

Chapter V comprising of Sections 50 and 51 under caption "Valuation of Suits" will be dealt with 

later. Chapter VI deals with Probates, Letters of Administration and Certificates of Administration,

while Chapter VII deals with refunds and remissions and Chapter VIII contains miscellaneous 

provisions. The repeal and savings clause is contained under Section 79 and the Court Fees Act,

1870 (Central enactment) and the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 (Central Act) were repealed so far as the 

application of the said statutes in the State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned. 

7. As seen from the above, the subject-matter of Civil Courts Act is constitution of several civil 

Courts investing them with jurisdiction to try all suits/matters of civil nature within certain

pecuniary and territorial limits and allied matters mentioned above, for the administration of civil

Justice. The grading of the Courts in their hierarchy has reference to the pecuniary and territorial

limits rather than to Ihe nature and kind of the subject matter which they are empowered to deal

with. The Civil Courts Act does not make any attempt to define as to what is the value of the suit or

the subject matter of the civil proceeding. It does not also attempt to prescribe the manner and 

mode of valuation of the suits or Court-fees payable thereon. The true aspect of the Civil Courts Act

is to establish the Courts, appoint the Presiding Officer thereto, spell out the working days and also

limit the vacation in a calendar year and provide Ihe territorial and pecuniary limits of each of the

hierarchy of Courts with corresponding provisions for appellate jurisdiction. Mode and manner of

valuation of the subject matter of civil cause is outside the purview of the civil Courts Act and mere

compliance of provisions of Civil Courts Act will not lead us anywhere, as mode, manner and method of valuation and the Court-Fees to be collected thereon have got to be determined and that

is done only by one statute i.e. The Court Fees Act, which in fact, is anterior to the Civil Courts Acl,

1972. If the Civil Courts Act wanted to explain the provisions of the Court Fees Act or to make a

departure, the same would have been certainly stated in the Civil Courts Act. Bui, the said

Legislation did not choose to do so. As such, for the administration of Justice to be carried out,

implementation of both the Acts i.e., Court Fees Act and the Civil Courts Act is necessary and in the

absence of either of the Acts, the Administration of Justice would be at stand-still, for, the Court

Fees Act is unworkable in isolation, as it will only determine the value of the suit and the Court-fees

payable thereon without prescribing the forum to receive and adjudicate the cause and likewise,

Civil Courts Act in isolation will be rendered otiose for the reason that no valuation can be done for

the purpose of conferring jurisdiction. As such, both the Acts, though, independent in their scope,

are inter-dependent for the administration of Justice. The words "amount or value of the subject

matter" in conjunction with words "suits and proceedings" under Section 16(2) of Civil Courts Act

do not connote the entire value of the property involved, be it movable or immovable or right

attached to the same. What Section 15 prescribes is the territorial jurisdiction and Section 16

prescribes only the pecuniary jurisdiction and while the territorial jurisdiction is one prescribed by a

notification issued for that purpose by the Government after consultation with the High Court, the

pecuniary jurisdiction is dependent upon the valuation of the suit to be made only under the Court

Fees Act and not otherwise. Section 17 deals with filing of the appeal and there also the words "amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding" aremenlioned.

8. What decides the jurisdiction with regard to a particular case is the nature of the claim as brought. The plaintiff is bound to assess the relief he claims on the basis of the benefit he seeks to obtain by filing of the suit. For instance, in a suit for redemption of mortgage, the valuation is on the amount due to the mortgagee, which is the value of the relief and the suit is'not valued taking the value of the property. So also, in the case of foreclosure, the relief is valued on the basis of the total amount due and not of the value of the property mortgaged. In a suit for partition of joint family property, the value for the purpose of jurisdiction is the value of the share claimed by the plaintiff and not of the whole estate. In a suit for injunction simplicitor, it is the value of the relief claimed and not on the value of the property involved. In a suit for eviction against the tenant, the value is the annual rental value and not the value of the property involved. In a suit for specific performance of enforcement of agreement, it is the consideration amount stated in the agreement which forms the valuation of the suit and not the value of the property on the date of the presentation of the plainl. We need not multiply the instances and suffice it to say that the proper method is to value for the Court-fees first and take that value for the purpose of jurisdiction, for, value will control the matter for Court-fees and jurisdiction. It is not the value of the thing affected that settles the value of the thing affected that settles the value of the relief sought, but it is the value of the relief sought, which determines the jurisdiction. "Subject matter" is not the same thing as property. Subject matter is the substance for adjudication and it has reference to the right which the plaintiff seeks to enforce and the valuation of the suit depends upon the value of the subject matter thereof and the

same is valued according to the A.P. Courts Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956 and not A.P. Civil

Courts Act, 1972. There arc several judicial precedents supporting our view that the value of the

relief for the purpose of Court-fees determines the jurisdiction and we need not state those plethora

of precedents and suffice it to mention a judgment of the Supreme Court directly on the point dealing with analogous provision in the Suits Valuation Act, 1887, in S.Rm.Ar.S.Sp. Sathappa

Chettiar v. S.Rm.Ar.Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, . It is apt to extract the relevant portion of the said

judgment:

"......There can be little doubt that the effect of the provisions of Section 8 is to make the value for

the purpose of jurisdiction dependent upon the value as determinable for computation of Court-fees 

and that is natural enough. The computation of Court-fees in suits falling under Section 7(iv) of the

Act depends upon the valuation that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Once the plaintiff

exercises his option and values his claim for the purpose of Court-fees, that determines the value for

jurisdiction. The value for Court-fees and the value for jurisdiction must no doubt be the same in

such cases; but it is the value of the Court-fees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance.

It is from this value that the value for jurisdiction must be detennincd. The result is that it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purposes of Court-fees that

determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and not vice versa"

9. In view of \vhat is stated supra, we hold that Section 16 of the A.P. Civil Courts Act, 1972 is not

concerned with the mode of valuation of the suits and the valuation of the suits for determining the 

jurisdiction is outside the purview of the said Act. This is equally applicable to the appeals also,

referred to in Section 17 of the above Act. Section 50 with its sub-sections (1) and (2) of the A.P.  

Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956 is the only provision dealing with the value of any suit for

the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the Courts. Likewise, the value of the appeal for the

purpose of jurisdiction is governed by only Section 49 of A.P. Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act,

1956. In the circumstances, we uphold the view taken by the Division Bench in Sidramappa v.

Sangappa (supra) and overrule the view taken by the learned single Judge in G. Venkatarattiam v. G.

Kesava Rao (supra).

10. The CRP is allowed. No costs.

Kalla Yadagiri And Others vs Kotha Bal Reddy on 13 November, 1994

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/623302/ 8

Apex Court on Vicitm Compensation-It is the duty of the Courts, on taking cognizance of a criminal offence, to ascertain whether there is tangible material to show commission of crime, whether the victim is identifiable and whether the victim of crime needs immediate financial relief, thereby granting interim compensation subject to final compensation being determined later.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 420 OF 2012

SURESH & ANR.

..... APPELLANTS

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA

..... RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J

 Para 46,

46. The amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure brought about in 2008 focused heavily on the rights of victims in a criminal trial, particularly in trials relating to sexual offences. Though the 2008

amendments left Section 357 unchanged, they introduced Section 357A under which the Court is empowered to direct the State to pay compensation to the victim in such cases where "the compensation awarded Under Section 357 is not adequate for such rehabilitation,

or where the case ends in acquittal or discharge and the victim has to be rehabilitated."

Under this provision, even if the accused is not tried but the

victim needs to be rehabilitated, the victim may request the State

or District Legal Services Authority to award him/her compensation. This provision was introduced due to the recommendations made by the

Law Commission of India in its 152nd and 154th Reports in 1994

and 1996 respectively.

13.

We are informed that 25 out of 29 State

Governments have notified victim compensation

schemes. The schemes specify maximum limit of

compensation and subject to maximum limit, the

discretion to decide the quantum has been left with the

State/District legal authorities. It has been brought to

our notice that even though almost a period of five years

has expired since the enactment of Section 357A, the

award of compensation has not become a rule and

interim compensation, which is very important, is not

being granted by the Courts. It has also been pointed

out that the upper limit of compensation fixed by some of

the States is arbitrarily low and is not in keeping with the

object of the legislation. 

14.

We are of the view that it is the duty of the Courts,

on taking cognizance of a criminal offence, to ascertain

whether there is tangible material to show commission of

crime, whether the victim is identifiable and whether the

3

Page 

37

Criminal Appeal No.420 of 2012

victim of crime needs immediate financial relief. On

being satisfied on an application or on its own motion,

the Court ought to direct grant of interim compensation,

subject to final compensation being determined later.

Such duty continues at every stage of a criminal case

where compensation ought to be given and has not been

given, irrespective of the application by the victim. At

the stage of final hearing it is obligatory on the part of

the Court to advert to the provision and record a finding

whether a case for grant of compensation has been made

out and, if so, who is entitled to compensation and how

much. Award of such compensation can be interim.

Gravity of offence and need of victim are some of the

guiding factors to be kept in mind, apart from such other

factors as may be found relevant in the facts and

circumstances of an individual case. We are also of the

view that there is need to consider upward revision in the

scale for compensation and pending such consideration

to adopt the scale notified by the State of Kerala in its

scheme, unless the scale awarded by any other State or

Union Territory is higher. The States of Andhra Pradesh,

Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya and Telangana are directed

to notify their schemes within one month from receipt of copy of this order. We also direct that a copy of this judgment be forwarded to National Judicial Academy sothat all judicial officers in the country can be imparted requisite training to make the provision operative and meaningful.15.In the present case, the impugned judgment shows that the de facto complainant, PW-2 Raman Anand, filedCriminal Revision No.1477 of 2004 for compensation tothe family members of deceased Devender Chopra andhis son Abhishek Chopra. The same has been dismissedby the High Court without any reason. In fact evenwithout such petition, the High Court ought to haveawarded compensation. There is no reason as to why thevictim family should not be awarded compensation underSection 357-A by the State. Thus, we are of the view thatthe State of Haryana is liable to pay compensation to thefamily of the deceased. We determine the interimcompensation payable for the two deaths to be rupeesten lacs, without prejudice to any other rights orremedies of the victim family in any other proceedings.16.Accordingly, while dismissing the appeal, we directthat the widow of Devender Chopra, who is mother ofdeceased Abhishek Chopra representingthefamily of the3Page 39Criminal Appeal No.420 of 2012victim be paid interim compensation of rupees ten lacs.It will be payable by the Haryana State Legal ServicesAuthority within one month from receipt of a copy of thisorder. If the funds are not available for the purpose withthe said authority, the State of Haryana will make suchfunds available within one month from the date of receiptof a copy of this judgment and the Legal ServicesAuthority will disburse the compensation within onemonth thereafter.The appeal stands disposed of accordingly...........................................J.[ V. GOPALA GOWDA ]